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Abstract
This thesis provides three essays in macroeconomics.
The first chapter analyzes trends in fertility and time allocation. Falling fertility rates
have often been linked to rising female wages. However, over the last 30 years the US
total fertility rate has been stable while female wages have continued to grow. Over the
same period, women’s hours spent on housework have declined, but men’s have increased.
A model with a shrinking gender wage gap is proposed capturing these trends. While
rising relative wages increase women’s labour supply, they also lead to a reallocation of
home production from women to men, and a higher use of labour-saving inputs. Both are
important in understanding why fertility did not decline further.
The second chapter presents a life-cycle model with heterogeneous households and
incomplete financial markets to study the implications of a reform that eliminates capital
taxation. In the economy individuals differ in terms of their gender and marital status, and
decision making within the couple is modelled as a contract under limited commitment.
When capital taxes are set to zero, there is a strong increase in wealth accumulation
that originates in dual earner households. Moreover, the policy change has important
implications for the division of resources within the family and for households’ insurance
possibilities.
The third chapter is motivated by the dramatic reshuﬄing in relative positions between
East Asian and Latin American economies. It studies the dynamic response of a two-
sector, manufacturing and agriculture, economy in the presence of import tariffs and
export subsidies on manufacturing goods, similar to those that characterized government
policy in these countries. It is shown that the response to these policies depends on the
level of productivity in the agricultural sector. Quantitative work, however, finds that
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differences in agricultural productivities themselves are key in explaining the differential
growth experiences.
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Preface
This thesis comprises three independent chapters.
In the first chapter I analyze trends in fertility and time allocation. Increases in
female employment and falling fertility rates have often been linked to rising female wages.
However, over the last 30 years the US total fertility rate has been fairly stable while
female wages have continued to grow. Over the same period, we observe that women’s
hours spent on housework have declined, but men’s have increased. I propose a model with
a shrinking gender wage gap that can capture these trends. While rising relative wages
tend to increase women’s labour supply and, due to higher opportunity cost, lower fertility,
they also lead to a partial reallocation of home production from women to men and a
higher use of labour-saving inputs into home production. I find that both these trends are
important in understanding why fertility did not decline to even lower levels. As the gender
wage gap declines, a father’s time at home becomes more important for raising children.
When the disutilities from working in the market and at home are imperfect substitutes,
fertility can stabilize, after an initial decline, in times of increasing female market labour.
That parents can acquire more market inputs into child care, is what I find important in
matching the timing of fertility. In a model extension, I show that the results are robust to
intrahousehold bargaining.
The second chapter, the result of joint work with Rigas Oikonomou, presents a life
cycle model with heterogeneous households and incomplete financial markets, to study
the implications of a reform that eliminates capital taxation. In the economy individuals
differ in terms of their gender and marital status. Drawing from the sizable literature of
the collective framework of household behaviour, we model decision making within the
couple as a contract under limited commitment. When capital taxes are set to zero there
12
is a strong increase in wealth accumulation that originates in dual earner households. We
compare our results to the standard framework where each household is a single bread
winner and find that omitting the more realistic household structure from the model can
be very misleading for policy. We use the model to study how the change in policy affects
the intrahousehold allocation and welfare within the household. We show that the policy
change we consider has important implications for the division of resources within the
family and for households’ insurance possibilities.
The third chapter draws on joint work with Francesco Caselli and John Coleman and is
motivated by the dramatic reshuﬄing in relative positions between East Asian and Latin
American economies. We study the dynamic response of a two-sector, manufacturing and
agriculture, economy in the presence of import tariffs and export subsidies on manufacturing
goods, similar to those that characterized government policy in these countries. We
show that the response to these policies depends on the level of productivity in the
agricultural sector. In our quantitative work, we find however that differences in agricultural
productivities themselves are key in explaining the differential growth experiences of
Argentina and South Korea.
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Chapter 1
Female Employment and Fertility
– The Effects of Rising Female
Wages
1.1 Introduction
Between the 1960s and today, we have seen enormous changes to the economic and
demographic structure in all Western countries. There has been a decline in total fertility
rates1 and an increase in women’s market hours (see figures 1.1 and 1.2 for US data). Many
authors explain both with a rise in female wages. An apparent puzzle, however, is that
while female wages and market hours have continued to grow, since the 1970s fertility2 has
stopped falling.3 Understanding the underlying fertility decisions is important since they
affect population growth, labor force composition and social security systems, and thereby
economic outcomes. In this paper I argue that the common driving force behind the trends
1The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children that would be born if all women lived
to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to the current age-specific birth rates.
2The total fertility rate and children ever born (CEB), a measure of completed fertility, display similar
trends. Based on US data for married women born 1826–1960, Jones and Tertilt (2008) report that CEB
and TFR, shifted by 27 years, are moving strongly together. Consistently, CPS data display since 1999
virtually constant CEB to women of age 40–44. Jones and Tertilt (2008) also document a strong decline in
fertility over the long-run; CEB to married women fell from about 5.5 children for the cohort born in 1928
to roughly 2 for the cohort of 1958.
3Most of the recent rise in the official total fertility rate is driven by the effects of immigration. For
US-born women the incline is much less and fertility virtually flat since the late 1970s. The details on the
decomposition of TFR by mothers’ birthplace are given in appendix 1.A.
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Figure 1.1: Male and female market hours
Notes: Yearly market hours worked for men and women aged 20 to 60. Source: PSID
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Figure 1.2: Total fertility rate
Notes: The dashed line shows the official total fertility rate (TFR) for the United States, the solid line the
author’s computation of TFR for US-born women; see appendix 1.A for details. Source: Vital Statistics of
the United States, combined with population estimates from the US Census.
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in fertility and in female employment is the narrowing of the gender wage gap (shown in
figure 1.3), rather than the level of female wages per se, since it changes the division of
labor within the family. Because of increasing disutilities from working at home and in the
market this reallocation has a nonlinear effect.
.
6
.
65
.
7
.
75
.
8
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Estimated Gender Wage Gap
Figure 1.3: Gender wage gap
Notes: This is computed from the regression of section 1.3.1.
My explanation is based on the observation that men’s home hours have increased,
allowing women’s home hours to fall. In the 1960s, when the wage gap was big, the
catching up of females wages increases women’s labor supply. The associated increase in
the opportunity cost of women’s time, who shoulder most of child care, lowers fertility, as
argued by Becker (1960) or Galor and Weil (1996). But as relative wages become more
equal over time, specialization in the household decreases. Consequently, male home hours
increase, a father’s time at home becomes more important for raising children, and the
allocation of time between home and market work becomes more evenly balanced for men
and women. If there is imperfect substitutability in the disutilities from working at home
and in the market, the marginal utility cost of having an additional child can become
constant, despite women working more hours in the market.
Circumstantial evidence in favor of this mechanism is provided by data on non-market
hours. Using data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007), based on the American Time Use Survey
since 1965, I show the trends in hours spent on home production, including time spent on
child care and on obtaining goods, in figure 1.4.4 The data displays a shift in household
4The measure is constructed as weekly hours spent on home production in a narrow sense, on obtaining
goods, and on basic child care. Arguably, for many people child care is an activity that is more enjoyable
than other forms of housework. Excluding child care from the measure of market work does not change the
qualitative trends. This can be seen in the regression results of table 1.8 in the appendix.
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Figure 1.4: Male and female home hours
Notes: Weekly hours spent on nonmarket work and basic child care for men and women aged 20 to 80.
Source: Aguiar and Hurst (2007), based on the American Time Use Survey
production from women to men, with an overall reduction of hours worked at home. My
findings are consistent with the earlier work of Robinson and Godbey (2008), who find,
based on time use data for 1965 to 1995, that there is convergence in activities across
gender.5
The importance of considering intrahousehold allocations can be seen in the right panels
of figure 1.4. While home hours of married men have increased over time, single men’s
hours of home production are constant, after an initial change between 1965 and 1975.
This is consistent with the explanation I propose. Single men, without a female partner,
are not affected by rising female wages, but married men spent more hours working at
home –a trend in US data that has not received much attention by researchers yet, with
the notable exception of Knowles (2007).6 Single women, on the other hand, spend less
time working at home, but the decline is not as pronounced as for married women, whose
husbands devote more of their time to home production.7
5They also report that average parental hours spent on child-care per child has been roughly constant.
Ramey and Ramey (2010), on the other hand, include time spent teaching children and document a rise
since the mid 1990s, especially for college educated parents.
6Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2007) study time use data across various developed countries, and find
that total work, the sum of home and market work, is virtually the same for men and women. For the US,
Ramey and Francis (2009) report that total work of men and women has been constant throughout the
20th century.
7In the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data marital status is defined in a legal sense, and it is not possible
to disentangle cohabiting from other singles. In figure 1.18 of the appendix I show that home hours have
changed more for singles with children, who are more likely to be cohabiting, than for singles without
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To the best of my knowledge, the only previous paper that has noted the flattening
out in total fertility rates and informally suggested an explanation in terms of increased
male home production is Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern (2008). My paper formally models
and quantifies the endogenous response of male and female hours and their implications
for fertility.8 I present a general equilibrium model matching the observed patterns of
fertility and hours worked through an exogenous decrease in the gender wage gap. In the
benchmark model I consider households maximizing the sum of male and female members
utilities. A rise in female relative wages directly increases female labor supply and lowers
female home production, whereas male time is getting devoted more to home activities and
less to market work. Initially, when the gender wage gap is big, there is an overall drop in
home labor and a couple devotes less time to having and raising children. However, when
the gender wage gap is fairly small and shrinks further, the rise in male time spent working
at home is almost big enough to keep total home labor constant. The reason for this
differential reaction to improvement in female relative wages is in the increasing marginal
disutility from working. Initially, specialization in the household meant a husband’s labor
supply was much higher than his wife’s, and therefore he was less willing to spend more
time on home production. But as relative wages become more equal, the spouses time
allocation, and thus their disutilities from working, are getting closer to each other, and
in the limit a drop in female home production is fully offset by men. To the extent that
disutilities from market and home labor are imperfect substitutes, this reallocation of hours
worked can be consistent with the couple’s utility cost of child care remaining constant.
On top of this, with the improvement in the wife’s earnings, a couple can acquire more
parental time saving inputs. Both the rise in male home labor and the higher use of
parental time-saving inputs into home production is what I find key in explaining the
flattening out of the total fertility rate.
In a model extension I show that these results are robust to intrahousehold bargaining.
Calibrated against US data, my model suggests that for the trends in fertility changing
relative wages per se are much more important than their bargaining-induced shifts in
children.
8Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern (2008) explain the increase in male home hours with intrahousehold
bargaining. I show that bargaining is not necessary; a change in relative wages per se implies not only a
reallocation of work in the market, but also at home. However, I also explore a version with intrahousehold
bargaining.
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intrahousehold allocations.
Other papers that have studied the implications of the decline in the gender wage gap
for both male and female hours are Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) and Knowles
(2007), but none of these papers has explored the implications for fertility. Galor and Weil
(1996) present a unified framework to explain the rise in female employment and the fall
in fertility that we observed until the mid 1970s. Since their mechanism links fertility
decisions to the market value of women’s disposable time9, it cannot explain why fertility
stopped falling when female wages continued improving. My work therefore highlights that
the existing literature that assumes perfect specialization within families, such that women
shoulder all of home production or child care, has overlooked important implications of
intrahousehold allocations.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Assumptions
I build a general equilibrium model of overlapping generations. Agents enter the economy
as young adults at age 20 and can have children in the first period of their lives, before
they turn 30. At age 60, agents retire, and they die deterministically at age 80. The
advantage of this modeling approach is that it incorporates an explicit age structure and
has implications for the demographic pyramid. Fertility leads to population growth and
thereby affects future labor markets and factor prices, and also social security benefits. A
complication is, I need to keep track of when children are born, as this implies when they
turn adults and leave their parent’s household. Thus, I assume for tractability that each
cohort can be represented by one representative household, formed by a representative
male and female, which can have a continuous number of children. Also the length of the
model period is motivated by tractability; a model period corresponds to 10 years.
9Other papers linking fertility decisions to the market value of women’s disposable time include Green-
wood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005) and Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz (2007).
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Agents and Households
All agents, men and women, derive utility from consumption of a market good (c) and
from having children (b), but derive disutility from working in the labor market (n) and at
home (h). They discount the future with factor β. Agents differ in terms of their gender
(g ∈ {m, f}) and their age (j). I assume that all economic active men and women live in
couple households, formed by one man (‘husband’) and one woman (‘wife’). Children live
with their parents. In other words, when children move out of their mother’s and father’s
household, they find a spouse right away and form a new couple household. To keep things
simple I assume that both spouses are of the same age and have the same deterministic
life-span, which I denote by Tl. For computational tractability, I assume that women, and
hence couples, can have children only in the first period of their (adult) life. I denote a
couple’s total number of children by b and the number of children living in their household
by bh. I assume that children leave the parental household after Ta periods. While parents
derive utility from having a child as long as they are alive themselves, households do not
leave bequests, abstracting from any further intergenerational altruism. Therefore agents
start their economic-active life (at age j = 1) with zero assets and leave no assets when
they die (at age j = Tl). Couples retire at age Tr, stop working in the market and receive
social security benefits Tss each period.
Let the absolute size of the cohort of couples of age j in period t be St(j). In period t,
the population share of the cohort aged j is then
µt(j) =
St(j)
Tl∑
k=1
St(k)
(1.1)
I apply a model of collective household behavior, as introduced by Chiappori (1988). The
male and the female partner have their own preferences, and derive felicity um and uf
respectively. Since they hold wealth jointly and have children together, they solve a joint
maximization problem. In particular, the couple household solves a Pareto program with
relative weight θ attached to the husband’s and 1− θ to the wife’s utility. In the benchmark
model, the household behaves as a unitary agent and θ = 0.5 throughout.
For the model with intrahousehold bargaining, I assume that the Pareto weight is
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determined through Nash bargaining under full commitment over the surplus generated by
marriage, where the threat point of a spouse is not entering the marriage. Since life-time
utilities of single men and women differ to the extent that they face different wages, the
outcome of the bargaining depends on relative wages.
Fertility
Childbearing imposes a time-cost on the mother (τb), whereas child-care requires more
home production (x), which could be done by the father, the mother, or both.10 A further
input to home production are goods acquired in the market (e). Although I refer to this
home-labor saving input as home appliances, in a broader sense this could include paid
domestic help, such as hiring nannies. I assume that the amount of the home good needed
is
x¯ = x¯(bh) with x¯
′(bh) > 0 (1.2)
Couples can have children only in the first period of their lives. Bearing a child reduces
the mother’s disposable time by τb in that period.
Household Production
Following Olivetti (2006) and Knowles (2007), I assume that the home good is produced
using a technology that is consistent with substitution among household member’s time
and home appliances according to
xh = e
γH1−γ (1.3)
where home labor input is H = zmhm + zfhf , and zm and zf the male and female home
labor productivities. This technology allows, to some degree, for a marketization of inputs
to home production.11 Rising market wages could lead to increases in market hours and
decreases in home hours –such as we have observed in the data for married females–,
without a drop in home production, as the household can acquire more home appliances.
10The former assumption is similar to Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2010), the latter is as in Knowles
(2007) and similar to Greenwood and Seshadri (2005)
11In a structural transformation framework, Ngai and Pissarides (2008) study substitutions between
home and market production, but do not distinguish between male and female labor.
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The home good is nonstorable and is a public good within the household.
Market Technology
Assume there is a final goods technology of the form
Yt = K
α
t N
1−α
t (1.4)
aggregating total market labor (N) and capital (K) into a final good which can be used for
consumption (c), investment in future capital stock, and for home appliances (e), which
I model as a flow to simplify matters. Capital depreciates at a rate δ each period. The
final goods sector is competitive. Factor prices are therefore equated to marginal products,
implying for the rental rate of capital (r) and wage rate per efficiency unit of labor (w)
rt = αK
α−1
t N
1−α
t − δ (1.5)
wt = (1− α)Kαt N−αt (1.6)
Endowments and Markets
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time that they can use for working in the
market (n) and at home (h); the remainder is leisure. Since childbearing lowers a woman’s
effective time endowment (by τb), the male and female time constraints are
nm(j) + hm(j) ≤ 1 for j = 1,. . . ,Tl
nf (j) + hf (j) ≤
 1 for j = 2,. . . ,Tl1− τbb for j = 1
Since in the data there is an age-profile in wages, I assume an age-dependent endowment
of efficiency units of labor for men pm(j) and for women pf (j). The model implies for the
wage of a woman of age j relative to a man of the same age that
wf (j)
wm(j)
=
pf (j)
pm(j)
. A gender
wage gap corresponds in the model therefore to different labor productivities across gender.
In reality, of course, differences in pay may be the result of discrimination. One way of
rationalizing the simplifying modeling assumption of differential productivities is, because
Chapter 1 23
of discrimination, women, with same abilities as men, have sorted into less productive
occupations. I will take women’s relative earnings, after controlling for observables such as
education, in year t from the data, which I denote by χt, and impose pf,t(j) = χtpm(j).
Once agents have passed the retirement age Tr they can no longer generate labor
income, which corresponds to pm(j) = pf (j) = 0 for j ≥ Tr, but the couple receives social
security benefits Tss. There is no uncertainty and agents’ income is not subject to shocks.
Agents can trade an asset with return rt. The economy is closed.
Government
The government provides a pay-as-you go social security system. Similar to the US system,
it levies a constant social security tax τss on labor income and redistributes the proceeds
as benefits Tss to retired households. Hence
Tss,t = τss · wtNtTl∑
j=Tr
µ(j)
(1.7)
Preferences
Agents derive utility from consumption of the market good and enjoy having children,
but have disutility from working in the market or at home. In particular, assume that
preferences are additively separable and given by12
u =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(
φn
(
n1+η
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
h1+ε
1 + ε
) s−1
s
) s
s−1
+ φb
b1−σb − 1
1− σb (1.8)
where c, n, and h are specific to a spouse, but the number of children b is common to the
couple.
These preferences feature imperfect substitutability of disutilities of working in the
market or at home. I view it as realistic to allow the utility cost of these two very different
activities to differ. Nonetheless, there is a relationship between the two: The marginal
disutility of supplying an additional hour of market work is increasing in the time worked
12Adding utility from children in this additive form is generalizing Galor and Weil (1996) and Greenwood
and Seshadri (2005), who assume ln(b).
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at home, and vice versa. These preferences allow for time allocations, consistent with the
data, such that both men and women work in the labor market and in the household –even
when male and female time are perfect substitutes.
I assume that there is a subsistence level in consumption of the home produced good,
which is increasing in the number of children living in the household (bh). As a simplifying
assumption, following Knowles (2007), agents do not derive any further utility from home
production, and this constraint will be binding, x = x¯(bh).
1.2.2 Couple Household’s Optimization
In the benchmark model I consider households in which spouses have equal Pareto weights
(θ = 0.5), such that the household behaves like a unitary agent. Since I assume for the
bargaining model full commitment to the sharing rule determined when both partners
meet (see section 1.5.1), in both scenarios the Pareto weight θ is constant over the couple’s
lifetime. Consider the optimization problem of a couple household of age j with current
wealth a, total number of children b, of which bh are still living at home. Let ug(cg, ng, hg, b)
denote the own utility function of the member of gender g ∈ {m, f}. The household’s
resources from financial assets are a(1 + r). Households before retirement can earn a labor
income net of taxes of w˜m(j)nm + w˜f (j)nf , where w˜m(j) = (1− τss)pm(j)w is the net male
wage and w˜f (j) = χw˜m(j) the net female wage. After reaching the retirement age (Tr)
households receive social security benefits Tss.
After having decided at the beginning of their lives on the number of children (b), for
age j ≥ 2 the value functions of the representative couple household solves13
VC(a; b, j) = max
a′,e,cm,cf
nm,nf ,hm,hf
θum(cm, nm, hm, b) + (1− θ)uf (cf , nf , hf , b) + βVC(a′; b, j + 1)
(1.9)
13To economize on notation, I do not index variables by time, but it should be understood that age (j)
takes on this intertemporal role.
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subject to the constraint set:
a′ =
 (1 + r)a+ w˜m(j)nm + w˜f (j)nf − cm − cf − e for j < Tr(1 + r)a+ Tss − cm − cf − e for j ≥ Tr (1.10)
x¯(bh) = e
γ (zmhm + zfhf )
1−γ (1.11)
bh(j) =
 b for 1 ≤ j < Ta0 for j > Ta (1.12)
nm+hm ≤ 1 and nf + hf ≤ 1 (1.13)
VC(·;Tl + 1) = 0 and aTl+1 ≥ 0 (1.14)
{wm(k), wf (k), r(k)}Tlk=j known (1.15)
In the first period of a household’s life, the value function is different. Then the couple
decides on the number of children (b), from which the parents will derive utility throughout
their lifetime. Since I am focusing on a representative couple, the household can choose
any nonnegative continuous quantity. At model age j = 1, when the household starts out
and is without any assets (a = 0), the value function solves
VC(0; b; 1) = max
b,a′,e,cm,cf
nm,nf ,hm,hf
θum(cm, nm, hm, b)+(1−θ)uf (cf , nf , hf , b)+βVC(a′; b; 2) (1.16)
subject to the constraints (1.10) to (1.15), with the time constraints (1.13) modified to
nm + hm ≤ 1 and nf + hf ≤ 1− τbb (1.17)
since having children lowers the mother’s disposable time.
There is no closed form solution to this optimization problem, but the usual Euler
equations hold. Numerically, I solve a couple’s deterministic finite life-time optimization
problem (1.9) conditional on a fertility history backwards, making use of the intratemporal
first-order conditions, which I show in the appendix. Then I choose the number of children
that maximizes the couple’s life-time value function in the first period of their lives (1.16).
When choosing a fertility plan the couple is outweighing benefits and costs from having
Chapter 1 26
children.14 The marginal benefit of having this extra child arises from higher felicity for
the rest of couple’s lifetime. The marginal cost of having more children lies in the need
for more home production, for as long as the child lives with the parents (Ta periods). To
increase home production, the couple devotes more time to home labor and uses more home
appliances. Both adjustments reduce consumption of the parents. As male and female
home labor rises, the parents find it more costly to supply as much labor to the market,
and therefore generate less income. Since home appliances are acquired in the market,
disposable income for goods consumption drops further.
1.2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all households maximize their life-time utility, firms maximize profits, the
government budget is balanced, all markets clear, and population growth is determined
by fertility decisions. In particular, couples of all ages solve their optimization problem
(1.9) and (1.16), factor prices are determined competitively by (1.5), social security benefit
14At an interior solution, the optimal number of children satisfies
φbb
−σb
Tl∑
j=1
βj−1 =
θ
γ
Ta∑
j=1
βj−1cm(j; b)
−σ
(
x¯(b)
zmhm(j; b) + zfhf (j; b)
) 1−γ
γ
x¯′(b)
=
θ
zm
Ta∑
j=1
βj−1
(
φn
(
nm(j; b)
1+η
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
hm(j; b)
1+ε
1 + ε
) s−1
s
) 1
s−1
φ˜hhm(j; b)
ζ x¯′(b)
=
1− θ
zf
Ta∑
j=1
βj−1
(
φn
(
nf (j; b)
1+η
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
hf (j; b)
1+ε
1 + ε
) s−1
s
) 1
s−1
φ˜hhf (j; b)
ζ x¯′(b)
where φ˜h = φh(1+ε)
1/s and ζ = (s−1)ε−1
s
. The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of having an additional
child, which at the optimum has to equal the marginal cost, the right-hand side. If a mother’s time
constraint was binding, the time cost of having the baby would have a further effect of lowering consumption,
since she would have less time to divide between market work and home production and loses earnings
potential (τbwf ).
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satisfy (1.7), and factor markets clear according to15
Nt =
Tr∑
j=1
St(j) (pmnm,t(j) + pf (j)nf,t(j)) (1.18)
Kt =
Tl∑
j=1
St(j)at(j) (1.19)
and the size of cohorts of adult couples is given by16
St(j) =

1
2St−Ta(1)bt−Ta for j = 1
St−1(j − 1) for 2 ≤ j ≤ Tl
0 for j > Tk
(1.20)
Notice that the population growth rate changes over time, which in turn affects the capital-
labor ratio. The model implies a working-age average male and female labor supply of
Ng,t =
TR−1∑
j=1
µ˜t(j)ng,t(j) for g ∈ {m, f}, where µ˜t(j) = µt(j)/(
∑TR−1
k=1 µt(k)) is the mass of
the aged j cohort relative to the working-age population. Similarly, average (over all ages)
home hours for g ∈ {m, f} are Hg,t =
Tl∑
j=1
µt(j)hg,t(j) and appliances Et =
Tl∑
j=1
µt(j)et(j).
Since couples have children only at the beginning of their adult lives, the total fertility rate
is simply given by the number of children the representative household of model age j = 1
has in that period, TFRt = bt.
1.3 Calibration
I choose parameters such that the model replicates in a base year the total fertility rate
and married male and married female hours worked, both at home and in the market. I
calibrate all parameters as time-invariant, and the only exogenous change over time is in
15I solve for the equilibrium using a Auerbach and Koltikoff (1987) type algorithm. This entails 1.
guessing time-paths for aggregate state variables and thereby of factor prices, 2. solving the optimization
problems of all households given the guesses, 3. aggregating over all generations alive and computing the
deviations from the guessed paths, 4. If the deviations are sufficiently small, the equilibrium has been found;
if not, update the guesses and iterate until consistent.
16On the right hand side of (1.20) the shift of Ta periods appears since children turn adult after Ta
periods and have been born when their parents where of age j = 1. The factor 1/2 in front reflects the fact
that children born are half boys and half girls, and a couple household consist of a man and a woman (of
the same age).
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the gender wage gap. A model period is set to 10 years. I calibrate the model parameters
against data for 1965, taking the demographic structure of that year, the size of cohorts
and the population growth rate, as given. For the required amount of home production, I
make use of the variation of married men’s and women’s home hours against the number
of children in the household. Table 1.1 lists all model parameters, along with a value taken
from the literature17, or whether it is to be set in a calibration exercise.
Table 1.1: Model parameters
Description Value/Moment to Match
σ elasticity of consumption 1 (log-utility)
σb elasticity of demand for children calibration
η related to elasticity of market hours 2 (Domeij and Floden (2006))
ε related to elasticity of home hours calibration
s substitutability of disutilities to work calibration
φn weight on disutility from market labor calibration
φh weight on disutility from home labor calibration
φb weight on utility from children calibration
β discount factor 0.580 (Cooley and Prescott (1995))
δ depreciation of capital 0.382 (Cooley and Prescott (1995))
α capital share in market output 0.36 (Hansen (1985))
pm(j) male wage profile estimated, see section 1.3.1
τss social security tax rate 0.11 (Heer and Maußner (2009))
γ share of market inputs in home 0.2 (and robustness checks)
zm male home labor productivity 1 (normalization)
zf female home labor productivity 1 (assuming zm = zf )
τb time cost on mother per child
1
2
1
10 (6 month)
x¯(bh) amount of home good needed cross-sectional variation
χt gender wage gap estimated, see section 1.3.1
Notes: Since the model is calibrated to a ten years frequency, the discount rates and depreciation rates are
converted as β = 0.94710 and δ = 1− (1− 0.047)10.
In the literature the range of estimates of the labor share in home production is very
wide. Studies that include housing as capital or equipment used for home production
typically find a relatively low value, close to the one of market production, e.g. Greenwood,
Rogerson, and Wright (1995), while Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991), who exclude
housing, estimate a very high value of 0.92. In my model, the need for home production is
at the margin arising from having children living in the household, and does not correspond
17As an approximation to the first order, the Frisch elasticity of market labor supply –when time-constraints
are slack– is 1
η
.
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closely to either study. Since parents can acquire home production inputs in the market,
such as hiring nannies or paid domestic help, the share of time-saving inputs acquired in
the market, γ, should be higher than the Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) value.
As a benchmark I consider an intermediate value of γ = 0.2, but I conduct a series of
robustness checks in section 1.F.
1.3.1 The Gender Wage Gap as Ratio of Residual Wages
To construct a series of the gender wage gap to feed into the model, I use data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United States from 1968 to 2007.18 First
I regress for individuals aged 20 to 59 the logarithm of real wages on a set of observables,
including most importantly education. In particular I estimate by OLS
logwi,t = β0,t + β1,tDfemalei,t + L(j) +Xi,tγ + i,t (1.21)
where Dfemalei,t = 1 if i is female and 0 if male. L(j) is a polynomial in age and Xi,t a
vector of other observables, including a polynomial in years of education and race dummies.
The estimated gender wage gap for year t, defined as the ratio of women’s to men’s relative
earnings not explained by Xi,t, is then given by e
β1,t . I give the full regression results in
table 1.9 of the appendix, and plot the implied series in figure 1.3. To construct the series
of χt to feed into the model, where a period has a length of 10 years, I take the simple
averages. For the final steady state I assume that the gender wage gap is closed. I impose
for the transition periods between the last available data point and the steady state, that
χt grows at the same rate as over 1968–2007 until it reaches 1 and then remains at 1.
The estimates of equation 1.21 imply an age profile in wages, for male wages pm(j) =
exp(L(j)), which I illustrate in figure 1.5. Then I impose for females
pf,t(j) = χtpm(j) (1.22)
where I obtained χt as described above.
18In section 1.B of the appendix, I discuss the advantages of using data from the PSID, rather than from
the CPS, and compare the data and results from these two surveys.
Chapter 1 30
2.
5
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
20 30 40 50 60
Age
Age Profile of Wages
Figure 1.5: Age profile of wages
1.3.2 Home Production
To calibrate the required amount of home goods x¯(bh), notice that male and female home
and market hours depend on a couple’s Pareto weights, consumptions and the required
amount of home good x¯(bh). In particular, at an interior solution a household’s first order
condition imply
x¯(bh) =
φh
φn
(
1 + ε
1 + η
)1/s h (s−1)ε−1sm
n
(s−1)η−1
s
m
w˜m
zm
γ
1− γ (zmhm + zfhf )
γ (1.23)
Conditional on all other parameters, this relationship can be used to infer x¯(bh) from the
Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data. As a functional form I assume
x¯(bh) = κ0 + κ1 · bκ2h (1.24)
and expect to find κ0 > 0, κ1 > 0 and 0 < κ2 < 1, which would mean home production is
always positive and increasing in number of children, but at a decreasing rate. I choose
the parameters κ0, κ1, κ2 to replicate the observed variation of married men’s and women’s
average home hours against the number of children in the household, according to (1.23).
The details are given in appendix 1.D.
1.3.3 Remaining Parameters
Six parameters are left to be chosen, but I have only the five targets of table 1.2 to match
in 1965, the base year. Four parameters (φn, φh, ε, s) correspond to the targets for male
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Table 1.2: Calibration targets of the benchmark model
1965-Moments to be Matched Data Fictive S.S. in Transition
Number of children (TFR) 2.913 2.9726 2.8493
Market hours of men 0.3886 0.3890 0.3907
Market hours of women 0.1120 0.1111 0.1139
Home hours of men 0.0950 0.0950 0.0953
Home hours of women 0.3896 0.3909 0.3893
Additional Target to be Matched
Long-run TFR 2 (assumed) 2.0312
Notes: For the 1965 moments, the first column shows the value of the statistics in the data. The second
column shows the model analogues, taking the demographics as given, when agents believe the gender wage
gap to remain constant forever. The third column shows the model implied outcomes, when in 1965 agents
learn the true future path of the gender wage gap. To discipline the calibration a restriction on the long-run
number of children is added. For the long-run TFR, the last column shows the model’s final steady state
TFR.
and female hours worked at home and in the market, and two parameters (φb, σb) are key
for the fertility choice.
These parameters are, of course, calibrated jointly, but it is insightful to think of them
as being chosen to match particular moments in the data. Notice that the optimality con-
ditions for a household before retirement imply
(
hm(j)
hf (j)
) (s−1)ε−1
s
= zmzf χ(j)
(
nm(j)
nf (j)
) (s−1)η−1
s
.
Intuitively, given the gender wage gap and relative home productivities, s is chosen to
replicate the ratio of female to male labor supply. Then ε is set to match relative home
hours. Then φn and φh are chosen so that absolute male and female market and home
hours, respectively, equal the observed ones. Given these parameters, the cross-sectional
variation in hours worked against the number of children gives, according to (1.23), the
parameters κ0, κ1, κ2, describing the required amount of home production x¯(bh). Finally,
the two parameters governing fertility have to be chosen. While φb captures the relative
weight the household attaches to having children (compared to consumption), σb essentially
captures the curvature. I restrict the calibration by choosing σb such that in the final
steady state, the total fertility rate is approximately 2. A value of 2 seems natural, as the
number of children born is just replacing previous generations. Moreover, it is close to
most recent values for the US. Conditional on a value for σb, I calibrate the remaining five
parameters to the data of 1965 under the fiction that households believed gender wage gap
to remain constant forever. Then I solve the model for the final steady state, in which the
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gender wage is closed. If the implied long-run fertility rate differs from 2, I update the guess
for σb until consistent.
19 Table 1.3 shows the values found through this calibration exercise.
They imply for the required amount of home production x¯(bh) = 0.1813 + 0.0279(bh)
0.8845.
Table 1.3: Calibrated parameters of the benchmark model
Description Value
σb elasticity of demand for children 0.3950
ε related to elasticity of home hours 3.5740
s substitutability of disutilities to work 1.4041
φn weight on disutility from market labor 2.6712
φh weight on disutility from home labor 1.8398
φb weight on utility from children 0.0515
1.4 Results of the Benchmark Model
To obtain the transition path of the calibrated model, I feed the series of the observed
gender-wage gap into the model. For the first period I need initial conditions. I take the
demographic structure from the data. Since I do not have age-specific data on household
asset holdings for 1965, I initialize household asset holdings with the values of a fictive
steady state in which agents believed the gender wage gap to remain constant forever.20
It should be stressed that in the model young couples, who are the ones deciding on how
many children to have, start out with zero assets. The initialization of asset holdings
applies to older households only, and could affect fertility only through general equilibrium
effects on wages or interest rates, which are likely to be small.
I assume that the economy will eventually reach a steady state in which male and
female wages are equalized. Since fertility is a choice in the model, the age distribution
evolves endogenously over time. Like Auerbach and Koltikoff (1987), I select the long-run
equilibrium such that in the final steady state the growth rate of the population is constant.
A constant number of children per couple is not enough to ensure this outcome, as an
infinite echoing series of baby booms or busts might occur. Since a balanced growth path
19I perform a series of robustness checks, including alternative values for σb (and therefore of φb), and
report the model results under alternative parameters in section 1.F in the appendix.
20This is the fictive steady state used for calibrating the model against the data. The age-distribution of
1965 is, however, not the stationary distribution, which would be implied by the population growth rate of
this year.
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Figure 1.6: Life-time choices in the initial steady state
Notes: This graphs plots the representative couple household’s policy functions for assets, male and female
market and home hours, as well as number of children living at home, over the life-cycle, from age j = 1
(20–29) to j = Tl = 6 (70–79).
requires constant population growth to ensure a constant capital-labor ratio, I solve for
the final steady state by solving a fixed-point problem for the population growth rate.21
1.4.1 Comparing the Steady States
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show the policy functions of the representative couple in the fictive
initial and in the final steady state. In the initial steady state a couple has more than
two children and there is population growth. Therefore, there are relatively more young
households in the economy, who start out without any assets. As a consequence, the
equilibrium interest rate is such that β(1 + r) > 1, and consumption, both male and female,
is increasing over the household’s life-cycle. As consumption rises, an agent prefers to
work less at a given wage. However, holding consumption and home production constant,
labor supply increases in the wage rate. Since there is the age premium in wages (figure
1.5), these two effects work against each other, resulting in the labor supply plotted in the
graph.
In the initial steady state, the gender wage gap implies gains from specialization in the
21First I guess a population growth rate, which implies a stationary age distribution. Then I compute
the steady state and the population growth rate implied by (1.20). I iterate to find the fixed point.
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Figure 1.7: Life-time choices in the final steady state
Notes: This graphs plots the representative couple household’s life-cycle policy functions for assets, male
and female market and home hours, as well as number of children living at home, under the prices of the
final steady state. Since the gender wage gap is closed, hours worked of men and women coincide.
couple household. Consequently, a wife shoulders most of the housework, and most of a
couple’s labor supply is coming from the husband. In the final steady state, on the other
hand, the gender wage gap is closed, and there are no gains from specialization anymore.22
Hours worked of men and women are therefore equalized, both in the market and at home.
Comparing the policy functions of the final and the initial steady state shows, most of
the increase in female labor supply comes from young women, which is consistent with the
empirical findings by Buttet and Schoonbroodt (2006) and Olivetti (2006).
1.4.2 The Transition in the Benchmark Model
Figure 1.8 shows the transitional dynamics of the economy23, starting from an initial
situation (t < 0), in which wages were expected to remain constant at their 1965 values.
Then at t = 0, corresponding to the year 1965, the true path of the gender wage gap gets
known, but relative wages do not start changing before t = 1, year 1975. The economy
22By assumption male and female home productivities are equal throughout. Advances in technologies
over the last century, such as infant formula, have brought male and female productivities closer together.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2007) argue that this allowed female labor force participation to rise. In my framework,
it also implies a rise in male participation at home.
23The transitional graphs in the main text show the behavior of aggregate variables. Figure 1.21 of the
appendix shows the disaggregation by age.
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starts to converge to a new steady state in which relative wages are equalized. During
the transition the gender wage gap, shown in the upper-left panel, closes gradually. As a
consequence, women work more hours in the market and less at home, whereas for men the
opposite happens. Initially, fertility is declining as raising children becomes more costly to
the parents.
0 10 20
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
Female Relative Wages
0 10 20
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
TFR
0 10 20
0.009
0.0095
0.01
0.0105
0.011
0.0115
0.012
Home Appliances
0 10 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Labor Supply
 
 
Male
Female
0 10 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Home Hours
 
 
Male
Female
0 10 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Factor Prices
 
 
w
r
Figure 1.8: Transition path of the unitary model (θ = 0.5)
Notes: This graphs shows the benchmark model’s transition over time, that is implied by the narrowing of
the gender wage gap (upper-left panel). The dotted lines show the data.
What is striking in the transition process is that fertility flattens out before the gender
wage gap is closed (at the blue dashed line). While the gender wage gap is closing, the
model implies a reallocation of labor across gender. When female wages rise, a household
finds it optimal to increase the wife’s labor supply and to decrease her time working at
home. However, since relative wages have changed, but not relative productivities at home,
this reallocation entails an increase in men’s home production. In all periods, the couple
also acquires more home appliances to substitute for the overall drop of their time working
at home. The link between higher female relative wages and lower fertility breaks at some
point.
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The change in relative wages alters the environment in which the couple makes its
economic decisions. Initially, when the gender wage gap is big, there is a great degree of
specialization in the household, resulting in a husband working substantially more in the
labor market than his wife, but much less at home. In this situation, due to increasing
marginal disutility from working, a husband is not prepared to put in much more time
at home when his wife works more hours in the market. A rise in female relative wages
directly increases female labor supply, and lowers female, as well as total, time spent on
home production. As the couple devotes less time to having children, fertility falls sharply,
despite the rise in home appliances. However, in later periods when the gender wage gap
is fairly small, the spouses time allocation and, thus, their disutilities from working are
very similar. When then the wage gap shrinks further, the rise in male home hours is, at
a given level of home production almost big enough to keep total home labor constant;
in the limit of equalized wages, a drop in female home production is fully offset by men.
On top of this, with the improvement in the wife’s earnings, the couple can acquire more
parental time saving inputs.
For the optimal choice on how many children to have, the couple outweighs the benefits
from having an additional child with the utility cost of child care. The reallocation of a
man’s time from market to home, which comes with the change in relative wages, might
actually reduce his marginal cost of having an additional child, although his share of child
care rises, since the disutilities are imperfect substitutes and his initial time allocation
was very unbalanced. Similarly, a mother’s marginal cost might increase, fall, or not be
affected at all. The model results clearly suggest that for the first part of the transition, as
female relative wages improve, the parents’ marginal utility cost is increasing, and therefore
they prefer to have fewer children. But when the gender wage gap is sufficiently small and
shrinks further, their marginal cost is not affected, resulting in a constant fertility rate.
I will show in the next two sections that key in understanding why fertility did not fall
further is the rise in male home labor, that we have observed in the data. The higher use
of parental time-saving inputs into home production is important in matching the timing,
but it alone is insufficient to explain the data.
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1.4.3 Counterfactual: The Absence of Male Home Labor
In this part I am shutting down the rise of male home labor. In the existing literature
on fertility it is commonly assumed that child-care is a function of female time only. By
setting male home productivity to zero, my model nests this as a special case. Notice that
in this counterfactual exercise, men and women do not become ‘identical’ in the final steady
state. Although their wages will eventually be equalized, specialization in the household
persists because of the different home productivities.
Not to confound changes in technology with changes in preferences, I keep all preference
parameters at their baseline values, but set zm = 0 and adjust zf such that the household
still chooses in 1965 the same number of children as in the data.24 Figure 1.9 shows the
transition of the model, when men cannot counteract the fall in women’s home hours.
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Figure 1.9: Transition of the unitary model (θ = 0.5) with zm = 0
Notes: For the model without male home production, this graphs plots the transition implied by the
narrowing of the gender wage gap (upper-left panel) over time. The dotted lines show the data.
It implies a monotone drop in fertility as long as female wages catch up– which is
24Since by assumption of zm = 0 this model variant is doomed to fail along the dimension of male home
hours, notice that I could not apply the calibration strategy of the benchmark model, which has Hm as one
of the targets.
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inconsistent with the data. Throughout the transition, parents are having fewer and
fewer children, since child-care hours continue to fall, when women’s market labor supply
rises. As women’s income increase, couples also acquire more home appliances, but this
marketization of home production is not strong enough to prevent fertility from falling.
Only once the gender wage gap has closed, the optimal number of children stabilizes.
Alternative Calibration of No Male Home Production
As an alternative calibration for the zm = 0-model, I adjust the parameters capturing the
choice of number of children, such that also this model variant has a total fertility rate of 2
in the final steady state. More specifically, I take the benchmark calibration, with zm = 0
and zf = 1, and adjust (φb, σb) to target a long-run TFR of 2, but keeping 1965’s TFR
at the observed value. Given all other parameters from the benchmark, this adjustment
yields φb = 0.0872 and σb = 0.9625. Then I solve for the transition of the model under this
alternative calibration and show the results in figure 1.10. Also under these alternative
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Figure 1.10: Transition of the unitary model (θ = 0.5) with zm = 0, alternative calibration
Notes: For model without male home production under the alternative calibration, this graphs plots the
transition implied by the narrowing of the gender wage gap (upper-left panel) over time. The dotted lines
show the data.
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parameters, the model without male home production predicts that the total fertility rate
falls as long as the gender wage gap shrinks. That parents use more market inputs into
home production is not sufficient for generating a flattening out of the fertility rate before
the gender wage gap has closed.
To conclude, in the benchmark model of above, it is the rise in male home labor, which
counteracts the fall of female time inputs into child raising, that is key in understanding
why the fertility decline ended.
1.4.4 No Marketization of Home Production
In this section I show, that parents can use more time-saving inputs at home when female
wages rise, is not crucial for generating a flattening out of the total fertility rate. However,
it is important in matching the timing.
To rule out marketization of home production, consider a simpler version of the model
in which home production is a function of male and female home hours only. This is the
special case of γ = 0. I use the same calibration strategy as for the benchmark model,
in order to give both models equal chances in matching the data.25 Figure 1.11 shows
the transition of this model variant. Also the model without marketization predicts that
fertility stops falling before the gender wage gap is closed (in t = 10, at the dashed line).
This shows that the reallocation of men’s time from market to home, and of women’s time
from home to the labor market is, in principle, sufficient in breaking the direct link between
higher female wages and fewer children. However, this version of the model predicts that
fertility does not flatten out before the year 2025 (t = 7), but in the data the fertility
rate has been constant already since the late 1970s. The benchmark model featuring
marketization of home production, on the other hand, gets closer and predicts, as shown
25The same calibration strategy as for the benchmark model gives the following parameters:
σb = 0.750, ε = 3.4935, s = 1.4073, φn = 2.6281, φh = 1.8434, φb = 0.0524 implying x¯(bh) =
0.3762 + 0.0515(bh)
0.9254. They imply for the targets:
1965-Moments to be Matched Data Fictive S.S. in Transition
Number of children (TFR) 2.913 2.9134 2.7982
Market hours of men 0.3886 0.3890 0.3949
Market hours of women 0.1120 0.1104 0.1159
Home hours of men 0.0950 0.0711 0.0715
Home hours of women 0.3896 0.3630 0.3616
Additional Target to be Matched
Long-run TFR 2 (assumed) 2.0279
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Figure 1.11: Transition path of the unitary model (θ = 0.5) with γ = 0
Notes: For the model without marketization, this graphs plots the transition implied by the narrowing of
the gender wage gap (upper-left panel) over time. The dotted lines show the data.
in figure 1.8, a flat fertility rate since 1995 (t = 4). In section 1.6, below, I compare the
different versions of the model and the data in greater detail.
1.5 The Bargaining Model
Since Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern (2008) have argued that changes in women’s household
status is important in explaining the time series in total fertility, I introduce next household
bargaining. The only modification to the benchmark model is that now the Pareto weights
in the household’s optimization program are determined endogenously.
Here, rising relative wages also improve women’s say in household decision making, which
corresponds in my model to a higher weight on women’s utility in a couple’s optimization
program. I assume that this weight is the result of a Nash bargaining over the surplus
generated by marriage. The wife’s bigger say reduces her share of housework, relative to
her husband, by more than what a change in relative wages per se would imply.
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1.5.1 Determination of Intrahousehold Weights
The solution to the couple’s optimization program at a given Pareto weight θ defines a
sequence of life-time utilities {VC,m(j|χ, θ), VC,f (j|χ, θ)}Tlj=1 for the man and the woman
who form the household. I follow McElroy and Horney (1981) and assume that the sharing
rule θ is the result of Nash Bargaining. When both partners meet at the beginning of their
adult lives, they bargain under full commitment over the surplus generated from marriage.
The threat point of each partner is staying single, rather than entering the match. In
equilibrium, the weights are then the solution to
θ = arg max
θ˜
[VC,m(1|χ, θ˜)− VS,m(1|χ)][VC,f (1|χ, θ˜)− VS,f (1|χ)] (1.25)
where VC,m(1|χ, θ˜) and VC,f (1|χ, θ˜) are the husband’s and wife’s lifetime utilities at age
j = 1 that are implied by the joint optimization program, and Vm,S(1|χ) and Vf,S(1|χ) are
the life-time utilities if the man or the women stayed single (at age j = 1), given the series
of the gender pay gap that they face over their lives (χ ={χj}Tlj=1 = { wf (j)wm(j)}
Tl
j=1).
To find the value of the threat points, consider the optimization problem of male and
female singles. Since they cannot have children, the value function of a single agent of
gender g ∈ {m, f} solves
VS,g(a; j) = max
c,,n,h,e,a′
u(c, n, h, 0) + βVS,g(a
′; j + 1) for j ≥ 1 (1.26)
subject to
a′ =
 (1 + r)a+ w˜g(j)n− c− e for j < Tr(1 + r)a+ Tss2 − c− e for j ≥ Tr (1.27)
x¯(0) = eγH1−γ with H = zgh (1.28)
n+ h ≤ 1 (1.29)
VS,g(·;Tl + 1) = 0 and a1 = Tl+1 = 0 (1.30)
{wg(k), r(k)}Tlk=j known (1.31)
I find the singles’ value function at age j = 1 numerically. Then I solve the Nash
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bargaining problem (1.25) to find a household’s Pareto weight. The resulting sharing rule
depends on the life-time series of the gender wage gap, since it changes the outside option
of females relative to males. In other words, the spouse’s bargaining position depends on
their relative wages.
1.5.2 Dependence on the Weights
A rise in wives’ Pareto weights, relative to their husbands, –a drop in θ– makes them
better off through a intrahousehold reallocation of consumption and hours worked. One
optimality condition that is particular useful in illustrating the mechanism of the model is
the ratio of male to female home hours. When both time constraints (1.13) are slack, the
optimal division of home labor for retired couples is given by26
hm
hf
=
(
1− θ
θ
zm
zf
)1/ε
for j ≥ Tr (1.32)
Increase in women’s relative Pareto weight imply an increase in the share of men’s home
hours. Numerically I find that this also the case for working-age couples. An improvement
in a woman’s bargaining position therefore decreases her share of home hours and lowers
her opportunity cost of having children. However, as her partner then has to contribute
more to home production, his preferred number of children is falling.
1.5.3 Calibration
As for the benchmark model in section 1.3, I calibrate the model with intrahousehold
bargaining against data for 1965. I report the obtained parameter values in table 1.4, and
the targets and their counterparts in the model table 1.5. They imply for the required
amount of home production x¯(bh) = 0.1923 + 0.0299(bh)
0.8793.
1.5.4 Steady State Comparison
Table 1.6 shows the model implied variables for the 1965-steady state, taking the age
distribution as given, and the final steady state with endogenous distribution across age.
26One can show that as s→∞, making the choice of home and market hours separable, the optimality
condition (1.32) also holds for working-age couples.
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Table 1.4: Calibrated parameters for the bargaining model
Description Value
σb elasticity of demand for children 0.4800
ε related to elasticity of home hours 4.1041
s substitutability of disutilities to work 1.3673
φn weight on disutility from market labor 2.3727
φh weight on disutility from home labor 2.4044
φb weight on utility from children 0.0764
Table 1.5: Calibration targets for the bargaining model
1965-Moments to be Matched Data Fictive S.S. in Transition
Number of children (TFR) 2.913 2.8371 3.0463
Market hours of men 0.3886 0.3889 0.3941
Market hours of women 0.1120 0.1111 0.1008
Home hours of men 0.0950 0.0948 0.0902
Home hours of women 0.3896 0.3885 0.4001
Additional Target to be Matched
Long-run TFR 2 (assumed) 2.0205
Notes: For the 1965 moments, the first column shows the value of the statistics in the data. The second
column shows the model analogues, taking the demographics as given, when agents believe the gender wage
gap to remain constant forever. The third column shows the model implied outcomes, when in 1965 agents
learn the true future path of the gender wage gap. To discipline the calibration a restriction on the long-run
number of children is added. For the long-run TFR, the last column shows the model’s final steady state
TFR.
The steady state results of the bargaining model, rows 1 and 2, confirm, improvement in
women’s relative wages lead to a reduction in men’s Pareto weight in household decision
making. In the final steady state, in which the gender wage gap is assumed to have
disappeared, both spouses have an equal weight in the household optimization (θ = 0.5),
whereas initially, when men earned relatively more, husbands accrued a bigger weight.
Not surprisingly, in response to higher wages, female labor supply increases and women’s
share of home production decreases. Fertility is lower in the long-run, when the gender wag
gap has closed. In the bargaining model there are three forces driving fertility decisions.
Firstly, higher wages exert a positive income effect increasing a couple’s desire to have
children. Secondly, higher relative earnings to women affect the division of market and
home labor between men and women. In particular, men have to contribute more to
home production, leaving women with more disposable time, which tends to boost fertility.
Thirdly, however, the bargaining effect has differential effects on men and women. While a
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Table 1.6: Steady states comparisons
χ θ TFR Nm Nf Hm Hf
0.602 endogenous 0.612 2.8371 0.3889 0.1111 0.0948 0.3885
1 endogenous 0.500 2.0205 0.2972 0.2972 0.2254 0.2254
1 fixed at 0.612 2.0884 0.2407 0.3600 0.2351 0.2158
Notes: This table shows the bargaining model’s steady state predictions, taking the gender wage gap (χ)
as given. The first row corresponds to the year 1965, for which the age distribution µ(j) is taken from the
data. The second row shows the prediction for the final steady state, in which, because of equal wages, the
spouses’ Pareto weights are equalized (θ = 0.5). The last row shows the counterfactual steady state that
would occur if the Pareto weights remained constant at their 1965 value.
higher Pareto weight on females increases the number of children a mother wants to have,
it reduces the optimal number for men, who will need to provide more input to child care.
To disentangle the effects, I conduct a counterfactual exercise. I vary women’s relative
wages, but keep the Pareto weights constant. The last row of table 1.6 shows the steady
state results under a fixed weight of θ = 0.612, which was found to be optimal under
χ = 0.602. Comparing them with the row above highlights the role of household bargaining:
household bargaining reduces fertility in the final steady state. While the improvement
in women’s say in the household, which comes along with the shrinking of the gender
wage gap, increases their preferred number of children, it reduces the optimal number of
children for fathers, who need to work more and more at home due the mothers’ bigger
say. The number of children the couple chooses is in between the optimal numbers for
both spouses. Overall I find that when female relative wages are high and women’s Pareto
weights increase, fertility drops. The intuition is that higher relative female wages per
se imply that, optimally, a husband provides more home hours. When in addition the
husband’s relative weight falls, he needs to supply yet more home hours, which reduces
his utility substantially. Consequently, the higher female relative wages are, the faster
the male preferred number of children drops; they prefer reducing home production over
having more children. Wives do prefer to have more children in this case, but the increase
in their weight in the household optimization is not strong enough to overcome the drop in
husbands’ optimal number of children.
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1.5.5 The Transition Path of the Bargaining Model
Figure 1.12 shows the transitional dynamics of the economy in the presence of intrahousehold
bargaining. As the gender wage gap closes, the husband’s relative weight in household
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Figure 1.12: Transition path of the bargaining model
Notes: This graphs plots the transition of the model with intrahousehold bargaining. The gender wage
gap (upper-left panel) closes exogenously over time. As a consequence the husband’s relative Pareto weight,
shown for newly matched households (age j = 1), falls (upper-right panel). The dotted lines show the data.
decision declines, until in the final steady state with equalized wages both spouses have
equal say and θ = 0.5. Notice that at t = 0 households learn the true future path of the
gender wage gap, but relative wages do not start changing before t = 1. Since Pareto
weights depend on life-time relative wages, the improvement in the wife’s relative wages
reduces the newly-matched husband’s Pareto weight, already in t = 0. This bargaining
effect increases female relative consumption, and ceteris paribus reduces her hours worked.
The reallocation of home hours from women to men is therefore stronger than what is
explained by changes in relative wages per se.
To further investigate how bargaining affects the transition, I take the bargaining model
under the same calibration, but keep the Pareto weights artificially at their initial level.
The transition path implied by this counterfactual is shown in figure 1.13. The same
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Figure 1.13: Counterfactual transition: holding Pareto weight constant
Notes: This graphs plots the hypothetical transition if men’s Pareto weight remained at their initial level.
The gender wage gap (upper-left panel) closes exogenously over time. The dotted lines reproduce the
transition path of the model with bargaining-determined Pareto weights.
income and substitution effects are at work, but only in figure 1.12, here reproduced by
the dotted lines, the bargaining effect is present. With household bargaining, in response
to higher relative wages, women get a bigger say in decision making, and their husbands’
relative weights decline. As a consequence, men’s share of housework rises by more than
what is explained by relative wages alone. Since initially home hours differ a lot by gender,
men’s disutility from putting in more time at home is relatively small, but the marginal
gain to women is big. The couple finds it, therefore, optimal to have more children when
bargaining shifts the burden of housework towards men. Thus, when the gender wage gap
is big and consequently home hours very unequal, intrahousehold bargaining tends to boost
fertility. However, when home hours are already rather equal because the gender wage gap
is fairly small, bargaining has the opposite effect on fertility. Rising relative female wages
per se imply that, optimally, a husband provides more home hours. When in addition the
husband’s relative weight falls, he needs to supply yet more home hours, which reduces his
utility substantially. Consequently, the higher female relative wages are, the faster drops
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the male preferred number of children; they prefer reducing home production over having
more children. Wives do prefer to have more children in this case, but the increase in
their weight in the household optimization is not strong enough to overcome the drop in
husband’s optimal number of children.
While initially, when the gender wage gap is big, the bargaining effect leads to higher
fertility, in the longer run it lowers fertility. Overall, however, the effect of intrahousehold
bargaining on fertility is rather small, and the behavior of fertility over time is, qualitatively,
as in the unitary model.
1.6 Confronting the Models and the Data
In this section, I compare the predictions of the different versions of the model to each
other and to the observed variation in the data. Table 1.7, lists the relative changes from
1965 to 2005, and figure 1.14 shows the transition paths of the various models and the
data for married men and women. The benchmark model performs better than the model
Table 1.7: Relative changes (in percent) over 1965–2005
Data Model
Married only All Individuals Benchmark zm = 0 γ = 0 Bargaining
TFR −35.3 (US-born mothers) −28.4 −45.9 −20.9 −33.6
Nm −5.6 −7.3 −10.7 −5.1 −10.6 −12.1
Nf +109 +87.5 +70.3 +114.3 +56.4 +104.3
Hm +70.8 +61.2 +55.7 0 +70.8 +62.3
Hf −24.5 −27.6 −20.6 −12.2 −16.8 −23.6
‘RSS’, 15
∑5
i=1(m
model
i −mdatai )2, against
data for married only 0.0355 0.0923 0.0647 0.0023
data for all individuals 0.0087 0.0962 0.0280 0.0065
‘Normalized RSS’, 15
∑5
i=1(
mmodeli −mdatai
mdatai
)2, against
data for married only 0.4240 0.2843 0.4788 0.5805
data for all individuals 0.0735 0.3166 0.1361 0.1022
Notes: Hm and Hf correspond to the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data for 2003. TFR in 2005 is based on my
calculations for TFR of US-born women only, but for 1965 it is for the entire US population. The error due
to data limitations is likely to be small, as in the 1970s US-born TFR was closely following the aggregate. I
also do not have enough information to decompose fertility into wedlock and out-of-wedlock births. The mi
in the success measures are the relative changes from 1965 to 2005 in TFR, Nm, Nf , Hm, Hf .
version ruling out male participation at home (zm = 0), and than the version not allowing
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Figure 1.14: Comparing the models and the data
for marketization of home production (γ = 0). But qualitatively all models with male
home production are quite successful. They imply (i) that the fertility rate should stabilize
before the gender wage gap is closed, and (ii) a secular rise in men’s time devoted to home
production. The zm = 0-model, on the other hand, fails in generating a flattening-out of
fertility before the gender wage gap has closed. This suggests that key in understanding
why fertility did not fall further, despite female wages kept improving, is the rise of male
home labor.
However, all models predict that fertility would flatten out much later than observed in
the data. In the benchmark model, the optimal number of children per couple stabilizes in
1995, but in the data the total fertility rate is virtually flat since the late 1970s. In the
model with γ = 0, which does not allow for marketization of home production or child
care, fertility stabilizes even later. It also understates the rise in female labor supply, but
overstates the number of children per couple.
Thus, quantitatively, both the rise of male time and the acquisition of time-saving
inputs into home production are important in understanding why the fertility decline came
to halt. Comparing the γ = 0−model to the benchmark, which uses γ = 0.2, also suggests,
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that the higher the share of market inputs into child care, the earlier fertility flattens
out. In the appendix I show a series of robustness checks, including this parameter, which
confirm this.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I argue that the common force behind the observed trends in fertility and
hours worked is the narrowing of the gender wage gap. I present a general equilibrium
model in which having children increases the need for home production, and in which rising
female relative wages have not only direct effects on employment, but also reallocate hours
worked at home from women to men. Initially, because of the gender wage gap, women
shoulder most of home production. When the wage gap shrinks, women’s labor supply
increases and total home production falls. Men, whose labor supply is much higher than
their wives, are because of increasing disutility from working not willing to fully offset the
drop in women’s time working at home. As a consequence fertility falls. However, the
smaller the gender wage gap is, the less of an effect there is on total home production, as the
scope for specialization in the household decreases. Because of imperfect substitutability
between the disutilities from working at home and in the market, the marginal utility cost
of having an additional child can become constant when female relative wages are still
improving, despite the change in hours worked, and fertility can remain flat.
Qualitatively the model predictions are consistent with the data: after an initial steep
decline, fertility stabilizes before the gender wage gap has fully closed. The model also
implies the secular rise of male home production and a fall in female time spent working at
home. However, the model generates the flattening out of the total fertility rate later than
observed in the data. While qualitatively the rise in male participation in home production
can yield a flattening out of the fertility rate, I find that a higher use of parental time-saving
inputs into home production helps in matching the timing. However, a marketization
of home production alone is not sufficient. Both the rise in male home production and
marketization are key in explaining why fertility did not decline to even lower levels.
Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A Total Fertility Rate by Mothers’ Birthplace
The US total fertility rate exhibits a U-shape with an incline since the late 1970s. Since
immigrant women have more children than the native population (in recent years)27, at
least some parts of this recovery in the aggregate data are the result of immigration. Thus,
I construct a series of total fertility rate for US-born women only. I take data from the
1.
5
2
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5
3
3.
5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
TFR US Born Women TFR Foreign Born Women
Offical TFR TFR All Women
Source: Vital Statistics of the United States
Own Calculations, using Population Estimates from US Census
Decomposition by Mother's Birthplace
Total Fertility Rate
Figure 1.15: Total fertility rate: decomposition by mother’s birthplace
Notes: Source: Author’s computation based on Vital Statistics of the United States, combined with
population estimates from the US Census.
US Vital Statistics, which, since 1970 (but not in 1972) lists live births by the mother’s
birthplace and five-year age brackets. To obtain age-specific birthrates by immigration
status, I then divide the number of live births by the corresponding number of women in
the population, for which I use IPUMS data (Census and American Community Survey)
with linear interpolation between collection years. Finally I calculate the total fertility
rates by adding up the age-specific birthrates and multiplying by 5, as the age brackets are
27Over the last decades there has been a dramatic rise in the fraction of births to immigrant mothers.
While in 1970 foreign-born mothers accounted for 7.2 percent of all births, in 2008 they account for 24.4
percent, see Vital Statistics of the United States.
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of five years width.28 Figure 1.15 shows the resulting breakdown: fertility of the native
population has shown only a very modest incline after the 1970s.
1.B Data Appendix
1.B.1 Fertility in Europe
Fertility trends in most European countries have been very similar to the US: after a
decline, fertility rates have stabilized. In figure 1.16 I show the total fertility rate for 20
European countries. These are the official numbers as published by Eurostat; for these
countries, due to lacking data, I cannot construct a measure for fertility of native women
only.
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Figure 1.16: Total fertility rates in Europe
Notes: Source: Eurostat
28As a consistency check, I do the same calculations for all women in the population, i.e. independent of
their immigration status, and compare the constructed series to the official total fertility data. The two
series align almost perfectly.
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1.B.2 Time Spent on Home Production
To highlight trends in home production, I use data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007), based
on the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Unfortunately the survey questionnaire in
1993 did not ask for the family structure of respondents, such as marital status or number
of children. Hence I drop 1993 from my analysis. Next, I need to define what activities
asked from ATUS to include as home hours. I start with the definitions of activities Aguiar
and Hurst (2007) made:
1. ‘Basic Child Care’ (what Aguiar and Hurst call child care basic). This excludes time
spent on teaching (in a broad sense) and playing with a child.
2. ‘Full Child Care’ (what Aguiar and Hurst call child care full) includes also teaching
and playing with children.
3. ‘Home Production’, which is sum of time spent on preparing meals, housework, home
and car maintenance, gardening and pet care and other domestic duties.
4. ‘Non-Market Work’ defined as ‘Home Production’ plus time spent on obtaining goods.
5. My own and preferred indicator ‘Non-Market Work including Basic Child Care’,
which I construct as ‘Non-Market Work’ plus ‘Basic Child Care’.
In all statistics and regressions with the dataset I make use of the adjusted weights
that Aguiar and Hurst (2007) provide. While the ATUS was designed to be nationally
representative when started in 1965, in subsequent years the survey provides weights for
respondents. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) adjust these weights for the number of working days
within the interview periods, as the survey asks for activities undertaken within a given
week.
All five measures of home hours show the same trend as in figure 1.4 over time: a
secular decline for women and a rise for men. This robustness across the different measures
is confirmed in OLS regressions for data on married respondents in 1965, 1975, 1985 and
2003. The results are shown in table 1.8.
The coefficients of the year dummies indicate the time-trend for female home hours.
The trend in male hours is given by the sum of coefficients of the year dummies and
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Table 1.8: Regressions of different measures of home hours for married men and women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Basic Full Home Non-Market Non-Market
Child Care Child Care Production Work +Basic Child Care
Dummy Year 1975 -1.691*** -1.629*** -5.533*** -6.386*** -8.077***
(0.353) (0.405) (0.888) (0.985) (1.065)
Dummy Year 1985 -0.252 0.290 -7.293*** -7.215*** -7.467***
(0.334) (0.394) (0.727) (0.828) (0.914)
Dummy Year 2003 0.797*** 2.302*** -10.68*** -11.40*** -10.60***
(0.304) (0.355) (0.644) (0.729) (0.801)
Dummy 1975× Male 2.887*** 2.580*** 8.158*** 8.700*** 11.59***
(0.429) (0.492) (1.062) (1.227) (1.324)
Dummy 1985× Male 1.934*** 1.671*** 14.06*** 14.22*** 16.15***
(0.378) (0.455) (0.897) (1.050) (1.140)
Dummy 2003× Male 1.916*** 1.456*** 16.53*** 17.11*** 19.02***
(0.350) (0.417) (0.758) (0.889) (0.973)
Dummy Male -5.111*** -5.436*** -25.52*** -28.11*** -33.22***
(0.296) (0.348) (0.658) (0.782) (0.857)
Number of Kids in Hh 2.323*** 3.111*** 2.306*** 2.422*** 4.745***
(0.140) (0.168) (0.302) (0.346) (0.378)
(Number of Kids in Hh)2 -0.182*** -0.274*** -0.168*** -0.192*** -0.374***
(0.0319) (0.0378) (0.0571) (0.0649) (0.0742)
Age -0.919*** -0.864*** -0.396 -0.463 -1.382***
(0.134) (0.157) (0.341) (0.383) (0.417)
Age2 0.0160*** 0.0141*** 0.0108 0.0129 0.0289***
(0.00270) (0.00317) (0.00732) (0.00819) (0.00885)
Age3 -8.86e-05*** -7.41e-05*** -6.27e-05 -8.06e-05 -0.000169***
(1.69e-05) (2.00e-05) (4.90e-05) (5.47e-05) (5.88e-05)
Constant 19.36*** 19.62*** 29.32*** 37.03*** 56.39***
(2.095) (2.418) (4.837) (5.420) (5.975)
Observations 17199 17199 17199 17199 17199
R2 0.198 0.209 0.270 0.259 0.295
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
their corresponding interaction with the male dummy. Across the five measures, the only
coefficients differing in signs are on the year 1985 and the year 2003 dummy for child
care. For all other measures of home hours they are significantly negative, indicating a
downward trend in female hours. The coefficient on the dummy for male respondents is
significantly negative and substantially big (in absolute values). Moreover, the coefficients
on the interaction of year dummies and the dummy for males is significantly positive and
exceed the overall year effect. This indicates that in 1965 married men worked fewer hours
at home than married women, and that over time male hours have been rising and female
hours falling.
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My preferred measure is ‘Non-Market Work including Basic Child Care’. Although
most parents might enjoy child care more than other domestic chores, I do include basic
care, as it is a necessary task to be done. The change in home hours over time is similar
across households with and without children (living at home), as shown in figure 1.17.
While these two household types have different levels of home hours, both display the
decline in women’s and the rise in men’s hours.
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Figure 1.17: Home hours for men and women, with and without children
Notes: Weekly hours spent on nonmarket work and basic child care for men and women aged 20 to 80.
Source: Aguiar and Hurst (2007), based on the American Time Use Survey
One final comment is in order. Since marital status in the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data
is defined in a legal sense, it is not possible to disentangle cohabiting from other singles.
But since it is more likely that men and women who are not married, but have children
together, are cohabiting, the current number of children can be employed as a proxy. Since
changes in cohabitation affect mainly younger people, I plot in figure 1.18 non-market
hours worked for men and women aged 20-40. Over time, as relative female wages rise,
women spend less time working at home, whereas men devote more time to non-market
work. These effects are strongest for married men and women, followed by singles with
children. This evidence supports that single men with no children, who are more likely to
be without a female partner, are not affected by female relative wages. For single women,
however, the trends in home hours of those with and without children are very similar, and
virtually flat. Notice that in the dataset time spent on activities is measured in hours per
week. In the model, agents have each period a time endowment of 1 that they can split
Chapter 1 55
10
20
30
40
50
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Male Female
All Men and Women
10
20
30
40
50
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Male Female
Married
10
20
30
40
50
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Male Female
Single without Kids
10
20
30
40
50
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Male Female
Single with Kids
Data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007) - ATUS
Weekly Hours Spend on Non-Market Work and Basic Child Care
Non-Market Hours of All Men and Women Aged 20-40
Figure 1.18: Home hours of 20 to 40 year old, married, and singles with and without children
Notes: Weekly hours spent on nonmarket work and basic child care for men and women aged 20 to 40.
Source: Aguiar and Hurst (2007), based on the American Time Use Survey
between market work, home work, and leisure time. Assuming that people need 8 hours of
rest every day, the principal total of 168 hours a week leaves 112 discretionary hours over
which people can decide. Hence to map data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007) into my model,
I divide all hours by 112.
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1.B.3 Market Hours: PSID versus CPS Data
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Figure 1.19: Hours worked: PSID versus CPS
Notes: Market hours of married men and women aged 20 to 60 in the PSID and in the CPS, mapped into
a time endowment of 1.
The sample size of the PSID is small compared to the Current Population Survey (CPS),
which I retrieve from IPUMS, provided by King, Ruggles, Alexander, Flood, Genadek,
Schroeder, Trampe, and Vick (2010). However, there are advantages of using the PSID
data. Prior to 1975, the CPS did not ask respondents for the exact number of weeks worked
last year (but only for a bracketing), and did not ask at all for the usual hours worked per
week. Therefore one cannot construct a reliable measure of yearly hours worked before
1975. In all years since its launch in 1962, however, the CPS asked for hours worked in the
previous week. I can map this too into my model. In particular, under my assumption that
2/3 of time is disposable, I divide ‘hours worked last week’ by (2/3× 24× 7) to obtain a
yearly analogue of male and female labor supply out of a time endowment of 1. Then I take
averages over nonoverlapping windows of 10 years, which is the length of one period in my
calibrated model. In figure 1.19 I compare male and female market labor as indicated by
the CPS and the PSID data. The data is very similar. Albeit the CPS suggests a slightly
higher level for married men’s labor supply, the two surveys show the same trends over
time. Also hourly wages, calculated as last year’s wage and salary income divided by last
year’s hours worked, in the CPS are not available before 1975. Therefore I can only obtain
the gender wage gap from the regression specified in 1.21 from 1975 onward. In figure 1.20
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Figure 1.20: Gender wage gap: PSID versus CPS
Notes: Estimated gender wage gap based on PSID or CPS data.
I show the estimated gender wage gap based on PSID and on CPS data. For the available
years, they are very similar. Calibrating the model against the smaller PSID sample, seems
therefore unproblematic for the purpose of this paper.
1.C Mathematical Appendix
1.C.1 Couple’s Optimization Problem
To derive the intratemporal optimality conditions of the couple’s optimization program,
substitute out cm and e in 1.9 from the constraints (1.10) and (1.11). Denote the multiplier
on the male and female time constraints (1.13) by λm and λf respectively. To ease notation,
let Ib = b for j = 1 and Ib = 0 otherwise. Then under the assumed preferences (1.8),
conditional on fertility choices and aggregate variables, the set of intratemporal first-order
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conditions (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker) conditions are:
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where φ˜n = φn(1 + η)
1/s and φ˜h = φh(1 + ε)
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and H = zmhm + zfhf
The Envelope Condition is ∂V (a;b,j)∂a = θ
∂um
∂cm
(1 + r), implying ∂V (a
′;b,j+1)
∂a′ = θ
∂um
∂c′m
(1 + r′),
such that the usual Euler equation ∂um∂cm = β(1 + r
′)∂um∂c′m follows. There is no closed-form
solution for these equations. Hence I solve the set of nonlinear intratemporal first-order
conditions (1.33) numerically, conditional on the individual state variables (assets and
number of children), and the aggregate state variables (gender wage gap and aggregate
capital stock, which imply the interest rate, male and female wages).
For retired households (of age j ≥ Tr) with slack time constraints, i.e. with λm = λf = 0,
one can characterize the optimal choices as a function of consumption further. Since
w˜m(j) = w˜f (j) = 0 and thus nm(j) = nf (j) = 0, the optimality conditions (1.33) imply
hm(j)
hf (j)
=
(
1− θ
θ
zm
zf
)1/ε
for j ≥ Tr
which is equation (1.32) in the main text.
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1.D Calibration Appendix
1.D.1 Gender Wage Gap as Ratio of Residual Wages
I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1968 to 2007. First I estimate for
men and women between of age 20 to 59 equation (1.21) by OLS. The obtained estimates
are shown in table 1.9. Since E[logwi,t|Dfemalei,t = 1]−E[logwi,t|Dfemalei,t = 0] = β1,t,
the gender wage gap for year t is given by eβ1,t , which I plot in figure 1.3 of the main
text. To feed χt into the model, where a period is 10 years, I take the averages over the
appropriate (nonoverlapping) windows.
1.D.2 Required Amount of Home Production
I aim at finding the parameters of x¯(bh) = κ0 + κ1b
κ2
h by exploiting the observed cross-
sectional variation in a base year of male and female hours against the number of children
in the household. Off-corners the intratemporal first-order conditions (1.33) for nm and
hm imply
x¯(bh) =
φh
φn
(
1 + ε
1 + η
)1/s h (s−1)ε−1sm
n
(s−1)η−1
s
m
w˜m
zm
γ
1− γ (zmhm + zfhf )
γ (1.34)
In the model, hours worked at home and in the market29 depend on the amount of home
goods needed. The dataset provided by Aguiar and Hurst (2007) includes respondents’
wages and number of children in the household for some years. Thus, equation (1.23) can
be used to back out the parameters of x¯(bh), conditional on all other parameters. I map
Aguiar and Hurst’s data for 1985 into my model, by scaling hours worked such that the
total time endowment is one, as explained above. Then I take averages by the number
of children in the household. Finally I scale male wages from the collapsed data such
that their mean equals the model’s (cohort-size weighted mean) equilibrium wage. Since
29The use of home appliances changes with the required amount, and this has –through the budget
constraint (1.10)– an effect on consumption, which affects labor supply, by (1.33).
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Table 1.9: Regression of log wages
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x¯(bh) = κ0 + κ1b
κ2
h , it follows
κ0 + κ1b
κ2
h =
(
φh
φn
(
1 + ε
1 + η
)1/s (hm(bh)) (s−1)ε−1s
(nm(bh))
(s−1)η−1
s
w˜m
zm
γ
1− γ (zmhm(bh) + zfhf (bh))
)γ
I solve this set of equations for bh = 0, 1, 2 in the three unknowns κ0, κ1, κ2, conditional on
all other parameters.
1.D.3 Remaining Parameters
Where parameters could not be backed out from model’s equilibrium conditions in combin-
ation with the data and could not be taken from the literature, I choose them to match
features of the 1965 data. I take the demographic structure of 1965 as a given, and compute
the cohort densities {µ(j)}Tlj=1 from the United Nations World Population Prospects: The
2008 Revision.
Conditional on a guess for σb, I choose the remaining parameters to match the moments
shown in table 1.2, under the fiction that agents assumed prices to remain constant.
{φn, φh, ε, s} are set to match Nm, Hm, Nf , Hf , while φb is set to match the total fertility
rate in 1965. Next, I solve for the final steady state of the model under these parameters. If
the final TFR is close to 2, I keep the values as calibrated parameters. If not, I guess a new
σb and return to choosing {φn, φh, ε, s}. To note is that changing one of the parameters in
{φn, φh, ε, s} triggers changes in κ0, κ1, κ2 (see the previous section).
1.E Additional Results
Figure 1.8 of the main text shows the model-implied behavior of aggregate variables,
averaging over all households alive. Figure 1.21 also shows the disaggregated transition
paths for the different age groups in the benchmark model (θ = 0.5; γ = 0.2).
1.F Robustness Checks
First, I perform a series of robustness checks on σb, which relates to the elasticity of utility
with respect to children. For the benchmark model I chose σb to target a long-run total
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Figure 1.21: Transition of the benchmark model – disaggregation by age
fertility rate of 2. Now I am lifting this restriction, and use various ad-hoc values for σb.
All other parameters are chosen under the calibration strategy of section 1.3, using γ = 0.2
as in the benchmark. Table 1.10 shows the resulting final steady states. The higher σb,
Table 1.10: Sensitivity analysis: steady state effect of σb
σb = 0.25 σb = 0.3 σb = 0.395 σb = 0.6
TFR 1.80 1.902 2.031 2.227
Nm 0.292 0.290 0.288 0.285
Nf 0.292 0.290 0.288 0.285
Hm 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.228
Hf 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.228
Notes: This table shows the final steady states of the different versions of the model, that are calibrated
individually. The calibration follows section 1.3, but uses ad-hoc values for σb, rather than targeting a
long-run TFR. The benchmark model is the one with σb = 0.395.
the higher is fertility in the final steady state, and the less fertility declines during the
transition. To replicate the steep decline in TFR of the 1960s, however, the model needs a
value for σb that is not too high. A very low value of σb, on the other hand, would imply a
lower TFR than observed most recently. All values, however, do imply a flattening out of
Chapter 1 63
fertility before the gender wage gap is closed.
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Figure 1.22: Sensitity analysis: varying γ
Next, I conduct a sensitivity analysis for the share of market inputs into home production,
γ, since in the literature the range of estimates is wide, and in my model the interpretation
of γ should include all market inputs into home production, not only appliances. In the
benchmark model I set γ = 0.2, which is much bigger than the estimate of 0.08 by Benhabib,
Rogerson, and Wright (1991) to allow for a greater marketization of child care, but below
the upper-end value of Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995), who include housing
capital and conclude that market inputs’ share into home production does not differ from
the capital share in market output (γ = α). Since in my model home production is at the
margin varying only with child care, which requires mainly human time, I work with a
(γ < α). In section 1.4.4, I have already shown the transition of the model with γ = 0. As
a further sensitivity analysis, I also calibrate models based different values for γ, and solve
their transition to steady state. Figure 1.22 and table 1.11 summarize the findings. The
higher γ, the earlier the fertility rate stabilizes, bringing the model closer to the data.
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Table 1.11: Sensitivity analysis: varying γ
γ = 0 γ = 0.08 γ = 0.2
Final Steady State
TFR 2.027 1.99 2.031
Nm 0.281 0.285 0.288
Nf 0.281 0.285 0.288
Hm 0.205 0.235 0.228
Hf 0.205 0.235 0.228
Relative Changes (in percent) over 1965–2005
TFR −20.9 −23.4 −28.4
Nm −10.6 −9.2 −10.7
Nf +56.4 +65.2 +70.3
Hm +70.8 57.7 +55.7
Hf −16.8 −18.37 −20.6
Notes: This table shows the calibrated models’ final steady states and the implied changes over 1965–2005.
The models are calibrated individually, using the strategy outlined in section 1.3. The baseline model has
γ = 0.2.
Chapter 2
Capital Taxes, Labor Taxes and
the Household1
2.1 Introduction
There is considerable literature that investigates the effect of changes in the tax code
on the economic behavior of individuals. First, using the collective model of household
behavior, Apps and Rees (1988; 1999) and Donni (2003), among others, present a formal
investigation of the impact of taxes on hours worked and welfare within the household. A
second strand is the dynamic macro literature of optimal taxation. Domeij and Heathcote
(2004), Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), among others,
have used the so called model of heterogeneous agents and wealth accumulation to analyze
the impact of changes in tax code.
Both bodies of work have undoubtedly highlighted important issues that governments
need to be aware of when changing their policies. We proffer that unless these influential
frameworks are combined into one, they offer only a partial view of the effects that changes
in the tax scheme have. To understand our objections, consider first the literature on
heterogeneous agents in incomplete financial markets. In this framework the household
is most often represented by a single individual, typically a male. This individual has an
uncertain labor income stream and accumulates wealth in order to buffer shocks to his
1This chapter is the result of joint work by Rigas Oikonomou and me, with equal shares in all aspects of
the paper.
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labor income. A considerable effort is made to match various cross sectional facts that
make this model a suitable representation of the economy to study the between household
distributional effects of changes in the tax policy. When the policy changes, however, little
is known of what happens within the household; especially, whether the new policy affects
the intrahousehold allocation and welfare.
In the collective framework the family is formed by more members than just one
individual, typically two spouses, a male and a female. The couple allocates resources
between its members according to a sharing rule, and changes in tax rates affect the sharing
rule and the division of the surplus within the family. One limitation of this literature is
that the models are usually static and therefore not suitable to analyze how different tax
schedules affect capital accumulation and, more generally, the intertemporal behavior of
families.
In this paper, we combine the two approaches. We set up a quantitative dynamic model
in which individuals live for several periods, some as singles and some married, as part of a
couple. Marital status is determined at the initial period of the life-cycle and is assumed
not to change over time. There is uncertainty about the labor income of individuals and
there are incomplete financial markets. As in the dynamic optimal taxation literature,
single individuals supply labor and accumulate precautionary savings in order to self-insure
against income risks. Couple households also save and allocate hours to the market, but as
in the collective model these decisions are made according to a sharing rule which reflects
the bargaining position of the male and the female spouse. This rule is initiated in the first
period of the life-cycle, whereby it solves a Nash bargaining problem. For every subsequent
model period the rule is updated to ensure that both spouses are better off in the marriage
than as singles. By considering different model variants, we thoroughly investigate the
impact of the household contract on the aggregate economy and the effects of policy on the
intrahousehold allocation. Our approach offers the possibility to study the welfare effects
of changes in the tax code between households as well as at the individual level, within the
household.
Taking US institutions as given, we consider a simple change in policy. We assume that
the government eliminates capital taxation and instead finances its spending through higher
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distortive labor taxes.2 We use the model to answer the question: which individuals and
household types benefit from this reform in the long-run, and which gain in the transition?
In dynamic models with single agents and precautionary savings, this type of policy change
has been shown to confer large welfare losses to the population. For example Domeij and
Heathcote (2004) illustrate that on the transition path only a small fraction of individuals
benefit from the reform, and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) suggest that taxing capital
at a high rate in this environment may not be a bad idea. The intuition is as follows: Since
precautionary savings make the demand for capital less elastic to the rate of return and
thereby to capital taxes, positive capital taxation does not have a large distortive effect on
the economy.
When we look at this effect from the perspective of our model that includes dual
earner and single earner households, we find that it is no longer of primary importance.
We trace this difference to the following empirical fact: Changes in labor income are not
perfectly correlated within families, and therefore couple households can reduce overall
risks considerably. Strong empirical evidence for this is given in the recent work of Blundell,
Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2012). Since family labor supply acts as an insurance
mechanism, it weakens the incentive to accumulate savings for precautionary purposes. In
effect the demand for capital, in the aggregate, becomes more elastic with respect to taxes.
Capital taxes have a large distortive effect on the economy and when our reform eliminates
them, individuals benefit both in the long-run and in the transition.
In our model the sharing rule, which divides resources, depends on the outside options
of the male and female spouse. As such, there is a limited commitment problem within
the household. For example when the labor income of one spouse increases, the sharing
rule must allocate more resources to her. This implies that the couple has to give up some
risk sharing to satisfy a participation constraint. Since our theory assigns an important
role to the savings behavior of couples, we need investigate the impact of this limited
commitment problem on household savings. We explore whether limited commitment
means that household members behave more like single individuals, thus restoring a strong
demand for precautionary savings in the household. In a simplified analytical version of the
2Following the works of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), many authors have studied the effects of
eliminating capital taxation in a wide range of models and contexts but without investigating the effects on
intrahousehold allocations.
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model in section 2.3, we show that it is virtually impossible to sign the impact of limited
commitment on the couples demand for savings. In our quantitative model we find that
less commitment has only a mild effect on wealth accumulation.
In our model, changes in the mixture of capital and labor taxes have a big impact on the
intrahousehold sharing rule. We show that increasing labor taxes has two opposing effects:
First, it decreases intrahousehold inequality in income and thus improves the households’
commitment and insurance possibilities. But through a second channel it may tighten
the participation constraints, as it impoverishes the household and thus makes it more
tempting to renege on past commitments. Lowering capital taxes, on the other hand, is
shown to always enhance commitment. This result derives from our treatment of wealth
as a state variable in the model. In line with empirical evidence for the US economy, we
assume that assets are commonly held within the couple. Therefore, as a household’s
financial income increases, a larger fraction of consumption is financed through wealth,
relaxing the participation constraints.
When the change in policy takes place, we look at how these channels translate
quantitatively to an impact on the sharing rule. We find that the incidence of rebargaining
on the intrahousehold allocation rises sharply, by nearly 35% compared to the original
steady state with high capital taxes. Younger families experience the largest drop in
intrahousehold insurance, meaning that the participation constraints become tighter for
these groups, since their assets are too low. In contrast, in the final steady state all age
cohorts build up a higher stock of wealth, and we show that the new policy regime may
ultimately improve the households’ insurance possibilities.
Even though intrahousehold commitment is less when the policy changes, there is a
reduction in consumption inequality within the household. Eliminating capital taxation in
our model means that more of individual consumption is financed through wealth, which is
a common resource in the family. But for the same reason between household consumption
inequality increases considerably under the new policy since wealth is more dispersed than
labor income across households. Overall in the cross section of individuals the second effect
dominates over the first.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First as discussed previously,
there is a sizable literature on the optimality of the US tax code in models of heterogeneous
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and wealth accumulation. Early contributions in this literature include the work of
Aiyagari (1995) and Imrohoroglu (1998) and more recent ones include the models of
Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) and Conesa and Krueger
(2006). In terms of our parametrization of individual uncertainty in the labor market,
the framework that we setup shares many features with the work by Conesa, Kitao, and
Krueger. Whereas they focus on the progressivity of the tax code and its welfare implications
between households, we look at the effects of changing linear taxes and investigate also
intrahousehold allocations.
More recently Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012a;b) set up a model where families
are formed by a husband and a wife and use it to investigate the aggregate effects on hours
and output of allowing couples to file separately for taxes. Their work exploits the fact
that female labor supply is more elastic because women in their model decide whether or
not to participate in the labor market. We take a different stand in our paper. We look at
families as an insurance device against idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks, whereas in
Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012a) there are no unpredictable changes in labor income
over the life-cycle.
Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2008) take a model with idiosyncratic labor
income risks and linear taxes and study the welfare effects of reforms that eliminate capital
taxation. In their model, they have extended families which consist of a parent and her
children, to observe the link between generations. They show that, because of double
altruism, setting the capital tax to zero and replacing it with labor income taxes, their
economy can generate support for the reform. Our analysis reaches a similar conclusion
but from a very different perspective. Rather than allowing for intergenerational transfers,
we present a model with transfers between spouses.
Our paper is also related to the considerable literature of the collective model of
intrahousehold decisions.3 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate
the impact of changes in the tax code on the intertemporal behavior of families and
the scope of intrahousehold risk sharing. Existing work in the collective framework uses
static models to investigate whether men and women should be taxed separately or face
3 See for example Chiappori (1988; 1992), Blundell and Etheridge (2010)) and especially to the recent
work of Mazzocco, Ruiz, and Yamaguchi (2007) and Gallipoli and Turner (2011) who present a dynamic
extension of this model.
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different tax schedules in light of the differences in the elasticity male and female labor
supplies. For example Apps and Rees (1999) investigate revenue neutral reforms that
increase the marginal tax rates of men and lower the tax rates of women in a model with
home production. Apps and Rees (2011) ask whether the optimal Ramsey policy calls for
lower marginal tax rates for women (see also Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis (2011)).
Here, we do not attempt to address these issues. Our approach is to abstract from the
complexities of the tax code and to summarize the institutions in a simple linear tax system.
But since our model is dynamic, we add to the literature by formalizing how changes in
linear taxes can affect the welfare and the risk sharing possibilities of families.
2.2 The Model
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals, equally many males and
females. Gender is indexed by g ∈ {m, f} and age by j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. Individuals survive
from age j to j+ 1 with probability ψj . At each date a new cohort of individuals enters the
economy; we assume that population grows exogenously at rate θ. Since population growth
and the survival probabilities are time-invariant, the model age distribution is stationary.
The life-cycle of individuals comprises of the following three stages: Marriage (matching),
work and retirement. Since our model does not endogenize family formation, we simplify
the first stage by letting matching take place in a pre-labor-market period of life labeled
age zero. A fraction µ of individuals will find partners at this stage and form households as
couples, and the remaining agents will remain bachelors. Marital status does not change
over time. After date zero individuals work for jR − 1 periods –conditional on survival–
and then retire at date jR. At age J , they die with probability one.
Agents are risk averse and derive utility from consumption c and leisure l. Per-period
utility is denoted by u(c, l). We follow the convention in the literature of representing male
and female preferences by the same utility function. Finally individuals and households
discount future utility flows at a constant factor β.
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2.2.1 Endowments
Agents in the economy differ in terms of their labor productivity along three dimensions: a
deterministic (life-cycle) component Lg(j), a fixed effect αi,g and an idiosyncratic labor
productivity shock i,g. When entering the labor market, each agent draws a realization of
αi,g, the value of which remains constant throughout her working life. We assume that
there are N possible realizations {α1,g, α2,g, ...αN,g} for each gender. We also assume that
the assignment of an agent to a realization is made according to some probabilities pSi,g
when the agent is single, and according to probabilities pMi,k when the individual is married.
Notice that pMi,k is the joint distribution of the two spouses across all possible values of αi,m
and αk,f . In our model, we allow the productivity endowments to be correlated within the
couple.
Idiosyncratic productivity g changes stochastically over time according to a first order
Markov process. We let pig(
′
g|g) be the conditional pdf for this process. The analogous
object for couples is denoted by pi(′|), where  in the case of a couple household is the
vector of productivities of its members. We also allow for an arbitrary correlation of labor
income shocks within the family.
2.2.2 Markets and Technology
We assume that the production technology can be represented with a Cobb-Douglas function
of the form:
Y = Kα(AN)1−α (2.1)
where K denotes the economy’s aggregate capital stock, and N is the aggregate labor input,
and A is the level of labor-augmenting technology. The resource constraint is given by
K ′ = (1− δ)K + Y −G− C (2.2)
where by convention, primes denote the next model period. C is aggregate consumption in
the economy, G is government spending and δ is the depreciation rate of the aggregate
capital stock. Factor prices are determined in competitive markets. Wages, measured in
efficiency units, are equal to the marginal product of labor, and the return to capital is its
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marginal product net of depreciation. We denote these objects by w and r respectively.
Financial markets are incomplete. There are no state contingent securities. By trading
claims on the aggregate capital stock, agents can self insure. In keeping with the literature,
we assume that these trades are subject to an ad hoc borrowing constraint a. The value
for the constraint is set to zero, such that our economy rules out borrowing altogether.
Moreover, there are no annuity markets and households leave accidental bequests which
we denote by B. Bequests are distributed uniformly across individuals in the economy.
2.2.3 Government
The government engages in two activities. First, it levies taxes on consumption τC , on
financial income τK , and on labor income τN to finance a level of expenditures G. We rule
out government debt so that the government runs a balanced budget each period.
Second, it runs a Pay-as-you-Go social security system, which is financed through a
proportional tax on the earnings of the working population. We denote by τSS the social
security tax, and by SS(g, αi,g) the transfer that retired individual i receives from the
government. Notice that transfers depend on gender g, and the wage fixed effect αi,g. Our
aim is to capture the current US social security system in a parsimonious way. SS(g, αi,g)
depends on gender because life-cycle productivity Lg(j) differs across men and women in
the economy.
2.2.4 Value Functions
Bachelor Households. We first consider the program of a bachelor of gender g and age
j. We let Sg(a,X, j) be the lifetime utility for this agent when her (his) stock of wealth
is a, her permanent productivity is αi,g, her idiosyncratic time varying productivity is g.
To save on notation, we summarize the fixed effect and the time varying component of
productivity in a vector X. This agent must choose consumption c and hours worked n (if
not retired, i. e. j < jR) to maximize her utility subject to the budget and the borrowing
constraints. She solves the following functional equation:
Sg(a,X, j) = max
a′≥a,l
u(c, l) + βψj
∫
Sg(a
′, X ′, j + 1)dpig(X ′|X) (2.3)
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Subject to:
l + n ≤ 1
a′ + (1 + τC)c = (a+B)(1 + r(1− τK)) + wgαi,gLg(j)(1− τN − τSS)n if j < jR
a′ + (1 + τC)c = (a+B)(1 + r(1− τK)) + SS(g, αi,g) if j ≥ jR
Couple Households. In this paragraph, we describe the program of the couple. As
discussed previously, we model decision making within the household as a contract under
limited commitment. By that we mean that there is a sharing rule on the basis of which
resources are divided between the male and the female spouse, and that this rule is affected
by the bargaining position of the household members. To be more specific, we assume,
as in Mazzocco, Ruiz, and Yamaguchi (2007), Gallipoli and Turner (2011) and Voena
(2012), that the household contract is such that both partners must at any point in time
be better off in the marriage than as singles. As in the limited commitment literature (see
for example Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000)), the household needs to give up some
efficiency and risk sharing to ensure that participation is satisfied for both of its members.
We introduce an additional state variable to the value function that represents the male
spouse’s share on household resources. We call this share λ. Equivalently, 1− λ represents
the female spouse’s share. As we explain below, the shares λ and (1 − λ) will change
over time to satisfy the participation constraints. Moreover, they will be initiated at the
matching stage, whereby the household will solve a Nash bargaining game.
As in Cubeddu and Rı´os-Rull (1997), Regalia and Rı´os-Rull (2001) and Mazzocco
(2007), among others, we assume that wealth is a commonly held resource in the family.
This assumption is a considerable simplification of the households program because it
reduces the number of state variables (we only have to keep track of the households total
wealth), and it implies that individual Euler equations do not have to be introduced as
additional constraints to the household’s program. Moreover, it seems that it is a reasonable
assumption to make for the behavior of US households. According to Mazzocco (2007),
in all US states, with the exception of the state of Mississippi, all income earned in the
marriage and wealth acquired with those earnings are considered common marital property.
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We take this to mean that only aggregate family wealth matters for the households decision
making.
In order to determine the outside options for the male and the female spouse, we assume
as Mazzocco (2007) that divorce leads to an equal division of assets. This assumption
also appears to be empirically relevant; in those states that have a ’common property law’
assets are indeed divided equally between the spouses after a divorce. Moreover, in the so
called equitable property states assets after a divorce are divided ’fairly’, meaning that
courts take into account a variety of factors, including the contributions of each party, but
also future earnings and living standards. Overall, in the US data an equal division of
household assets is the average (see Mazzocco). Because individuals are born with zero
assets in our model, couples are born married and stay married forever. Our assumptions
of common property and equitable division are therefore in line with the US data.4
Let M(a,X, λ, j) be the value function of a household of age j (in our economy
households are formed by agents of the same cohort), where X summarizes the productive
endowments of its members, and as before a is the level of wealth of the household. Moreover
we let ξ be a constant benefit that accrues to each spouse in the marriage. The program of
the couple can be written as:
M(a,X, λ, j) = maxλu(cm, lm) + (1− λ)u(cf , lf )) + ξ (2.4)
+ βψj
∫
M(a′, X ′, λ′, j + 1)dpi(X ′|X)
Subject to:
lg + ng ≤ 1 for g ∈ {m, f}
4We assume that there are no legal costs associated with separation. In contrast, Cubeddu and R´ıos-Rull
(1997) assume that divorces lead to a large destruction of household net worth (40% in their model). In
our case, because divorce never occurs in equilibrium even if we assume no legal costs, it is innocuous in
terms of the wealth distribution. Of course the saving behavior would be affected, because the outside
options of the male and the female spouse determine the rebargining of the marital contract. For example, if
households lose a percentage of their wealth in the process of divorce, as they do in Cubeddu and R´ıos-Rull
(1997), then higher wealth means that the incentive to stay together will probably be stronger. But if costs
are fixed then poorer households will have more commitment. In reality, we believe that the proper way to
introduce wealth destruction during separations is to use both types of costs. For wealthier households
legal fees are more likely to be higher as the incentive to hire more qualified lawyers is obviously greater.
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a′ + (1 + τC)(cm + cf ) = (a+ 2B)(1 + r(1− τK))
+w(
∑
g
Lg(j)αii,gng(1− τN − τSS)) if j < jR
a′ + (1 + τC)(cm + cf ) = (a+ 2B)(1 + r(1− τK)) +
∑
g
SS(g, αi,g) if j ≥ jR
Notice that in 2.4, the couple draws a new value λ′ in the next period. We assume that
this updating occurs if there is a violation of participation. If, for example, under a new
realization of the state vector X ′ the husband is better off as a single than under the
contract λ, his share in household resources must increase to reflect his improved bargaining
position. Analogously, λ decreases if the female spouse has to be made better off. Formally,
let Vg(a,X, λ, j) be the expected lifetime utility of the household member of gender g under
the optimal policies that solve equation 2.4. It is determined by the following functional
equation:
Vg(a,X, λ, j) = ug(cg, lg) + ξ + βψj
∫
Vg(a
′, X ′, λ, j + 1)dpi(X ′|X) (2.5)
The updating rule for λ is as follows:
λ′ ∈ arg min
λ∗
|λ∗ − λ| such that (2.6)
Vg(a
′, X ′, λ∗, j + 1) ≥ Sg(a
′
2
, X ′g, j + 1)
where Xg is a vector formed by elements of X that are relevant to household member g
if he or she were to be single. Equation 2.6 says that the value of λ is updated in those
states where the participation constraint is violated, and is otherwise constant. Whenever
there is a change in λ, this change is the minimum required to satisfy participation for
both spouses.
The value of λ is initiated at the matching stage of the life-cycle, as a solution to the
following Nash bargaining problem:
λ1 ∈ arg max
λ
[ Vm(a,X, λ, 1)− Sm(a
2
, X, λ, 1) + ξm] [ Vf (a,X, λ, 1)− Sf (
a
2
, X, λ, 1) + ξf ]
Two final comments are in order. First, notice that the Nash sharing rule determines
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the initial intrahousehold allocation under the influence of two additional gender specific
utility gains ξg for g ∈ {m, f}. These gains at the matching stage determine the magnitude
of income transfers from one spouse to the other. For example, if ξm > ξf then the
household contract will give an initial allocation with large transfers from the male to the
female spouse thus leading to a big inequality in hours within the family. We will choose
values for ξm and ξf to target the division of hours in the family as in the US data.
Second, although the marriage gain ξ is constant over the life-cycle and, therefore, has
no direct effect on the optimality conditions in 2.4, it does affect the extent to which the
two spouses can commit to the allocation that they bargain in period 1. For instance, if ξ
is sufficiently large, the household surplus is sufficiently large such that updating of the
weight λ never occurs. In this case, there exists an initial weight λ1 such that the household
can commit to never update the sharing rule, and perfect risk sharing within the household
will obtain. For smaller values of the utility gain the household contract is one of limited
commitment, meaning that the participation constraints will occasionally bind (see Ligon,
Thomas, and Worrall (2000); Attanasio and R´ıos-Rull (2000)). In our numerical analysis,
we investigate how different values of this parameter affect the household contract and the
welfare gains from the tax reform.
We characterize the competitive equilibrium in section 2.C in the Appendix.
2.3 A Two Period Version of the Model
In this section we present a simplified version of the model. We assume that individuals
live for two periods and face labor income uncertainty only in period 2 of the life-cycle.
There are no fixed effects or gender differences in the price of labor. Idiosyncratic labor
productivity in period 1 is normalized to unity. We denote the period two endowment of
the individual of gender g by g. The mean productivity is equal across the two agents.
Furthermore the utility gains at the matching stage ξm and ξf are set to zero. The Nash
sharing rule thus specifies an initial share λ1 =
1
2 as the two family members are effectively
identical in period one.
This version of the model buys us considerable tractability. In period two, given the
idiosyncratic productivities m and f , we can solve analytically for the intrahousehold
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allocation. Moreover, given preferences, the utility gain ξ and the endowments of the
two agents, we can determine how the sharing rule λ2 evolves. We use the model first to
determine the impact of the tax schedule on the intrahousehold allocation and, second, to
investigate how the degree of commitment affects optimal household savings.
2.3.1 The Effect of Taxes on Household Decision Making
We first illustrate how capital and labor taxes affect the properties of the sharing rule in
period two. Our starting point is to assume that u(cg, lg) = η log cg + (1− η)log lg. With
this parametrization of preferences a share of one half translates into equal consumption
between male and female spouses. If, on the other hand, λ2 6= 12 , then under limited
commitment the consumption levels diverge, giving rise to within household inequality.
Our goal here is to trace the effect of different policies on risk sharing in that sense.
We solve the model backwards. Assume that we are in period 2, and that given the
sharing rule, the household decides how to split consumption and hours in the family. Let
Ac = (1 + r(1− τK))a1 be the level of wealth of the household brought forward from period
one. It is trivial to show that the optimal consumption is cm = λ2η(Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g)
and cf = (1 − λ2)η(Ac +
∑
g w(1 − τN )g). Similarly, the optimal choice of leisure for
male and female spouses is given by: lm = λ2(1− η)Ac+
∑
g w(1−τN )g
mw(1−τN ) and lf = (1− λ2)(1−
η)
Ac+
∑
g w(1−τN )g
fw(1−τN ) .
Participation Constraints. To respect the participation constraint of each household
member, the allocation rule λ2 must satisfy the following conditions:
η log λ2 η (Ac +
∑
g
w(1− τN )g) + (1− η) log λ2 η
(Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g)
mw(1− τN ) + ξ ≥
η log η (
Ac
2
+ w(1− τN )m) + (1− η) log η
(Ac2 + w(1− τN )m)
mw(1− τN ) (2.7)
which guarantees that the male spouse is better off in the marriage than as a single and,
η log (1− λ2) η (Ac +
∑
g
w(1− τN )g) + (1− η) log λ2 η
(Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g)
fw(1− τN ) + ξ ≥
η log η (
Ac
2
+ w(1− τN )f ) + (1− η) log η
(Ac2 + w(1− τN )f )
fw(1− τN ) (2.8)
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which represents the analogous condition for the female spouse.
Solving equations 2.7 and 2.8 for λ2 defines the following bounds:
λ2 ∈ { e−ξ
Ac
2 + m w (1− τN )
Ac +
∑
g g w (1− τN )
, 1− e−ξ
Ac
2 + fw(1− τN )
Ac +
∑
g gw(1− τN )
} (2.9)
Notice that with ξ = 0 the level of utility for each household member is identical to what
they would get as singles. In this case, the spouses cannot commit to any allocation other
than the one that divides the assets equally and gives to each of them their own labor
income. Being together is no different than being a single when ξ = 0.
However, if ξ > 0, expression 2.9 gives a region where the initial allocation is not
rebargained. For instance, for each value of f and financial income Ac, there is a unique
threshold m(Ac, f ) such that if m < m(Ac, f ), the contract updates λ2 to be equal to
the upper bound of 2.9. In words, if male productivity in period 2 is low, the sharing rule
has to be rebargained. The new weight λ2 is equal to the upper bound of 2.9 because the
upper bound is lower than a half, thus making the participation constraint of the female
spouse bind. Similarly, there is an analogous m(Ac, f ) such that for an m above this
threshold the new contract gives λ2 equal to the lower bound of 2.9. Henceforth, we refer
to the lower bound in 2.9 as λL2 and to the upper bound as λ
U
2 .
Labor Taxes. Given the intrahousehold allocation, we can derive the effect of changes
in the level of labor taxes τN and capital taxes τK . First consider that labor taxes fall, i.e.
(1−τN ) increases. Abstracting for the moment from general equilibrium effects (movements
in wages and interest rates), we can write:
dλL2
d (1− τN ) = e
−ξAc
mw −
∑
g gw
2
(Ac +
∑
g g(1− τN )w)2
(2.10)
dλU2
d (1− τN ) = e
−ξAc
∑
g gw
2 − fw
(Ac +
∑
g g(1− τN )w)2
(2.11)
Consider first the case where m > m(Ac, f ). In this case, it must be that λ2 = λ
L
2 >
1
2 ,
i.e. the male spouse’s weight needs to increase (the lower bound in 2.9 binds). The partial
derivative 2.10 will be positive; meaning that a reduction in the level of labor taxes increases
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λL2 and, therefore, makes the change in λ2 relative to λ1 even greater. A fall in the tax
rate reduces risk sharing within the household because in those states where the male
labor income is high, the husbands consumption share increases even more relative to
an economy where tax rates on labor income are high. The intuition is that changes in
labor income are the root of the limited commitment problem. Lower tax rates exacerbate
intrahousehold income inequality and also exacerbate the limited commitment problem.
Note that if f >> m the upper bound λ
U
2 will bind. In that case, the female spouse must
be made better off and a reduction in τN will decrease λ
U
2 hence making the fall in the
male share larger.5 We summarize the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Holding wages and interest rates constant, a reduction of labor income
taxes reduces insurance within the household under log-log separable preferences. The
household sharing rule and thus intrahousehold allocation become more responsive to
changes in the idiosyncratic labor productivity of the male and the female spouse.
General equilibrium effects that are left out from 2.10 and 2.11 operate in the opposite
direction. To see this, note that in the short-run, with the economy’s capital being fixed, a
fall in labor taxes will affect wages and interest rates through hours worked. Since hours
will increase in response to the fall in distortionary taxation, the wage rate w will decrease
and the interest rate r will rise. Consequently, the above expressions have to be multiplied
by 1 + dwd(1−τN )
(1−τN )
w , and also an additional term that reflects the effect of higher financial
income on the constraint set has to be included.6 This term is given by d r(1−τK)a1d (1−τN ) > 0
times the partial derivatives of λL2 or λ
U
2 with respect to Ac.
dλL2
d Ac
= e−ξ(1− τN )
∑
g gw
2 − mw
(Ac +
∑
g g(1− τN )w)2
(2.12)
5Obviously from 2.10 and 2.11, these effects go through if the household has positive wealth at the
beginning of period 2. If Ac equals zero, then the derivatives are zero and changes in the tax schedule have
no impact on the intrahousehold allocation.
6Notice that the magnitude of the term dw
d(1−τN )
(1−τN )
w
has to be implausible to invalidate proposition 1.
For example, assume that the technology is off the form KαN1−α; that gives a wage rate w = (1−α)KαN−α.
Moreover, note that we can write the term dw
d(1−τN )
(1−τN )
w
as dw
dN
dN
d(1−τN )
(1−τN )
w
Let eN be the elasticity of
N with respect to (1− τN ), it follows that dwdN dNd(1−τN )
(1−τN )
w
= −αeN . If we assume that α (the capital
share in value added) is roughly one third, the elasticity has to be above three to reverse the sign of the
term 1 + dw
d(1−τN )
(1−τN )
w
. This seems to be implausibly high given that most empirical estimates place the
elasticity of labor supply below unity.
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dλU2
d Ac
= e−ξ(1− τN )
fw −
∑
g gw
2
(Ac +
∑
g g(1− τN )w)2
(2.13)
By a similar reasoning to the one above, we can show that
dλL2
d Ac
< 0 and
dλU2
d Ac
> 0. In other
words, when labor taxes fall, the rise in the interest rate will increase the importance of
financial income to the households budget and will relax the limited commitment constraints.
This effect, however, will grow weaker as the economy builds up a higher capital stock after
the fall in the labor income tax rate.
Capital Taxes. Notice that expressions 2.12 and 2.13 imply that a rise in asset income
from any source, capital taxes, interest rates or savings, has a beneficial effect on household
risk sharing. More risk sharing comes from two sources. First, the household will enjoy a
higher return given the stock of assets (in the short-run), and second the level of wealth
will increase as the household is induced to save more in response to the higher return (
in the longer term). As more of the households consumption is financed through wealth,
changes in labor income have a smaller impact on individual welfare and, therefore, on
the participation constraints. The next proposition summarizes the effect of lower capital
taxation on household insurance:
Proposition 2. Lower capital taxes improve insurance under log-log preferences. The
household sharing rule and thus intrahousehold allocation are less responsive to changes in
labor income.
Again, the result in proposition 2 holds unless there are powerful general equilibrium
effects in the short-run after the change in policy takes place. In our quantitative model
in section 2.5, we will comment on how the change in the tax scheme affects household
commitment and risk sharing when general equilibrium effects are present.
Non-Separable Preferences. We derive the impact of changes in taxation assuming
that individual utility is given by u(cg, lg) =
(cηg l
1−η
g )1−γ
1−γ with γ > 1. Using simple algebra,
we can write the participation constraints for male and female spouses as follows:
(
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g
(1 + f(λ2, ))((w(1− τN )m))1−η
)1−γ
χ
1− γ + ξ ≥
(
Ac
2 + w(1− τN )m
(w(1− τN )m)1−η
)1−γ
χ
1− γ
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(
f(λ2, )
1 + f(λ2, )
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g
(w(1− τN )f )1−η
)1−γ
χ
1− γ + ξ ≥
(
Ac
2 + w(1− τN )f
(w(1− τN )f )1−η
)1−γ
χ
1− γ
where χ = (ηη(1 − η)1−η)1−γ and f(λ2, ) = ( λ21−λ2 (
f
m
)(1−η)(1−γ))−1/γ determines the
shares of resources that accrues to the male and the female spouses. Notice that with
nonseparable utility, the family member that works the most must be compensated with a
higher consumption share, and thus the sharing rule depends on the relative endowments
(the term
f
m
). We show in the appendix that the effect of a rise in 1 − τN on λL2 is
determined by the sign of the following expression:
(1− γ)
[
(ξ˜ (
Ac (1− η)
1− τN − η
∑
g
w g) κ1(Ac, ) + (Ac w (m −
∑
g g
2
))κ2(Ac, ))
]
(2.14)
where κ1 =
(w(1−τN )m)(1−η)(1−γ)
(Ac+
∑
g w(1−τN )g)2−γ > 0, κ2 =
(Ac
2
+w(1−τw)m)−γ
(Ac+
∑
g w(1−τw)g)2−γ > 0 and ξ˜ =
−ξ(1−γ)
ηη(1−η)1−η >
0.
In 2.14, if Ac = 0 then only the leading term is different from zero and in fact it is
positive. In this case, we can show that an increase in 1− τN will increase intrahousehold
risk sharing against uncertain labor income, or to put it differently, it will reduce the
response of the sharing rule to variations in income. When Ac > 0, the second term is
added and also the first term in 2.14 eventually switches sign. When the overall partial
derivative is negative, the fall in labor taxation exacerbates inequality within the family
and reduces welfare by reducing insurance. This is the result we established under log-log
separable utility. What non-separability brings to the equation is the leading term in 2.14
that yields the non-monotonicity of the sharing rule in labor taxes and makes the effect of
changes in labor income taxation ambiguous.
To understand what this term captures, note that when wealth is low, a rise in the tax
rate reduces inequality in terms of labor incomes, but it also impoverishes the household.
When utility is curved, the reduction in household income translates into a huge increase in
the marginal utility of consumption. Given m and f the participation constraints tighten.
There is, therefore, a powerful income effect that in the case of log utility was balanced by
the larger equity in household resources. In the appendix, we show that a similar result
applies to the upper bound λU2 . We also establish that the effect of lower capital taxation
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is unambiguous; it always improves the household’s insurance possibilities.
Proposition 3. Assume that utility is nonseparable in consumption and leisure.
Lowering labor income taxes reduces intrahousehold inequality when household wealth is low.
In contrast, when the household is wealthy, reducing labor taxation has a detrimental effect
on intrahousehold insurance. Lower capital taxes always improve the households insurance.
Proof: See Appendix.
In our quantitative analysis in section 2.5, we deal only with the case of nonseparable
utility. As the results of this section suggest, because the new policy will replace capital
taxes with labor taxes it is not clear whether it will ultimately relax the households’ limited
commitment problem or not. To the extent that the policy change does not affect overall
household resources by much, shifting the burden of taxation from wealth to labor income
will probably enhance commitment, because under the new policy more of the households
consumption will be financed through wealth. Older households are wealthier and more
likely to fit this requirement. According to proposition 3, younger individuals are poorer
and less likely to satisfy this condition. In section 2.5, we will show that the results from
the quantitative model are in line with this intuition.
2.3.2 Optimal Savings
In this section, we illustrate what determines a couple household’s savings. Consider a
couple that starts the first period of the life-cycle with a weight λ1 =
1
2 . Note that an
increase in savings in the first period entails a cost in terms of marginal utility. If utility
is log-log separable, this cost is given by the expression 1−a1+2w(1−τN ) , and if γ > 1 it
is given by (−a1+2w(1−τN ))
−γ
(w(1−τN ))(1−η)(1−γ)χ where χ = η
η(1−γ)(1− η)(1−η)(1−γ).7 The second period
benefit from higher savings is given by:
β(1 + r(1− τK))E1
[
λ2
dum
dAc
+ (1− λ2)duf
dAc
+
dλ2
dAc
(um − uf )
]
(2.15)
The leading two bracketed terms in 2.15 represent the marginal benefit, keeping the
household sharing rule constant, whereas the last term measures the effect of higher savings
7Notice that the period one idiosyncratic productivity endowments are normalized to unity for both
spouses.
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on the sharing rule. If the couple was able to commit to the first period contract, setting
λ2 =
1
2 everywhere on the state space, the derivative
dλ2
dAc
would equal zero. It follows that
the marginal utility terms would be the only ones that would count for the marginal benefit
of household savings.
Under log separable utility, we can show that
E1
[
λ2
dum
dAc
+ (1− λ2) duf
dAc
]
=
1∑
g gw(1− τN ) +Ac
(2.16)
Notice that the right hand side of 2.16 is independent of the weight λ2. In fact, this
expression is the same as the one we would get if we were to solve for the full commitment
allocation that sets λ2 =
1
2 regardless of the productivity levels of the male and female
spouse. Under log utility, therefore, it is the last terms in 2.15 ( dλ2dAc (um − uf ) ) that
describes how household bargaining affects the expected marginal benefit from savings. In
order to assess whether limited commitment leads to a higher demand for savings, we have
to focus on that term.
We consider separately each relevant region in the state space where the term dλ2dAc (um−
uf ) is different from zero, that is every region where the marital contract is rebargained.
As discussed previously, for male productivity m less than a lower bound m(Ac, f ) the
weight λ2 will fall to λ
U
2 (there is an increase in the female spouse’s share). Conversely, if
m > m(Ac, f ) (upper bound) then λ2 = λ
L
2 . In any other region there is no rebargaining
of the households allocation and, therefore, λ2 =
1
2 . Thus we can write the conditional
expectation of dλ2dAc (um − uf ) as:
E1
dλ2
dAc
(um − uf ) =
∫ m(Ac,f )
0
∫
dλU2
dAc
(um − uf )dF (f , m)
+
∫ ∞
m(Ac,f )
∫
dλL2
dAc
(um − uf )dF (f , m) (2.17)
where F is the joint density of idiosyncratic productivity in the household.
From equation 2.9 it is easy to establish that the derivative
dλU2
dAc
is positive and the
derivative
dλL2
dAc
is negative. In order to sign dλ2dAc (um − uf ), in each relevant region of 2.17,
we need to determine the difference in the welfare levels of husbands and wives.
As it turns out, this difference is not of one sign. This is so because the limited
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commitment model has nothing to say about the absolute level of utility; it simply states
that if ever participation is violated, a correction has to be made that makes one of the
spouses as well off as if they were single. Since the model does not admit an analytical
solution for the conditional expectation, we used numerical methods to compute the relevant
integrals. Depending on the level of assets, we found that E1[
dλ2
dAc
(um − uf )] could be both
positive or negative, which implies that the effect of limited commitment on household
savings is ambiguous.8
The more general case for γ > 1 yields similar results. For this model we can derive
the following expression for the leading term in 2.15:
E1
[
λ2
dum
dAc
+ (1− λ2) duf
dAc
]
= E1
[
(Ac+
∑
g
w(1− τN )g)−γχ (2.18)(
(
1
1 + f(λ2, )
)1−γ
λ2
(w(1− τN )m)(1−η)(1−γ)
+ (
f(λ2, )
1 + f(λ2, )
)1−γ
1− λ2
(w(1− τN )f )(1−η)(1−γ)
)]
The above expression suggests that the intrahousehold allocation affects the optimal savings
of the family relative to the full commitment model, even beyond the term E1
dλ2
dAc
(um−uf ).
To see how, first note that the bottom line of 2.18 can be further simplified into:
((
1
1 + f(λ2, )
)−γ
λ2
(w(1− τN )m)(1−η)(1−γ)
= (λ
1
γ
2 
ω
m + (1− λ2)
1
γ ωf )
γ (2.19)
where ω = −(1 − η)(1 − γ)/γ < 0. Second, assume that male and female productivities
in period 2 are perfectly negatively correlated, so that m + f =  which is constant. It
is obvious that 2.19 is the only term that matters for household savings, as under these
assumptions (Ac+
∑
g w(1− τN )g)−γχ would be constant, no matter the realizations of
m and f .
The term in 2.19 exerts an influence to household savings because it changes the marginal
benefit to the household. Since it is a concave function in m, higher uncertainty decreases
the marginal utility, even under full commitment when the shares are constant. Moreover,
if the shares λ2 change with the endowment, as they do under limited commitment, they
contribute further to the variability of 2.19. This lowers the marginal gain from an extra
unit of savings even further. In this example limited commitment means less rather than
8This result emerges also in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000).
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more savings. The analysis of the term E1
dλ2
dAc
(um − uf ) is similar with the log log case
and, for the sake of brevity, is omitted.
From the analysis of this section we conclude that, under household bargaining, even
though individuals behave more like single agents, this does not necessarily lead them to
accumulate more assets. Instead, we can construct examples where household savings drop
under limited commitment.
One final comment is in order. Note that the covariance structure of wages within
the household is extremely important for the sharing rule and, of course, the optimal
allocation. In the two period model of this section, more negatively correlated shocks
imply that the limited commitment problem in the household is more severe. If, on the
other hand, shocks were perfectly correlated yielding m = f , then it is trivial to show
that household rebargaining would not occur in equilibrium. The optimal weight λ2 would
equal a half, and the demand for savings of a two member household would be identical to
the demand of a single earner household. When shocks are not perfectly correlated, the
need to accumulate assets to buffer shocks to the labor income is less, and as a consequence
couple households accumulate less wealth.
2.4 Calibration
2.4.1 Preferences and Demographics
The demographic parameters have been set so that the model has a stationary demographic
structure that matches the age distribution in the US economy. We assume that individuals
are born at age 25 and live at most until age 95. Retirement is at age 65. The survival
probabilities are taken from Arias (2010), based on the US National Vital Statistics Reports.
The model period is set to five years. This means that there are fifteen periods in the model
and the retirement age jR = 10. Although we make this assumption for computational
reasons, in what follows we report annual values for the parameters.
We set the fraction of households that are married µ equal to .52 which is the corres-
ponding statistic in the PSID data over all age groups. Note that this is a very conservative
choice. We deliberately chose not to count divorced individuals and widowers as married,
though in the model, we assume that marital status is independent of age (divorce never
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occurs). Had we chosen to take this assumption to the data the appropriate target for
µ would be 77% (see Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012a;b)). With µ = .52 roughly
69% of all individuals in our economy are married. Population growth is assumed to be
constant θ = 0.012.
Per period utility for each household member is of the following form:
ug(c, l) = [(c
ηl1−η)1−γ − 1]/1− γ
We calibrate the preference parameters as follows: first, we follow Conesa, Kitao, and
Krueger (2009) and Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2008), and set γ = 4.9 We
also choose a value of η = .38 so that our model produces, in the steady state, average
hours worked of one third. With these numbers the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
(1− η(1− γ))−1, is equal to .4673.
For married couples we have to determine the utility gains ξm and ξf at the Nash
bargaining stage and the flow gain ξ that couples enjoy at each period. As discussed earlier,
these parameters govern the following two aspects of the intrahousehold allocation. First,
ξm and ξf determine the transfers from one spouse to another, and along with differences in
the age productivity profiles Lj(g), they determine inequality in hours within the household.
We pick numbers for these parameters to match average hours worked for married men
and women as in the US data; according to the PSID married males worked 2104 hours in
2004, married females 1420 hours, single males 1743 hours and single females 1593 hours.
We map these numbers into model units and we normalize the work time to be one third
of the time endowment on average in our economy.
Second, the constant gain ξ determines the ability of the household to commit to an
allocation that is chosen at the matching stage. The smaller ξ is, the more the household
members will be tempted to renege on this allocation and the more frequent rebargaining
will occur in every period.
We adopt the following approach: We present the results from three different types of
models. The first is a model where commitment is very limited, meaning that ξ is small
9Based on empirical evidence by Attanasio and Weber (1995) and Meghir and Weber (1996), which
suggests that individual preferences are not separable in consumption and leisure, Mazzocco, Ruiz, and
Yamaguchi (2007) argue that a value of γ greater than unity is appropriate.
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enough such that the participation constraints bind very frequently in the simulations. In
fact, in that model, we target the lowest level of ξ so that the surplus from the marriage is
positive and divorce does not occur in equilibrium. The second version is one where ξ is high
enough so that the participation constraints never bind. And finally, we consider a version
of the model where commitment is between these two extremes, i.e. where participation
constraints do bind but half as frequently as in model number one. Considering these three
alternatives allows us to investigate thoroughly the impact of the household contract on
the aggregate economy and the effects of policy on the intrahousehold allocation.
2.4.2 Technology and Endowments
The technology parameters are chosen as follows. In the model we allow technology At
to grow at a rate equal to 1.4% per year. In order to represent our economy in the
computer, we have to make the standard normalizations as in Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998). Moreover, we set the capital share in value added α equal to .36 and we choose
the depreciation rate of capital δ to match an investment to output ratio of 21% in the
steady state. This gives us an annual value for this parameter of 5.26%. The subjective
discount factor β is calibrated for each model variant so that the economy in the steady
state produces the capital output ratio of 2.7. This procedure yields for all values of ξ a
discount factor of approximately 1.003.
Individual wages in the model are the product of three components; the gender specific
life-cycle profile, the fixed effect, and the temporary idiosyncratic productivity shock.
wi,t = Lg(j) αi,g i,t (2.20)
Following the bulk of the literature, we take the life-cycle profiles Lg(j) from Hansen (1993).
Moreover, our principle to calibrate the fixed effect component and the distribution of
the idiosyncratic shocks  is to reproduce the life-cycle cross sectional variance of family
earnings as they are documented in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004).10 For the
fixed effect, we choose two values α1, α2 which we assume are common across gender and
marital status. We follow Conesa and Krueger (2006) and assume that α1 = e
−σα and
10Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009); Conesa and Krueger (2006) follow a similar strategy.
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α2 = e
σα where σα governs the variance of the earnings ability. For bachelor agents, we
calibrate the fractions pSi,g of high and 1 − pSi,g of low ability in the population to 1/2.
For couples, we calibrate the joint probabilities pMi,k so that our economy reproduces the
degree of marital sorting in earnings ability that has been documented in the US data;
for instance Hyslop (2001) estimates a .5 correlation of fixed effects within the family in
his PSID sample. Hence, we set pMi,k = .375 if i = k and p
M
i,k = .125 if i 6= k to match
this empirical correlation. We set σα = .35 so that the model is consistent with a cross
sectional variance of household labor income of .24 for young cohorts (see Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2004)).
The idiosyncratic component  is assumed to be a first order autoregressive process
that we discretize as a Markov process with 5 nodes (25 for the couple). We choose the
persistence of this process and the variance of the innovation to  to make the model
produce a linear rise in the cross-sectional variance of income with age and a value of 0.9
at age 65. Finally, we allow for shocks to  to be contemporaneously correlated within the
family and set the correlation equal to .15 (see also Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2010), Hyslop (2001)).
2.4.3 Government
In order to parameterize the steady state tax code, we proceed as follows. The level of
government expenditures G is chosen so that in the balanced growth path, the government
consumes 21% of output. This spending is financed by the tax levies on consumption,
capital and labor income. We follow Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2008) and fix
the consumption tax τC to .05, and we set the steady capital income tax τK to .35. The
value of τN is chosen so that the government runs a balanced budget. In our numerical
experiment, we eliminate capital income taxation and adjust labor income taxes, while
holding the level of expenditures constant to their steady state value.
Our principle to calibrate the social security benefit system is the following: First, as
explained previously, we consider the individual as the unit to which benefits are distributed
and not the household. Second, we try capture in a parsimonious way, with the functional
SS(g, αi,g), the fact that social security contains a redistributive component in the US. For
instance, in 2004 individuals received 90% of the first 7,300 of their total social security
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entitlement, 32% for earnings between 7,300 and 44,000, and 15% for earnings above 44,000.
We calibrate SS(g, αi,g) so that the model economy gives roughly the same redistribution
of income in retirement in terms of median lifetime earnings as in the US economy. To give
an idea of the numbers, we calculate in the model that men of the highest earning ability
(fixed effect) get roughly 1.5 times as much as men of the lowest ability, whereas their
lifetime earnings are twice as high. Furthermore, women with the lowest ability receive
in benefits roughly 67% of what poor men receive, and women of high ability get slightly
(3%) more than poor men. We fix the social security tax rate at 12.5% and solve for the
average level of benefits. In the computational experiment, we keep the tax rate constant
across environments and vary the level of benefits.
Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Description Value
µ fraction married households 0.52
θ annual population growth 1.2%
Aˆ annual productivity growth 1.4%
α capital share 0.36
δ annual depreciation rate 5.26%
β discount factor 1.003
γ preference parameter 4
η preference parameter 0.38
τC consumption tax 5%
τK capital income tax 35%
τSS social security tax 12.5%
Notes: For the wage processes see section 2.4.2. For growth rates (Aˆ, θ, δ) the reported values are annual,
but we solve on 5-yearly frequency.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Long Run Effects of the Reform
We report the steady state long-run effects from the reform. In table 2.2, we show the
percentage changes in capital, total hours worked, social security benefits and output when
the model converges to a steady state with zero capital taxation. The initial steady state
values for these quantities are normalized to 100. The first column reports the results
from the limited commitment model, the second from the version of the model, where
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the participation constraints bind albeit less frequently (medium commitment), and the
third column reports the results when contracts are complete, i.e. when the participation
constraints never bind (full commitment).
Table 2.2: Long-run steady state: quantities
Quantity Limited Medium Full Single Men Single Men
& Women
K 110.6% 110.8% % 111.0% 109.4% 109.2%
N 92.2% 92.1% 92.2% 92.3% 91.5%
SS 99.0% 98.9% 99.0% 98.5% 98.0%
Y 98.9% 99.0% 99.1% 98.1% 97.3%
Aggregate capital increases by 10.6% in the model with limited commitment, by 10.8%
in medium commitment, and by 11% under the full commitment model. Hours worked
fall due to the rise in distortionary labor taxation, and they fall by the same amount
(to decimal rounding) in all models. In all models, labor taxes have to rise by roughly
100% from the initial to the final steady state to make up for the loss of revenue when
capital taxes are set to zero. Since the response of aggregate capital is slightly different
across the economies, the fall in output is also slightly different. It is highest in the limited
commitment model (1.1%) and lowest in the full commitment model (0.9%). The third
row of the table shows that the level of social security benefits falls because the tax base
shrinks with the fall in labor income and the tax rate τSS has been kept constant in the
new steady state.
In table 2.3, we present a break down of the response of assets and hours worked by
gender and marital status in the three models. We denote by xkg the response of quantity
x ∈ {a, n} (assets or hours) for household type k ∈ S,M (single or married) and gender g.
All individuals and household types experience the largest steady state increase in assets
in the full commitment model. The wealth of single female households increases the least
(between 7.5% and 7.9%), single male households accumulate slightly more (between 9.1%
and 9.4%), whereas for couple households assets increase between 11.5% and 12.0% in the
final steady states.
The fact that couples respond more than singles to a change in capital taxation should
come as no surprise given our previous discussion of the role of precautionary savings in the
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Table 2.3: Long-run steady state: disaggregated quantities
Quantity Limited Medium Full
Assets
aSm 109.1% 109.2% 109.4%
aSf 107.5% 107.7% 107.9%
aM 111.5% 111.7% 112.0%
Hours
nSm 92.8% 92.8% 92.8%
nSf 90.3% 90.3% 90.3%
nMm 93.2% 93.3% 93.3%
nNf 91.2% 91.2% 91.4%
Saving Rates
sSm 10.97 % 10.96 % 10.97 %
sSf 11.87% 11.87% 11.86%
sM 10.81% 10.75% 10.72%
model. When labor income is risky, the higher the demand for precautionary savings, the
lower is the elasticity of capital accumulation with respect to taxes.11 Single households
fit this profile. They have to accumulate wealth in order to insure against productivity
shifts. But couple households are different; because labor income shocks are not perfectly
correlated in the family, couples also possess intrahousehold insurance. The two spouses
can help each other to finance a smooth consumption path through transfers.
To give an idea of how large these transfers are, we calculate in the initial steady state
of the models income subsidies from one household member to the other as a fraction of
total household resources devoted to finance consumption. We define the transfer as the
excess of private consumption over individual income, assuming that each spouse owns half
of the household wealth stock each period and finances half of the wealth brought forward
to the next period. We find that in the limited commitment model intrahousehold transfers
are roughly 12.9% of total consumption spending, whereas in the full commitment model
that number is 15.2%. These numbers correspond to all age cohorts in the model. For
non-retired households, transfers of income are even greater. We return to this issue in
11Note that in an economy with high capital taxation more of the households resources are made out of
risky labor income. In this environment, households increase their precautionary savings. In contrast, with
low capital taxation, households accumulate wealth due to the higher return but lose a significant portion
of the precautionary savings demand, since capital income, at least in the model, is riskless.
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section 2.5.3, where we take a close look at the intrahousehold allocation in the models.
In the last three rows of table 2.3, we have added the average saving rates by household
type for the three models. We define the savings rate as the ratio of the change in the
households net asset position (change in wealth) to total household income (labor and
financial income). We compute this statistic for ages 25 to 45, that is in the period of
the life-cycle where savings are mainly for precautionary purposes, in contrast to later
periods of the life where individuals save to finance retirement. Notice that single female
households have the highest savings rate in all models (roughly 11.8%). Single males have
an average saving rate of around 11%, and couple households save less out of their total
income than all other household types. These statistics are in line with the intuition that
the incentive to save in order to buffer shocks to labor income is less for couple households.
The results of table 2.3 suggest that more commitment leads to a weaker desire to save.
The average couple household has a saving rate of 10.81% in the limited commitment model,
and of 10.72% in the full commitment model. The difference, however, is quantitatively
small, or at least too small to imply that household members that face participation
constraints of the sorts of the limited commitment model, behave more like single individuals
and have a stronger demand for precautionary savings. As we showed in section 2.3, it is
extremely difficult to sign the impact of limited commitment on household savings, meaning
that savings could be higher or lower under less commitment. The results of this section
confirm this point.
One aspect of the household program that may be responsible for changes in the saving
behavior of couples across models can be traced to the initial bargaining stage. As we
increase the level of utility ξ to enhance commitment, the initial allocation features more
equity meaning that the shares are closer to a half. This affects savings in the following way:
In a family where for example the husband has a high fixed effect and the wife a low fixed
effect, a weight closer to a half gives more importance to the wife’s preferences. Because
social security redistributes towards poorer individuals, the female household member
wants to save less and, therefore, overall household savings fall.12Though we acknowledge
that these effects are present, and possibly important for household decision making, we
do not attempt to analyze their impact here.
12This is similar to the reform in the divorce law that Voena (2012) considers.
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Aggregate Quantities in Singles Models. In the last two columns of table 2.2, we
added the aggregate results from two models where each household is populated by a single
individual. The model that we call ‘Single Men’ is calibrated such that all households are
single male households. The model ‘Single Men and Women’ is a model where half the
population is single males and the other half single females. Notice that with bachelor
households the response of aggregate capital to the reform is smaller. Aggregate capital
increases by 9.4% in the ‘Single Men’ model and by 9.2% in the ‘Single Men and Women’
model and, therefore, by less than our benchmark models with singles and couples. These
results illustrate that adding a richer and more realistic demographic structure in the
economy, matters for economic outcomes. Once more these differences reflect the weaker
precautionary savings motives in families of two individuals, which make the distortions
from capital taxation larger.
Welfare. In table 2.4, we look at the long-run welfare effects of the change in tax code.
We define our welfare measure as the percentage increment in consumption that keeps
expected welfare constant across the two economies (with and without the reform). We
report the average value of this quantity for all individuals in our economy, assigning equal
weight to each individual in the welfare function, and separately for males and females
single and married.13
13We construct average utility as follows:
U =
1
2µ+ (1− µ) (µ
∫ ∑
g
Vg(a,X, λ, j)ΓM (da×dX×dλ×dj)+ 1− µ
2
∫ ∑
g
Sg(a,X, j)ΓS,g(da×dX×dj))
(2.21)
where µ is the fraction of households populated by couples in our economy (there are 2µ married individuals).
Since preferences are the same for all individuals the value of the compensation variation is given by:(
Utax
Uno tax
) 1
η(1−γ) −1, where U tax (Unotax) is average utility in a steady state with (without) capital taxation.
Similarly, when we want to make a welfare assessment for married individuals, we compute expected utility
as follows:
UM =
1
2
(
∫ ∑
g
Vg(a,X, λ, j)ΓM (da× dX × dλ× dj)) (2.22)
Notice that the welfare criterion under 2.22 is different than the average household utility the way we define
it in equation 2.4. For example, if we were to use the value function M(a,X, λ, j) in our welfare calculation,
we would construct average utility for married individuals as:
W =
∫
M(a,X, λ, j)ΓM (da×dX×dλ×dj) =
∫
λVm(a,X, λ, j)+(1−λ)Vf (a,X, λ, j)ΓM (da×dX×dλ×dj)
The value for W and UM do not coincide because the planner attaches a weight equal to 1/2 to every
individual, but households attach weights λ and 1− λ respectively. In the ergodic distribution ΓM , these
household weights are generally different from 1/2. Apps and Rees (1988) show that aggregating preferences
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All types of individuals are on average better off in the final steady state without capital
taxation. The average welfare gain is 1.6% of consumption in the limited commitment
model (first column of table 2.4), 1.69% in the medium commitment model (column 2),
and 1.78% in the full commitment model (third column). Single females enjoy the largest
welfare gains (between 2.96% and 3.16%), whereas the gains are most modest for single
male households (ranging from 0.8% to 0.97%). Married women seem to benefit more
than married men from the reform under limited commitment (1.76% vs 1.1%), but as the
degree of commitment increases the gains become more equally split between the spouses.
Individuals are on average better off in the economy where the response of capital
to the reform is larger. This economy, according to our results, is the full commitment
economy that exhibits the largest rise in aggregate capital and, consequently, the smallest
fall in output. Although we do not report the age profiles of the gains in the table, our
results suggest that the reform is costly to younger individuals. For example, in the
full commitment economy individuals aged 25–35 are willing to give up 2.16% of their
consumption in the old steady state to keep capital taxes high. Similar results obtain in
the other two models. Because families are born with zero wealth and, as such, have to
rely on labor income to finance consumption they are hurt when labor taxes increase.
Borrowing constraints and the time path of life-cycle productivity are key in under-
standing the division of welfare gains across household types in the model, and in particular
to understanding why female households benefit more from the reform. Note that in
our calibration the productivity path of men steeply rises with age (see the results of
Hansen (1993)). Male productivity peaks at age 45–50 and the ratio of the maximum
to initial productivity is 1.22. Consequently, in the model, men want to borrow against
their permanent income to smooth consumption, but cannot do so due to the presence of
the borrowing constraints. When capital taxes are replaced with labor taxes young single
men experience a fall in income that makes their consumption path even steeper over the
life-cycle.14 Female productivity, on the other hand, is not steeply rising; it peaks at ages
35 to 40 and is roughly 2% higher relative to age 25. Therefore, young single women in the
of individuals into a household utility and maximizing over a policy parameter, can be misleading for policy,
because the effects of changes in policies are mediated through the household sharing rule λ.
14See Erosa and Gervais (2002) for an analysis of the effect of life-cycle income profiles on the preferences
for labor and capital taxes.
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model are not made as worse off in the new steady state.
Table 2.4: Long-run steady state: welfare
Compensating Limited Medium Full Single Men Single Men
Variation & Women
Total 1.60% 1.69% 1.78% 0.10% 1.00%
Married Males 1.10% 1.23% 1.52%
Married Females 1.76% 1.75% 1.56%
Single Males 0.80% 0.87% 0.97% 0.10% -0.45%
Single Females 2.96% 3.06% 3.16% 2.16%
To understand how these gender differences in the economic environment affect the
overall and relative welfare gains for married individuals several remarks are important.
First, note that as most of the married household income comes from the husband, couples
are more like single men than single women. That is to say that the couple cannot smooth
the life-cycle income profile by allocating more hours to the wife at the early stages of the
working life. Dual earner families enjoy relatively large welfare gains, but this comes out
of the fact that in the final steady state they increase wealth by more than singles and,
therefore, benefit more from the new tax scheme.
Second, married women do better than married men according to the welfare measure,
but this should come out of how the bargaining position of the spouses change rather than
the labor income profiles. Thus, we need to evaluate the impact of the policy change on
the backfold position of individuals in the family. To do that, we compute in the initial
and the final steady states the compensating variation of each of these two outside options.
We find that under the new policy women do even better; their compensating variation
is 4%, whereas the analogous object for men is .39% (note that this is relevant under
limited commitment). So, on the one hand, women are in a position to bargain for a better
allocation, but on the other hand, most of the extra surplus for the couple comes from
wealth, which as we showed earlier, does not trigger rebargaining but rather improves
commitment. The overall effect is a slight change in the weight (less than 1%) in favor of
married women in the final steady state.
Finally, in the last two columns of table 2.4, we report the average welfare gains and
loses in the two singles economies. The ‘Single Men Model’ gives a value for our measure
of compensating variation equal to .1% meaning that individuals have to be compensated
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with a .1% increase in consumption to remain in the old steady state. In the ‘Single Men
and Women’ model, male households lose from the reform. They are willing to give up
.45% of consumption to keep capital taxation high. Female households, on the other hand,
gain from the reform. The compensating variation for them is 2.16%, one percentage point
less than the analogous gain in the full commitment model with singles and couples, but
less than a percentage point less than in the limited commitment model. According to
these results, gender heterogeneity is an important determinant of the welfare responses in
the model, but also considerable welfare gains are attributed to the presence of two earner
households.
2.5.2 The Transition to the Steady State
In this section, we report the welfare effects from the change in policy, but instead of
focusing on a comparison between steady states, we focus on the impact of the new tax
schedule in period 1, right after the reform takes place. Our approach to solve for the
equilibrium of the model in this section is to guess a time path of prices and quantities
(interest rates, tax rates and benefits), compute the optimal decision rules of households
that face this time path, and simulate the model starting from the ergodic distribution of
the initial steady state. Thus, the solution characterizes the dynamic adjustment of the
economy from the first period in which the reform is implemented to the new long-run
steady state. Because the transition is completed in more than 15 model periods, the
first generation of individuals that experience the change in policy are not alive in the
new steady state. Therefore the welfare results of this section could in principle differ
considerably from the results presented in the previous section.
In figure 2.1, we plot the time paths of interest rates, labor taxes, aggregate capital and
benefits over 30 model periods. Each period counts for five years of calendar time. We label
period 0 the old steady state, and period 1 the first period of the transition, right after
the reform takes place. The figure starts from period 1, and shows the adjustment of the
economy towards the new steady state. Note that aggregate capital is predetermined in the
first period, but taxes, benefits and interest rates, and also wages and hours (not shown)
immediately adjust to new values. We report the magnitude of these initial adjustments in
the text, but we leave them out of the figure.
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Figure 2.1: Transition paths
Notes: On the left panel the blue line traces the evolution of labor income taxation. The green line
represents the level of benefits. The right panel shows the real interest rate (blue line, five annual value)
and the time path of the capital stock (green line). The figure shows prices and quantities in the full
commitment model. We obtain similar paths in the other models.
In period one, the interest rate jumps from a value roughly .475 to a value of .437 due
to the immediate fall in hours. When the capital tax is abolished, the government adjusts
upwards labor income taxes to finance spending. From a value of roughly 14% in the old
steady state, τN instantaneously jumps to about 30%. Because the economy has not build
up a higher stock of capital yet (capital is fixed in the short-run), wages are lower than in
the long-run steady state, and thus labor taxes have to increase by even more relative to
their long-run steady state value.
When the change in policy occurs, benefits fall relative to the initial steady state by
roughly 7%. Then they increase along the transition because capital accumulation increases
wages and labor income. The time paths for other variables not shown in the figure are
as follows: aggregate hours fall by 8.15% on impact and wages rise by 3.25%, due to the
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decreasing marginal product of labor and the fall in hours. The largest drop in hours is by
single females (10%) followed by married females (7.5%). Male hours worked, both for single
and married men, fall by about 6.3%. The figure shows the paths for prices and quantities
in the full commitment model. The analogous paths for the limited commitment models
are similar, and for the sake of brevity, we omit them. We are more interested in tracing
how these changes in the tax code affect the welfare of individuals and in investigating
which household types stand to gain and which to lose from the reform.
Welfare. In table 2.5, we report our measure of compensating variation, the percentage
increase or fall in consumption that individuals would accept to remain in the old steady
state. This statistic compares the original steady state welfare with the welfare of individuals
in the first period of the transition, right after the change in policy takes place.
Table 2.5: Compensating variation in the first period of the transition
Compensating Limited Medium Full Single Men Single Men
Variation & Women
Total -2.12% -2.11% -2.07% -3.6% -2.00%
Married Males -2.27% -2.28% -2.32%
Married Females -2.69% -2.69% -2.59%
Single Males -3.29% -3.27% -3.22% -3.6% -4.00%
Single Females 0.18% 0.21% 0.28% -0.55%
Table 2.6: Support for the reform
Percentage Limited Medium Full Single Men Single Men
Support & Women
Total 56.3% 56.3% 56.4% 39.9% 49.2%
Married Males 52.9% 52.2% 52.3%
Married Females 51.6% 51.2% 51.1%
Single Males 46.6% 46.6% 46.7% 39.9% 41.1%
Single Females 66.0 % 66.1% 66.1% 57.2%
On average households that are alive in the first period of the transition, lose from
the reform. As capital is fixed in the short-run and households are burdened with higher
labor taxes, it is not surprising that they are worse off at the time of the change in policy.
Only wealthy households stand to gain especially if their overall income (financial and
labor) increases due to the higher return on capital. The table shows that across household
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types, single male households are willing to pay the most to avoid the policy change.
The compensating variation is between -3.22% (full commitment) and -3.29% (limited
commitment) for this demographic. Single females, on the other hand, benefit from the
reform, but the gain is fairly small, ranging from .18% to .28% in the models.
The second and third rows of the table report the welfare gains for married males and
females, respectively. It may seem surprising that married men suffer smaller loses than
women in the model. For instance, in the limited commitment model men are willing to
give up 2.27% of consumption to keep capital taxes positive, whereas the analogous figure
for women is 2.69%. It is surprising given that single women benefit more from the reform
than single men. We would have anticipated that under limited commitment the division
of gains and loses from the reform would be such that it reflects the improved bargaining
position of women.
In section 2.5.3, we show that when the policy changes in the first period of the transition
there is indeed more bargaining within households. But rather than women benefiting, it is
male spouses that see an increase in their share of resources from this rebargaining. When
we simulate the outside options in the old steady state and in the first period, we still find
that women do better than men. If we divide assets by two and we evaluate the welfare of
singles using the distribution of assets for couples, we find that the compensating variation
is -3% for men and -.24% for women. When comparing these figures with the welfare loses
of married men and women, it seems obvious that the participation constraints for men
become looser and for women tighter under the new policy.
Does that mean that female participation constraints will bind more frequently? It is
uncertain since a key factor that determines this, is the initial position of the couple in
the bargaining set. Generally, the bargaining set becomes smaller under the new policy,
because couples lose part of their labor income and not all families are wealthy enough to
benefit from the higher returns to capital. If the initial position of a couple is near the
constraint of the husband, it is the husband’s constraint that binds more frequently. This
is precisely what happens in our simulations.
Finally, notice that rebargaining of the intrahousehold allocation does not significantly
affect the welfare loses of men and women. The payoffs are similar under medium com-
mitment and under full commitment, where by definition, there is no rebargaining and
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yet women still do worse than men. The way individual utility responds to the change
in the mixture of capital and labor taxes, also depends on the allocation, i.e. relative
consumption and hours, of the two spouses which determines the local relative welfare
gains and loses. To be more precise note that there is no reason to think that in a model
without rebargaining such as the full commitment economy, both spouses will be as well
off under the new policy. The new tax scheme will change the allocation of consumption
and hours in the family and thus within families one spouse will be better off than the
other spouse. We return to this in section 2.5.3.
Support for the reform. Summarizing welfare gains and loses by the average compens-
ating variation masks a large degree of heterogeneity in the economy. Welfare loses could be
very large for a few families, but for the rest there might be moderate gains from the reform.
We are, therefore, interested in determining whether the policy change is acceptable to a
significant fraction of individuals in the economy. In table 2.6, we show the fractions of
the population that benefit from the reform in period 1 in the three models. The total
support is roughly 56% in the three economies and slightly larger under full than under
limited commitment. Most married couples benefit from the reform and, as we anticipated
given the previous findings, men are slightly more in favor than women. The majority of
single individuals is also better off, but as the table shows a larger fraction (roughly 66%)
of single female households stands to gain than single male households (roughly 46%).
The last two columns show the analogous fractions for the ‘Single Men’ and ‘Single
Men and Women’ economies. There is a large difference in terms of the percentage
support for the reform between the benchmark models and the ‘Single Men’ economy. In
the latter, the change in policy is appealing only to a minority of households (39.9%).
Similarly, in the ‘Single Men and Women’ model the analogous fraction is roughly 49%.
Gender heterogeneity clearly exerts an influence here, but note that this model deliberately
exacerbates the percentage of female headed households in the economy (we set them equal
to 50%). According to the PSID data in 2007 in roughly 34% of households the female was
the head (in the sense of being the main earner).15 By this metric the total support for
15We would get an even smaller number if we imposed, as in the model, that marital status is independent
of age (no divorce). For example, according to the data from the 2000 US Census 77% of households
between age 30 and 40 are married (see Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012a;b)). In couples households,
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the reform would be roughly 46%.
These results are consistent with previous findings in the literature. For example,
Domeij and Heathcote (2004) argue that because wealth is very concentrated in the US
economy (a small number of households own the largest part of the stock of wealth) only a
small fraction of individuals benefit from the elimination of capital taxation in the transition.
In their incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents, they match the wealth
distribution as in the data and show that the change in policy has huge redistributive
effects that confer welfare loses to the population. Garcia-Mila`, Marcet, and Ventura (2010)
perform a similar exercise calibrating their model to match the wealth to income ratios of
US households. They, too, verify that a policy that eliminates capital taxation decreases
welfare in the majority of households.
In the appendix, we show that the benchmark and the singles only models produce
similar wealth and earnings distributions. We show that the Gini coefficient of the wealth
distribution is around .55 in all models. Moreover, as discussed previously, we have
calibrated the earnings processes to match the between household income inequality in all
models as in the US data. Therefore, the environments are close enough in terms of the cross
section of households. But the perspective that we offer here is a different one from Domeij
and Heathcote (2004); according to our paper, it is the attitudes toward labor supply and
savings that differ between couples and single households that explains the differences
in the welfare effects from the policy. We are convinced that a model that matches the
wealth distribution, as Domeij and Heathcote (2004) do, but also matches the conditional
distributions by gender and marital status, will have very interesting implications for the
effects of the change in the tax code. Unfortunately, that requires a more complete theory
of wealth accumulation and labor supply for families than the one we offer here; a theory
that includes fertility, bequest motives etc. We leave this for future work.
2.5.3 Impact of the Tax Schedule on the Household Sharing Rule
In this section, we investigate the impact of the tax reform on the behavior of couples.
We have yet to answer the question whether changes in the tax code lead to significant
changes in intrahousehold decision rules. For example, in section 2.3.1, we established that
the male partner is typically the head.
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increasing labor taxation may, or may not, lead to more frequently binding participation
constraints. On the one hand, as after-tax income inequality within the household is reduced,
rebargaining will probably occur less often. On the other hand, when total household
labor income is lower, the temptation to renege on the contract increases. It seems that
for families that are wealthy enough to benefit more from the first channel, the change in
policy will lead to an improvement in the risk sharing possibilities. Moreover, comparing
the initial steady state to the final steady state, or to the first period of the transition, is
likely to make a difference in the results. In the long-run, households accumulate more
wealth which definitely improves commitment. In the short-run assets are fixed.
Table 2.7: Participation constraints
Limited Medium Limited Medium Limited Medium
Initial Steady State Final Steady State Transition
Total 18.0% 9.6% 17.8% 8.8% 24.5% 10.7%
25-45 27.3% 15.7% 29.6% 15.6% 38.7% 17.3%
50-65 10.9% 5.1% 8.4% 3.2% 13.1% 5.8%
Retired 4.9% 0.3 % 1.8% 0% 6.9% 1.1%
In table 2.7, we compute the frequency with which participation constraints bind in
the initial and the final steady states as well as in the first period of the transition. The
statistic reported in the table counts the number of times that a change in the weight λ
takes place in a panel of families that is representative of the population. We leave out of
the table the case of full commitment, since there participation constraints never bind.
Obviously, the limited commitment case features more frequent updating of the sharing
rule than the medium commitment model. In the old steady state for 18% of our sample,
we detect an adjustment in λ under limited commitment, while under medium commitment
the analogous number is 9.6%. Rebargaining takes place mostly at young ages; the fractions
are highest for individuals aged 25 to 45 and lowest for retired individuals. There are
two opposing effects. First, shocks that occur towards the end of the life-cycle are more
permanent, given our calibration of idiosyncratic productivity and, consequently more
likely to lead to changes in the sharing rule. Second, by their middle age families have
accumulated enough wealth, and as we showed previously in our model, this relaxes the
participation constraints. Here it seems that the second effect dominates the first.
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In retirement, even though there are no changes in labor income, there are changes in
the sharing rule. In some families one of the spouses commands a large share of household
resources after having experienced a good run of income shocks right before retirement,
and as wealth decumulates during retirement the other spouse needs to be made better off.
This explains the rebargaining of contracts after retirement.
According to the table in the final steady state (columns 3 and 4), the participation
constraints are relaxed. The frequency of updates drops from 18% to 17.8% in the limited
commitment model and from 9.6% to 8.8% in the medium commitment model. The largest
gains in terms of intrahousehold risk sharing occur for middle aged and retired households.
These families accumulate more assets in the final steady state. Young families may even
face tighter constraints in their planning program, meaning that rebargaining may be more
frequent for these groups in the final steady state. This was certainly the case for our
youngest cohorts (ages 25–30). As discussed previously, young families lose a large fraction
of their labor income with the rise in labor taxation and this increases the temptation to
rebargain.
In the first period of the transition (columns 5 and 6), the new policy upsets the
intrahousehold sharing rule. As the table shows, rebargaining is much more frequent than
in any of the steady states. We detect a change in the weight λ on average 24.5% of the
times. This rise in the incidence of rebargaining is relevant for all age groups. Young
individuals have very low assets and, therefore, the change in policy makes it more tempting
to renege. However, retired agents also suffer from a fall in benefits; keeping their wealth
constant, this implies tighter participation constraints. This highlights that even a simple
policy that replaces capital taxes with higher linear labor taxes can affect intrahousehold
decision making.
In figure 2.2, we plot the male spouse’s weight λ in the final steady state and in the
transition on the vertical axis against the weight in the initial steady state on the horizontal
axis. The circles represent households. The lines that begin from the origin are 45 degree
lines that represent the points with no change in the weight. If observations are below this
line, the male spouse’s weight is higher in the initial steady state. The converse holds if
observations lie above the line. The top figures are produced from the limited commitment
model and the bottom panels from the medium commitment economy. Notice that there is
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Figure 2.2: Sharing rule λ in the limited and the medium commitment models
Notes: The top panels show the weight λ in the limited commitment model. The bottom panels are for
the medium commitment model. Left panels (top and bottom) compare the initial steady state with the
final steady state. Right panels compare initial steady state with the first period of the transition.
considerably more volatility in the first environment.
When we plot the initial vs. the final steady state (top and bottom left), changes in
the intrahousehold weights do not seem to favor either the male or the female spouse.
In this case observations are scattered around the 45 degree line, indicating that there
are families where husbands improve their relative position and other families where the
wives’s position improves. But when we consider initial steady states against the first
period of the transition, mostly male household members improve their relative position.
This is precisely the point that we made earlier in section 2.5.2, where we explained that
rebargaining right after the change in policy tends to favor married men, which produced
slightly smaller welfare loses for men in the aggregate.
What do these changes in the sharing rule imply for intrahousehold inequality? If the
change in the tax schedule reduces inequality in the household, then this would show up as
a rise in the husband’s weight when the weight in the initial steady state is low, and a fall
in the weight when the initial weight is high. This does not seem to be the case in any of
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the models considered. We return in a subsequent paragraph to consider more thoroughly
inequality within the household.
Labor Supply and Consumption. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the effect of the change
of the tax code on the labor supply and consumption behavior of households. Figure 2.3
shows the limited commitment model, and figure 2.4 the full commitment model. Both
graphs refer to the first period of the transition. On the top left, we show the scatter plot
of hours worked by the male spouse as a fraction of total household hours in the initial
steady state and the first period of the transition. The figure refers to families aged 25 to
45. The top right shows the same plot for individuals between age 50 and 65. The bottom
left shows the consumption shares of the male spouse in the first period of the transition
against the initial steady state for non-retired agents, and the bottom right the shares for
retired agents. Again if observations are on, or strongly concentrated around the 45 degree
lines, there is no significant change of behavior of families.
There is a change in the distribution of work hours for young families (top left of the
figures). In principle, married men work more hours when the change in policy happens.
There are a few households where the wife’s share in total hours increases, but these are
households were the wife worked more than the husband in the old steady state. To be
more precise, households reduce hours under the new tax code but allocate more hours to
the main family earner, which for some households, is the female spouse.
The new policy also changes considerably the labor supply behavior for households
aged 50 until retirement. There is a large number of households in which, after the rise in
distortive labor taxes, either the male or the female spouse drops out of work altogether. In
the figures this is represented by those observations that are at zero or one on the vertical
axis (note that it occurs both the limited and the full commitment model). Again the
principle seems to be that the household would like to allocate more hours to its main
earner. The new policy therefore seems to increase intrahousehold inequality in hours.
According to the bottom panels of the figures, after the change in policy there is in
both models a fall in consumption inequality within the household. In the full commitment
model this change concerns only non-retired households, while in the limited commitment
model it is relevant for all age cohorts. The fall in consumption inequality shows up as
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Figure 2.3: Hours and consumption: limited commitment model
Notes: This figure shows the first period of the transition against the initial steady state for various
statistics of the limited commitment model. The top panels show hours worked by the male spouse as a
fraction of total household hours, the top-left for age 25–45 and the top-right for age 50–65. The bottom
panels show the consumption shares of the male spouse, the bottom-left for non-retired and the bottom-right
for retired families.
a rise in the husband’s consumption share when the initial share is low, and a fall in the
share when the initial share is high.
This relative change goes hand in hand with hours inequality. First note that for young
households, in order to convince the main earner of to work more hours, there must be a
decrease in their consumption share because of the wealth effect to labor supply. Second, for
those households where one of the spouses drops out of the labor market, the consumption
share of that spouse must increase because she is now off her labor supply curve. To put it
differently, at corner solutions individual consumption has to exceed the ratio of the net
wage rate to the marginal utility of leisure, since leisure is constrained to unity. The fall
in consumption inequality is, therefore, also consistent with the behavior of older cohorts.
The limited commitment model adds rebargaining of the allocation. As demonstrated
previously, male spouses benefit from those changes in the contracts. As a consequence,
consumption inequality does not fall as much as under full commitment.
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Figure 2.4: Hours and consumption: full commitment model
Notes: This figure shows the first period of the transition against the initial steady state for various
statistics of the full commitment model. The top panels show hours worked by the male spouse as a fraction
of total household hours, the top-left for age 25–45 and the top-right for age 50–65. The bottom panels
show the consumption shares of the male spouse, the bottom-left for non-retired and the bottom-right for
retired families.
Transfers. In table 2.8, we ask whether within family transfers of income change in
response to the tax reform. The statistic in table 2.8 reports transfers from one spouse to
the other spouse as a fraction of total family consumption. We define the transfer as the
gap between individual consumption and individual resources assuming that each agent
owns half of the wealth stock and finances half of the asset accumulation of the family.
As the table shows mean transfers are large (more than 10% of household consumption)
and have a discernible life-cycle pattern; they are higher for young families, and as the
household ages they decrease. Not surprisingly, more commitment means more transfers.
Average transfers are 12.9% in the old steady state in the limited commitment model and
14.5% in the full commitment model.
The table shows that when we change the tax code, intrahousehold transfers of income
fall. The main reason for this is that in the new steady state families are wealthier and
they finance consumption more out of wealth rather than labor income. As wealth is an
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Table 2.8: Transfers
Limited Medium Full Limited Medium Full
Initial Steady State Final Steady State
Total 12.9% 13.3 % 14.5% 12.5 % 12.9% 13.9%
25-45 15.1% 15.5 % 17.0% 15.1 % 15.5% 17.0%
50-65 12.0% 12.4 % 13.1% 10.6% 10.9% 11.4%
Retired 6.2% 6.7 % 7.4% 6.1 % 6.6% 7.2%
Limited Medium Full
Transition, first period
Total 12.2% 12.6 % 13.7%
25-45 14.5% 15.1 % 16.8%
50-65 10.4% 10.7 % 11.2%
Retired 6.2% 6.7 % 7.4%
equally divided resource in the family, the wife that is the recipient of the of bulk transfers,
finances more of her consumption out of her own resources. Indeed we find that transfers
fall precisely for those families that have more wealth (middle aged households). This effect
is present even in the first period of the transition since households experience a capital
gain on savings, because of lower capital taxation, and, therefore, become wealthier.
The change in the labor supply behavior of families that we described in the previous
section has exactly the opposite effect on transfers. The spouse that supplies zero hours
is effectively off her labor supply curve. She gets more consumption than what the labor
market condition would prescribe; since consumption is higher and earned income is zero,
the difference must be filled with higher transfers. We find that for households that have
one of their members at the corner, transfers are larger.
To illustrate these points, we give a simple derivation of a household that makes its
optimal choice in one period. Letting Ac be total financial income of the household and Y
be the total after-tax labor income, we can derive male transfers as:
Tm =
sm(Y )Y +Ac/2
Y +Ac
− cm
Y +Ac
=
(sm(Y )− 12)Y
Ac + Y
+
1
2
− 1
1 + φ(λ, lg)
(2.23)
where sm(Y ) is the male spouse’s share the total labor income of the household. Moreover,
φ(λ, lg) = (
λ
1−λ)
1/(η(1−γ)−1))( lmlf )
(1−η)(1−γ)/(η(1−γ)−1)) gives the sharing rule given the op-
timal choice of hours. Notice that we do not express the sharing rule as a function of
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productivities, because we want to demonstrate how transfers will respond to corner
solutions (at corners it is impossible to get closed form solutions).
According to equation 2.23 transfers change when labor or capital income changes, but
also the share sm and the sharing rule φ exert an influence. For households where both the
husband and the wife work, after the reform we can assume that sm is roughly constant.
Furthermore if we concentrate on the full commitment equilibrium it should be that φ is
also constant.
More wealth decreases transfers if sm >
1
2 , that is if the male spouse contributes more
than half the household’s labor income. This is the case for all households where transfers
from male to female spouses are positive. Moreover note that under the new policy total
household labor income falls and this fall contributes to a further decrease in transfers.
But when the wife drops out of the labor market, the share sm increases from below one
to unity and the value of φ also changes. The first effect increases transfers; the second
increases transfers insofar as the ratio lmlf is greater after the change in policy. This is
because the female spouse is off her labor supply curve.
There is a final channel through which transfers change in the model; changes in the
sharing rule. We explained earlier that, especially in the first period of the transition,
household contracts are rebargained and that male spouses draw higher weights λ. To the
extent that in these families transfers run from men to women, the new contract should
prescribe lower transfers to the female spouse. We find that this effect is present, though
relevant mostly for younger cohorts in the limited commitment model.
Consumption Inequality. In order to better understand inequality of consumption
within the household in figure 2.5 we plot the following statistic in the initial and the final
steady states: ∣∣∣∣ cm,icm,i + cf,i − cf,icm,i + cf,i
∣∣∣∣ (2.24)
In words 2.24, represents the absolute difference in the consumption share of the male
and the female spouse. If different from zero it implies that the two spouses command a
different share of household resources and, therefore, there is consumption inequality in the
family. The figure shows the limited commitment model (top) and the full commitment
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model (bottom) in the final steady state and in the initial period, where the policy change
occurs. Observations that lie below the 45 degree line mean less inequality within the
household in the final steady state. Because we divide by aggregate household consumption,
2.24 is independent of wealth and precautionary savings, and hence it is useful to compare
in the two environments.16
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Figure 2.5: Absolute differences in consumption shares
Notes: The figure shows the absolute difference in consumption shares in the limited commitment model
(top) and the full commitment model (bottom). The plots on the left show this in the final steady state
against the initial steady state, and the ones on the right the first transition period against the initial steady
state.
There is a drop in the absolute differences in consumption shares within the household
16We explain some of the properties of 2.24. For retired individuals where lm = lf = 1 applies we can
write: ∣∣∣∣ cm,icm,i + cf,i − cf,icm,i + cf,i
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣( λi1− λi )IES − 1) 1( λi
1−λi )
IES + 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (2.25)
where IES is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1− η(1− γ))−1. The second is for non retired
couples: ∣∣∣∣ cm,icm,i + cf,i − cf,icm,i + cf,i
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣(1− ψi λi1− λi )1/γ) 1(ψi λi1−λi )1/γ + 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (2.26)
We can show that 2.25 is a convex function that is centered around 1/2 and that 2.26 is also convex
but centered around 1
1+ψi
. ψi is the following function of the ratio of male to female wages ψi =
( m
f
)−(1−η)(1−γ)/γ for household i.
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under the new regime in all the models. It is less in the limited commitment model because,
as noted above, higher labor taxes make it more tempting to renege on the household
contract, especially in young households. Since men have typically a higher consumption
share than women, rebargaining increases inequality. But this increase is not enough to
balance a second channel that decreases inequality within the household.
We said earlier that in households where one spouse drops out of the labor market,
that spouse must be compensated with higher consumption. Effectively, the constraint
lg ≤ 1 forces that individual to take less leisure than she would if she were on her labor
supply curve. Under nonseparable utility, there must be a rise in her consumption share
and, consequently, a drop in the difference with the family’s main earner.17
To give an idea of the magnitude of the drop in intrahousehold consumption inequality,
we compute the cross-sectional average of 2.24. In the old steady state the average is 3.52%
in the limited commitment model, and 2.9% in the full commitment model. In the new
steady state it drops to 3.41% (by 3.1%) in the limited, and to 2.8% (by 3.5%) in the full
commitment model. In the first period of the transition, there is a drop of only 2.23% in
the limited commitment model relative to the original steady state. Clearly, the difference
is due to rebargaining. When we used the mean standard deviation of consumption instead
of 2.24 as a measure of inequality we obtained very similar implications.
Finally, note that inequality between married households in the model is three times as
large as intrahousehold inequality (0.033 vs. 0.1 in terms of standard deviation). When
the change in policy takes place, however, we find that the two statistics move in opposite
directions. Inequality between households increases by nearly 10%, whereas the mean
standard deviation within the household falls by nearly 5%. The reason is that in the new
steady state a larger fraction of consumption for households and individuals is financed by
wealth. Since wealth is more unequally distributed than labor income across households,
this increases interhousehold inequality. Of course the converse holds within the couple;
wealth is a common resource in the family.
17In terms of the one period model, we can show that the male spouse’s consumption is given by
1
1+φ(lm,lf ,λ)
(Ac + Y ) where Ac is financial income, Y is total after-tax labor income of the family and
φ(lm, lf , λ) = (
λ
1−λ )
(1/(η(1−γ)−1)))( lm
lf
)((1−η)(1−γ)/(η(1−γ)−1))). The argument above is that φ(l∗m, 1, λ) >
φ(l∗m, l
∗
f , λ) under the new policy, where l
∗
g is the optimal labor supply given by the standard labor market
condition. We claim, in the text, that females, who would like to take more leisure, but hit the bound of
one, have to increase their consumption. This reduces consumption inequality in all models.
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Are both spouses better off? In the previous section, we presented a welfare assess-
ment of the change in the tax code. We gave detailed results on the welfare effects by
gender and marital status and looked at the fraction of individuals that benefited from
the new policy. We showed that for married men and women there were some differences
in the welfare evaluation. In that section, we saw that a change in policy gives rise to
considerable rebargaining of the household contract when commitment is limited. It also
implies that transfers from male to female spouses drop considerably right after the change
in policy, since for several households, the labor supply of one of the spouses is at a corner.
It is not difficult to imagine that for certain families the change in policy benefits one
of the spouses but not the other. This does occur in our simulations. We find this in the
limited commitment model in 3.7% of married couples, in the full commitment model in
2.1%, and in the medium commitment in 2.6%. These families are mostly in the working
years, but older than age 35 (for very young households both spouses are worse off under
the new policy). Moreover, it is mostly married men that are made better off, and wives
are made worse off.
To understand this result, note that there are two forces that determine the division
of the welfare gains in the model. First, there is the rebargaining of the marital contract
that was highlighted earlier, and second there is the change in the labor supply behavior
that makes one of the spouses drop out of the labor market. Under limited commitment
the changes in the weight λ favor men, and therefore married men tend to be made better
off and married women worse off. Under full commitment, where bargaining never occurs
after the matching stage, the differences in welfare are driven exclusively by the restrictions
to labor supply. Since household secondary earners would like to take more leisure (but
this is not feasible), their welfare may fall even though the family as a whole may be made
better off. Young households obviously discount the possibility that one of the two spouses
will be at a corner in the future.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the welfare effects of a reform that eliminates capital taxation, in a
model with gender and marital status heterogeneity, uncertain labor income and incomplete
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financial markets. Calibrated to the US data, our model suggests that males and females,
couples and singles, formulate their decisions in very different economic environments,
and hence respond differently to changes in the tax code. In couple households, given an
empirically plausible covariance structure of wages, spouses can provide insurance to one
another against labor productivity shocks. We show that this means that the distortive
effect of capital taxes on wealth accumulation is larger for these households and hence for
the economy overall.
In our model, decision making within the couple is represented as a contract under
limited commitment. When the labor income of one spouse increases, the household must
allocate more weight to her well-being. The household gives up some risk sharing to satisfy
a participation constraint. We investigate how the tax code affects the intrahousehold
allocation and especially the risk sharing possibilities of the couple. We show that lower
capital taxes, which lead to wealth accumulation, mean more insurance within the family,
but that higher labor taxes, though they make the distribution of disposable income less
dispersed, increase the temptation to renege on past commitments. In our quantitative
model, we find that when the policy changes many households respond by revising the
intrahousehold allocation.
We view this paper as a first step towards a larger research project aiming to incorporate,
in a unified framework, a realistic demographic structure and a realistic formulation of
intrahousehold decision making. We believe that to this end, there is a number of important
extensions that need to be made to the model in order for it to represent a theory of
optimal household behavior and thus to be useful as a benchmark for policy evaluation.
The first set of extensions is to add those features to the model that improve matching the
wealth distribution by gender and marital status. On top of this list is the incentive of
individuals to leave bequests to their descendants, but also modeling carefully marriage
and divorce decisions that give rise to selection effects as in the data. A second set is to
extend this model to consider nonlinear taxation. A very important implication of risk
sharing within the family is that it can limit the scope of insurance provided through the
tax system. For example, progressive taxation will promote equity between households by
taxing at higher marginal rates wealthier families, but little is known about its effects on
inequality within the household. We are convinced that the model proposed in this paper
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can be used to study these questions jointly.
Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A Participation
In the data, many women (especially married) do not participating in the labor market
at all. In our model, we assume that the choice of hours is made at the intensive margin,
though do get corner solutions, and, therefore, non-participation.
We address here whether not having an explicit participation is a serious omission. It
turns out not to be, because the model has a five yearly horizon In table 2.9, we show the
labor market participation, for men and women, single or married, as we calculated it from
the PSID data. We compute the fraction of people that have worked at least one hour in a
window of s years, ending in 2007 and starting in 2007− (s− 1).
Table 2.9: Cumulative labor market participation up to 2007
s=1 s=3 s=5 s=7 s=9 s=11 s=12
Men
Single 85.44% 89.51% 92.78% 94.64% 95.93% 96.03% 96.37%
Married 93.20% 96.04% 97.08% 97.84% 98.79% 98.90% 98.96%
Total 91.26% 94.40% 96.00% 97.04% 98.07% 98.18% 98.31%
Women
Single 82.89% 87.27% 89.29% 91.99% 93.16% 93.53% 93.89%
Married 79.26% 85.42% 89.34% 92.05% 93.55% 94.94% 95.17%
Total 80.40% 86.00% 89.33% 92.03% 93.43% 94.50% 94.76%
The table shows that the fraction of men and women that have worked in the 5-year
period 2002–2007 (the corresponding value of s equals 5). For married women, this is about
10 percentage points higher than in annual data (s = 1). So the participation decision is
less of an issue on a horizon of five years, as in our model.
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In figure 2.6, we compare the model’s prediction of labor market participation to the
data. Notice that the model can generate non-participation among the female population
but most non-participation is concentrated towards retirement.
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Figure 2.6: Models and data: participation of women in employment
2.B Derivations in the Two Period Model
In this section, we derive explicitly the formulas from the two period model of section
2.3 that were omitted from the text. We assume that household members value the
consumption-leisure bundle according to a utility function of the form
(cηg l
1−η
g )1−γ
1−γ . The
optimal consumption and leisure choices in period 2 satisfy:
λ2ηc
η(1−γ)−1
m l
(1−η)(1−γ)
m = (1− λ2)ηcη(1−γ)−1f l(1−η)(1−γ)f And
(1− η)cg
ηlg
= w(1− τN )g
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Assuming an interior solution, we can substitute the intraperiod consumption-leisure
optimality condition into the consumption first-order condition and obtain:
λ2
c−γm
(w(1− τN )m)(1−η)(1−γ)
= (1− λ2)
c−γf
(w(1− τN )f )(1−η)(1−γ)
which gives that female consumption is f(λ2, ) = (
λ2
1−λ2 (
f
m
)(1−η)(1−γ))−1/γ times male
consumption in the model. Solving for the optimal choices, we can write male and female
utility as:
(
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g
(1 + f(λ2, ))(w(1− τN )m))1−η
)1−γ
χ
1− γ + ξ ≥
(
Ac
2 + w(1− τN )m
(w(1− τN )m)1−η
)1−γ
χ
1− γ
(
f(λ2, )
(1 + f(λ2, ))
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g
(w(1− τN )f )1−η
)1−γ
χ
1− γ + ξ ≥
(
Ac
2 + w(1− τN )f
(w(1− τN )f )1−η
)1−γ
χ
1− γ
where χ = (ηη(1− η)1−η)1−γ .
Rearranging, we can express the sharing rule with the following nonlinear equations:
(
1
(1 + f(λ2, ))
)1−γ ≤ ξ˜ ( (w(1− τN )m)
(1−η)
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g
)1−γ + (
Ac
2 + w(1− τN )m
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g
)1−γ (2.27)
(
f(λ2, )
(1 + f(λ2, ))
)1−γ ≤ ξ˜ ( (w(1− τN )f )
(1−η)
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g
)1−γ + (
Ac
2 + w(1− τN )f
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g
)1−γ (2.28)
where ξ˜ = − ξ(1−γ)
(ηη(1−η)1−η)1−γ > 0.
The effect of changes in labor taxes. Equations 2.27 and 2.28 define the upper
and the lower bound that the weight λ2 needs to respect in order for the participation
constraints to be satisfied. The partial derivatives of the right hand side of equation 2.27
with respect to (1− τN ) are:
(1− γ)
[
(ξ˜ (
Ac (1− η)
1− τN − η
∑
g
w g) κ1(Ac, ) + (Ac w (m −
∑
g g
2
))κ2(Ac, ))
]
(2.29)
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where κ1 =
(w(1−τN )g)(1−η)(1−γ)
(Ac+
∑
g w(1−τN )m)2−γ > 0, κ2 =
(Ac
2
+w(1−τw)m)−γ
(Ac+
∑
g w(1−τw)g)2−γ > 0. The derivative of
equation 2.28 is similar and for the sake of brevity omitted. As discussed in text, 2.29
illustrates that the effect of changes in labor taxation on the household sharing rule depends
on the level of wealth of the household Ac. If Ac = 0, it reduces to:
−(1− γ)
[
ξ˜η
∑
g
w g
]
κ1(Ac, ) > 0 (2.30)
As the LHS of 2.27 is decreasing in λ2, a positive partial derivative means that λ2 has to
increase by less to satisfy the participation constraint of the male spouse. Therefore, in the
case of m >> f where the lower bound applies, the disturbance to the household sharing
rule is smaller. The converse may obtain if Ac > 0. As in the case of log separable utility,
an overall negative derivative 2.29 yields that lowering labor taxes makes it more difficult
for household members to commit to an allocation.
The effect of changes in capital taxes. We derive the partial derivative of equation
2.27 with respect to financial income as:
(γ − 1)
[
ξ˜ (
(w(1− τN )m)(1−η)
Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g)2−γ
+ (
(Ac2 + w(1− τN )m)−γ
(Ac +
∑
g w(1− τN )g)2−γ)
(m −
∑
g g
2
)
]
(2.31)
The leading term in 2.31 is always positive, meaning that an increase of financial income
relaxes the constraint. The second term is positive only when m > f . Since equation
2.27 defines the lower bound on λ2, it binds only when male productivity exceeds female
productivity. Therefore, higher financial wealth or lower capital taxation enhance the
households commitment. This proves proposition 3 in the main text.
2.C Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we briefly define the time invariant competitive equilibrium Given a level
of expenditure G in the steady state, the tax schedule {τK , τW , τC , τSS}, social security
policy and unintended bequests, the competitive equilibrium is a set of value functions
{Sg,M, Vg}, household decision rules for consumption, savings and leisure, and measures
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of households over the state vector of assets, productivity, age, gender, marital status and
the sharing rule λ such that:
1. Given prices, Sm, Sf and M solve the functional equations and optimal policies
derive. In particular, optimal policies are functions cS,g(a,X, j), a
′
S,g(a,X, j), nS,g(a,X, j)
for consumption, assets and hours for singles and analogously cM,g(a,X, λ, j), a
′
M (a,X, λ, j),
nM,g(a,X, λ, j) for couples.
2. Prices w and r satisfy:
w = (1− α)KαN−α r = αKα−1N1−α − δ
where N is the aggregate labor input in units of effective labor.
3. The social security policy satisfies:
wNτSS = (
∑
g
1− µ
2
∫
SSg(α, j)ΓS,g(da× dX × {jR, . . . , J})
+ µ
∫
SSg(α, j)ΓM (da× dX × dλ× {jR, . . . , J}))
where ΓS,g is the measure of bachelors over relevant states and ΓM is the analogous object
for married couples.
4. Accidental bequests satisfy:
B =
1
Φo
(
∑
g
1− µ
2
∫
a′S,g(a,X, j)(1− ψj)ΓS,g(da× dX × {1, . . . , jR − 1})
+ µ
∫
a′M (a,X, λ, j)(1− ψj)ΓM (da× dX × dλ× {1, . . . , jR − 1})
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5. The government budget constraint is balanced:
G = wτN (
∑
g
1− µ
2
∫
nS,g(a,X, j)Lg(j)gαgΓS,g(da× dX × {1, . . . , jR − 1})
+
∑
g
µ
∫
nM,g(a,X, λ, j)αggLg(j)ΓM (da× dX × dλ× {1, . . . , jR − 1}))
+τC(
∑
g
1− µ
2
∫
cS,g(a,X, j)ΓS,g(da× dX × dj)
+
∑
g
µ
∫
cM,g(a,X, λ, j)ΓM (da× dX × dλ× dj))
+τK(
∑
g
1− µ
2
∫
(ra+B)ΓS,g(da× dX × dj + µ
∫
(ra+ 2B)ΓM (da× dX × dλ× dj)
6. Market Clearing:
K =
∑
g
∫
1− µ
2
aΓS,g(da× dX × dj) + µ
∫
aΓM (da× dX × dλ× dj)
N =
∑
g
1− µ
2
∫
nS,g(a,X, j)Lg(j)gαgΓS,g(da× dX × {1, . . . , jR − 1})
+
∑
g
µ
∫
nM,g(a,X, λ, j)αggLg(j)ΓM (da× dX × dλ× {1, . . . , jR − 1})
7. The measures ΓS,g and ΓM are consistent. In particular, for all subsets A,X ,Λ,J
of the state space such that 1 /∈ J
ΓS,g(A,X ,J ) = ψj
∫
X′∈X , a′S,g∈A, j+1∈J
ΓS,g(da× dX × dj)
ΓM,g(A,X ,Λ,J ) = ψj
∫
X′∈X , a′M,g∈A, λ′∈Λ, j+1∈J
ΓM,g(da× dX × dλ× dj)
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2.D Stationary Distributions of the Calibrated Models
In table 2.10, we show the Gini coefficients from the stationary distributions of wealth and
earnings in the initial steady state. The benchmark models as well as the ‘Singles Only’
economies produce similar levels of wealth and earnings concentration (coefficients roughly
.54 to .55 and .36 to .38, respectively). In the US data, the analogous statistics are .743 and
.449, respectively. It is not surprising that the model produces distributions that feature
less concentration than the data. This is a property of models of heterogeneous agents and
wealth accumulation (for a summary of the literature see Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gimı´nez, and
R´ıos-Rull (2003)).
Table 2.10: Wealth and earnings distribution in the initial steady state
Quintile Limited Full Single Men Single Men Fraction Couples
& Women PSID 2007
Wealth Distribution
1 0.44 0.43 0.2597
2 0.39 0.40 0.4044
3 0.52 0.52 0.6173
4 0.64 0.64 0.7097
5 0.79 0.79 0.7945
Gini 0.551 0.552 0.539 0.541 0.7438
Earnings Distribution
1 0.20 0.20 0.2190
2 0.34 0.34 0.3246
3 0.62 0.61 0.5624
4 0.71 0.72 0.7659
5 0.90 0.90 0.9088
Gini 0.381 0.382 0.345 0.3512 0.4498
The table provides additional information. It shows for each quintile of the wealth
and earnings distributions the number of couples households as a percentage of the total
number of households in that bracket. Not surprisingly a couples household with two
earners accumulates more wealth and has nearly twice as much labor income than a
typical single earner household. This brings couples to the top of the wealth and earnings
distributions. According to table 2.10, the model does a remarkable job in matching the
earnings quintiles, and very good job in matching the wealth quintiles (although it predicts
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a larger fraction of couples in the first quintile than the data).
Chapter 3
Industrial Policies and Growth1
3.1 Introduction
A persistent puzzle in the study of cross-country differences in economic performance since
World War II is the dramatic reshuﬄing in relative positions between East Asian and
Latin American countries. This reshuﬄing is most vividly illustrated by the comparison
in Figure 3.1 between Argentina and South Korea. Panel A shows the absolute level of
GDP per worker, in constant 1996 dollars in the two countries. South Korea started out
in the mid-1950s with productivity about a quarter of the productivity of Argentina, and
ended up a half-century later about a third more productive. In panel B the same series
are normalized to 1 at the beginning of the sample to more sharply illustrate the difference
in performance.
Argentina and South Korea are just illustrative examples: similar, though somewhat
less dramatic, comparisons could be made for the other large Latin American economies,
such as Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, on one hand, and others high performers in East
Asia, particularly Taiwan, on the other. One exception is Chile, which performs very well,
and on which we return below.2
1This chapter draws on work that was carried out jointly by Francesco Caselli, John Coleman, and me.
The work was motivated by Francesco Caselli’s and John Coleman’s idea to assess the role of policies in the
reshuﬄing in relative positions between East Asian and Latin American countries. I have carried out most
of the analytical and numerical analyses and written around 90% of the text; general decisions about the
direction of the paper were made equally between the three authors.
2While over 1960–2010 Chile performed best amongst the Latin American economies and saw an
improvement in real GDP per worker by 140%, it did by far not grow as rapidly as the East Asian
economies.
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Figure 3.1: GDP per worker in constant 1996 dollars
Notes: Source: Penn World Table 6.1
The reason why the comparison between Latin American and East Asian countries over
the post-war period is interesting and puzzling is that countries in this set shared broadly
similar economic institutions. In particular, they were market economies with a high degree
of government intervention and guidance, particularly in the sphere of international trade,
where all countries pursued various forms of import-subsitution and export promotion
strategies. Indeed in the unending dispute over the costs and benefits of industrial policy,
supporters of government intervention typically point to the ‘success’ of East Asia, while its
detractors tend to cite the disappointing performance of Latin American countries. Why
policies with a similar underlying philosophy seemingly worked well in one place but failed
in the other has not satisfactorily been resolved.
In this paper we study the dynamic response of a two-sector, manufacturing and agricul-
ture, economy to the introduction of import tariffs on manufacturing goods similar to those
that characterized government policy in many low- and middle-income market economies in
the first several decades of the post-war period. We show that this response depends on the
level of productivity in the agricultural sector. If the agricultural sector is very productive,
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the domestic market for manufacturing goods is large. Hence, manufacturing firms choose
to take advantage of the tariff barriers to operate as domestic monopolies. Because of
this the manufacturing sector remains relatively small, and accumulation and growth are
subdued. On the other hand if agricultural productivity is low, domestic manufacturers
face too little domestic demand, and choose instead to compete on international markets.
Since in these markets they are price takers, they have no strategic incentive to contain
their scale of operations. This leads to fast accumulation and growth. This mechanism
can explain the contrasting experience of Latin America and East Asia as countries in the
former generally had much higher agricultural productivity. It can also explain within-Latin
America differences as Chile had much lower agricultural productivity.
The key assumption in generating this pattern is that firms cannot (systematically)
price discriminate between domestic and foreign markets. In particular, they cannot charge
the monopoly price at home and then also sell on the international market at the (much
lower) world price. We believe this assumption to be plausible, as such practices invariably
appear to lead to accusations of dumping and to retaliatory measures by trading partners.
We quantify the relevance of our mechanism by calibrating our model to the experiences
of Argentina and South Korea. Besides tariffs, we also add export subsidies, since these
tended to be a prominent feature of industrial policy in both countries (e.g. Amsden (2001)).
Nevertheless, we find that the key policy to understand differences in performance is the
tariff protection of manufacturing. In particular, in counterfactual simulations we find that
in the long-run Korean firms would have started supplying the world market, even if there
had been no policy measures taken.
Our paper is related and contributes to various strands of the literature on structural
transformation and trade. Matsuyama (1992) analyzes the role of agricultural productivity
in an endogenous growth model and predicts for a small open economy a positive link
onto economic growth. Our work differs in the assumptions made. While Matsuyama’s
mechanism for growth is a learning-by-doing externality in manufacturing, we do not impose
such spillovers. In our setup, the size and the growth rate of the manufacturing sector
depends on the dynamics of skilled labor, as in Caselli and Coleman (2001). Industrial
policies and agricultural productivity will affect workers’ decisions on skill acquisition. In
a closed economy framework Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002) show that countries
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with relative low productivities in agriculture allocate a relative large fractions of resources
into food production. Their result relies on the closed economy assumption which implies
that a subsistence level in food consumption must be satisfied by domestic production.
In our setup monopolistic producers in manufacturing decide whether to export or not.
In situations with no international trade the Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002) result
will survive, but when there is international trade production factors will be allocated
according to comparative advantage.
3.2 The Model
We consider a small open economy with two sectors, farm (F ) and manufacturing (M),
employing unskilled (U) and skilled (S) labor respectively. As in Caselli and Coleman
(2001), labor incurs an idiosyncratic cost in transitioning from U to S. In terms of time,
this cost is φξi, where ξi is distributed among members of a generation with density µ(ξi)
and φ a constant related to overall efficiency of education. Each worker is endowed with
one unit of time, which he can devote to working and/or acquiring skills. Member i of
each newly born generation faces the following choice at (and only at) the beginning of life.
Either he can immediately join the farm sector, to which he then supplies one unit of labor
for each of the periods in which he remains alive. Or he can devote the first ξi time units
of his life to acquiring skills and supply one unit of labor to the manufacturing sector for
each of the remaining periods he stays alive. We assume that φξi is distributed among
members of each generation with time-invariant density function µ(ξi). Hence, ξi measures
the amount of time it takes for person i to acquire the skills to become a non-farm worker,
relative to other members of the same generation. For simplicity, we assume φξi < 1 for
every i, such that education never ‘spills over’ into periods of life subsequent to the first.
For any person alive at time t, the probability of dying in period t + 1 is the constant
1 − λ. In each period, a generation of size (1 − λ)L is born. Then at time t the size of
the generation born at t− j is (1− λ)λj . Note that this assures that the size of the total
population is L in every period. Within a dynasty, there is intergenerational altruism and
perfect intergenerational correlation of types. There is no aggregate uncertainty.
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Assuming Stone-Geary preferences, the consumption basket is given by
Ct =
(CF,t − γ)θC1−θM,t
θθ(1− θ)1−θ (3.1)
where γ is the subsistence level of farm good consumptions. These preferences feature
for γ > 0 an income elasticity for F goods smaller than one. As in Caselli and Coleman
(2001), we assume perfect intergenerational correlation of types within a dynasty and
intergenerational altruism and that at each point in time a dynasty has exactly one
member; once that person dies another person is born into that dynasty. The model
therefore admits a representative consumer, who maximizes U =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct), where β is
the discount factor.
The manufactured good has differentiated varieties, which are aggregated with a CES
technology according to
CM,t =
[∫ 1
0
cM,t(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
with ε > 1
where the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the manufactured goods is ε
and assumed to be greater than one.
In manufacturing, production of variety i is subject to decreasing returns according to
yM (i) = AM · (lS(i))α for i ∈ [0, 1], with 0 < α < 1 (3.2)
where AM is the manufacturing sector’s productivity and lS(i) is skilled labor employed
by manufactures producer i.3 Production in the non-manufacturing sector is subject to
constant returns to scale and given by
YF = AF · LU (3.3)
where AF is the F sector’s productivity, and LU unskilled labor employed.
All goods are tradeable on the international market and are used for consumption only.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and non-protected or subsidized. We use
3Decreasing returns ensure that in the open economy a producer, at given prices and wages, demands a
finite number of skilled workers.
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the F good as the numeraire. In the manufacturing sector, however, industrial policies,
such as import tariffs (τ) and export subsidies (s) apply, which we assume to be common
to all varieties. Moreover, for all varieties of manufactured goods there exists a perfect
substitute on the world market at price p∗.
The producer of variety of the manufactured good can choose between selling only to
the domestic market, where he has some market power, or exporting and charging on both
the domestic and the international market the world price. If there was no international
trade, there would be monopolistic competition in manufacturing, and the producer of
variety i would charge the monopolistic price pM (i). But in the small open economy,
competition with imported goods imposes an upper bound a domestic firm can achieve on
the domestic market. When supplying the domestic market only, manufacturing firm i will
therefore charge
p(i) = min
{
pM (i), (1 + τ)p∗(i)
}
(3.4)
Moreover, the firm the producer will choose to export and charge p∗ on the domestic and
the international market if that results in higher profits. For a sufficiently large domestic
market the monopolist will choose to sell on the domestic market only, whereas for a
sufficiently small domestic market the producer will choose to export. An export subsidy,
though, will encourage a firm to export and charge p∗.
We will assume balanced trade to rule out counterfactual implications for net foreign
assets, and impose therefore nxF + p
∗nxM = 0. Finally we assume that the government
balances its budget in every period through a lump-sum tax T to finance the outlay on
industrial policies, the spending on export subsidies minus the collected tariff revenues.
If tariff revenues exceed payments on subsidies, T is negative, representing a lump-sum
payment to households.
As mentioned above, we assume that policies are common to all varieties in manufactur-
ing. Since productivity is common to all producers, the unconstrained domestic equilibrium
is the standard monopolistic competition symmetric equilibrium. Since we also assume
symmetry on the world level by having a common world price for all varieties, we mainly
focus on symmetric equilibria with p(i) = p, but due to a discontinuous jump in labor
demand when switching from the domestic mode of production to exporting, there is also
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a situation with an asymmetric equilibrium, as discussed later.
3.3 Equilibrium
In any period t, the representative consumer choose consumption to maximizes utility
subject to her per-period budget constraint
Pt+1Bt+1 = Et − PtCt + (1 + rt)PtBt
where Et denotes net income, Pt the price index of the consumption bundle Ct, and Bt
real bond holdings at time t. The intertemporal optimality condition is the usual Euler
equation
u′(Ct) = β(1 + rt+1)u′(Ct+1) (3.5)
Within any period, the demand for the two consumption goods is the solution to the
following expenditure minimization problem
min
CF,t,CM,t
CF,t + PM,tCM,t s.t.
(CF,t − γ)θ(CM,t)1−θ
θθ(1− θ)1−θ = Ct
which implies for relative consumption
CF,t =
θ
1− θPM,tCM,t + γ (3.6)
and for consumer demand for F and M goods
CF,t = θP
1−θ
M,t Ct + γ = θEt + (1− θ)γ (3.7)
CM,t = (1− θ) Ct
P θM,r
= (1− θ)Et − γ
PM,t
(3.8)
where PM,r is the consumer price of the basket of manufactured goods (in units of F
goods) and Et = Pt · Ct denotes the household’s consumption expenditure. The implied
consumption-based price index is Pt = P
1−θ
M,t +
γ
Ct
. Since the economy cannot borrow
from abroad, and bonds are in zero net supply, clearing of the bond market requires
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Bt+1 = Bt = 0, and the amount the representative consumer spends on consumption is in
equilibrium equal to net income
Et =
1
L
[wU,t · LU,t + wS,t · LS,t + ΠM,t − Tt] (3.9)
where ΠM,t =
∫ 1
0 piM,t(i)di are aggregate profits in manufacturing and Tt is the lump-
sum tax levied to balance the government budget.
The minimization of expenditure on varieties i ∈ [0, 1] of the manufactured good with
corresponding prices pt(i), gives the demand for differentiated variety i ∈ [0, 1] of the
manufactured good and the price index for manufactured goods as
cM,t(i) =
(
PM,t
pt(i)
)ε
CM,t for all i ∈ [0, 1] (3.10)
PM,t =
[∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
(3.11)
A newborn worker, who is subject to an exogenous survival probability λ ∈ (0, 1),
invests in skills if the present value of wages as a skilled worker exceeds those of a unskilled
worker plus the idiosyncratic cost of acquiring skills ξi. Define the following discount factor
Qs,t :=
s∏
k=t
(
1
1 + rk
)
for s > t and Qt,t = 1
where by (3.5) the equilibrium interest rate is rt+1 =
u′(Ct)
βu′(Ct+1) − 1. At time t expected
present value of wages from skill type j = U, S, taking the death probability into account is
hj,t =
∞∑
s=t
Qs,tλ
s−twj,s for j = U, S
Income maximization subject to the time cost φξi implies that at time t individual i of the
new-born generation acquires skill if hS,t − φξiwS,t ≥ hU,t. This defines a cutoff value
ξ¯t =
1
φ
hS,t − hU,t
wS,t
such that all newborns with ξi ≤ ξ¯t choose to acquire skills, whereas all those with ξi > ξ¯t
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choose to worker in non-manufacturing. Notice that ξ¯t ≥ 0, since skilled labor can be
employed as unskilled labor without cost, and therefore wS ≥ wU . Moreover, profit
maximization in non-manufacturing and clearing of the market for unskilled labor implies
due to the production technology (3.3) that the wage rate for unskilled workers is equal
to the marginal product in the F sector, wU = AF . The cutoff value for the time cost is
therefore
ξ¯t =
∞∑
s=t
Qs,tλ
s−t (wS,s −AF )
wS,t
(3.12)
Out of the newborns (generation 0), who are endowed with one unit of labor each, time
spent in education is
l0e,t = Lφ
ξ¯t∫
0
ξiµ(ξi)dξi (3.13)
where µ(ξi) is the pdf of ξi. Similarly, the new-born’s supply of skilled and unskilled labor
is
l0S,t = L
ξ¯t∫
0
(1− φξi)µ(ξi)dξi (3.14)
l0U,t = L
∞∫
ξ¯t
1 · µ(ξi)dξi (3.15)
The evolution of the distribution of labor supply over time, where a fraction (1 − λ) of
workers is replaced by newborns, is given by
LsU,t = λ · LsU,t−1 + (1− λ) · l0U,t (3.16)
and similarly, since education ”does not spill” from one period to the next,
Le,t = (1− λ) · l0e,t (3.17)
LsS,t = λ · (LsS,t−1 + Le,t−1) + (1− λ) · l0S,t (3.18)
To note is that skilled labor supply is increasing the net present value of skilled wages.
An increase in wS,s for s ≥ t raises ξ¯t which increases l0S,t and in turn LsS,t.
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Demand for unskilled labor, which is only employed in the competitive F sector, is
LdU,t =
1
AF
YF,t
In the manufacturing sector, where producers have some market power on the domestic
market but also the possibility to sell abroad, firms will choose the mode of production
that maximizes their profits. Since firms in the M sector are infinitesimally small and
skilled labor is perfectly mobile within the sector, the individual firm i takes wages for
skilled labor as a given. But firms do decide on whether to sell only domestically or also to
export, and at which price. They cannot price discriminate between the two markets and
they have to supply the domestic market to be able to export.
To highlight what their choices are when they are not constrained by the cum-tariff
import price and opt not to export, we first consider a situation without international
trade.
3.3.1 No International Trade
On the domestic market, the monopolistic producer of variety i ∈ [0, 1] of the manufactured
good faces a downward sloping demand curve, which is in the absence of international trade
given by domestic consumption demand. Consequently, the producer maximizes profits,
pt(i) · yM,t(i) − wS,t · lS,t(i), subject to the production function (3.2) and the consumer
demand function (3.10). Substituting in, the firm’s optimization problem becomes,
max
pt(i)
piM,t(i) = pt(i)
(
PM,t
pt(i)
)ε
LCM,t − wS,t
(
1
AM
(
PM,t
pt(i)
)ε
LCM,t
) 1
α
which has first order condition pt(i) =
1
α
ε
ε−1wS,t
(
1
AM
) 1
α
((
PM,t
pt(i)
)ε
LCM,t
) 1−α
α
. The
second order condition holds since profits are concave in pt(i) due to ε > 1. Notice that
marginal cost are MC(yM,t(i)) = wS,t
(
1
AM
) 1
α
(yM,t(i))
1−α
α , and the optimal price is a
constant markup on (the increasing) marginal cost. Solving for p(i) gives firm i’s optimal
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price in the case of no international trade, which we denoted by pMt (i), as
pMt (i) =
[
1
α
ε
ε− 1wS,t
(
1
AM
) 1
α
(LCM,t)
1−α
α
] α
α+ε(1−α)
P
ε(1−α)
α+ε(1−α)
M,t (3.19)
The equilibrium is symmetric with pMt (i) = p
M
t for all firms i ∈ [0, 1], which implies
by (3.11) also PM,t = p
M
t . Moreover cM,t(i) = CM,t, yM,t(i) = YM,t = LCM,t, and
piM,t(i) = ΠM,t. By (3.2), labor demand of producer i is given by l
d
S,t(i) =
(
yM,t(i)
AM
) 1
α
.
The equilibrium price of a variety of the manufactured good as well as for the basket of
manufactured goods, is therefore
PM,t = p
M
t (i) =
1
α
ε
ε− 1wS,t
(
1
AM
) 1
α
(LCM,t)
1−α
α (3.20)
which describes the equilibrium price as a function of aggregate consumption of the
manufactured good. Moreover, maximized profits and demand for skilled labor are
ΠM,t = piM,t(i) =
(
LCM,t
AM
) 1
α
wS,t
(
1
α
ε
ε− 1 − 1
)
(3.21)
LdS,t =
∫ 1
0
ldS,t(i)di =
(
LCM,t
AM
) 1
α
(3.22)
The decentralized equilibrium is such that all firms maximize their profits, all workers
maximize their income through their skill acquisition choice, consumers maximize utility, the
government budget is balanced, and all markets clear. Here no international trade occurs
and production must equal domestic consumption of each good. Moreover the government
does not collect import tariff revenue nor pays export subsidies, so no lump-sum tax is
imposed to satisfy the government’s budget constraint. With YF,t = CF,t, YM,t = CM,t,
and Tt = 0 equations (3.5) to (3.22) describe the equilibrium.
3.3.2 With International Trade
We consider a small open economy that takes the world price as given. The crucial difference
to a closed economy is that every producer faces a demand curve that is perfectly elastic
at some prices, which depend on the world price for manufactured goods and industrial
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policy measures (which are common to all varieties). It is
ydM,i(pt; p
∗, τt) =

∞ for pt < p∗t
L
(
PM,t
pt(i)
)ε
CM,t for p
∗ ≤ pt ≤ (1 + τ)p∗
0 for (1 + τt)p
∗ < pt
for ∀i ∈ [0, 1]
Firms have the possibility (i) to supply only the domestic market, (ii) to supply both
the domestic and the foreign market, or (iii) not to produce at all. They cannot price
discriminate between the two markets and they have to supply the domestic market to
be able to export. Depending on the world price p∗, import tariffs τt, export subsidies st,
as well as the behavior of other firms different strategies are optimal for producer i. For
now, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria. We show in the next section that the
symmetric equilibrium is unique if it exists. There are four possible scenarios:
1. The cum-tariff import price of substitutes from the world market is so low that it
restricts domestic firms and they produce less than the quantity consumed domestically
Consequently, there are net imports of the manufactured good. We refer to this
scenario as case 1.
2. The cum-tariff import price of substitutes from the world market is so low that it
restricts domestic firms’ pricing, but they produce to satisfy domestic demand, such
that there are no imports (case 2 ).
3. The domestic monopolistic producers are not constrained by import prices and do
not export either. They are at their domestic interior optimum, and there is no
international trade (case 3 ).
4. The incentive to export is sufficiently strong, and domestic firms produce for both
the domestic and the international market. There are exports of manufactured
goods.(case 4 ).
All firms will choose the mode of production that maximizes their profits. We consider
each case in turn, starting with the unconstrained domestic optimum.
Suppose at prevailing prices, the producer of variety i of the manufactured good prefers
not to export, given the behavior of other firms. Moreover suppose the firm’s price setting
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is not restricted by the cum-tariff price of competing imports (case 3 ). Since the producer
is only supplying the domestic market, the profit maximization problem is as in section
3.3.1. Moreover, since the equilibrium is symmetric, the outcome is exactly the same as
above, with p
(3)
t = P
(3)
M,t = p
M
t as derived in (3.20), and nx
(3)
M,t = 0.
However, it might be that the cum-tariff import price of the perfect substitutes from
international markets is below this by the producer desired price pMt . If the producer was
charging a price above (1 + τt)p
∗, though, it would lose all demand. Hence the upper
bound on domestic prices (3.4) imposed by competing imports is binding (case 1 or 2 ). As
long as it is still profitable to produce at all, the domestic producer will underprice the
competing imports by setting pt(i) = (1 + τt)p
∗, and choose quantities to maximize profits
of selling at this price on the domestic market where consumer’s demand is given by (3.10);
the maximization problem is
piM,t(i) = max
yM,t(i)
(1 + τt)p
∗yM,t(i)− wS,t
(
yM,t(i)
AM
) 1
α
s.t. yM,t(i) ≤ cM,t(i) =
(
PM,t
(1 + τt)p∗
)ε
LCM,t
This implies yM,t(i) = min{AM
(
α(1+τt)p∗AM
wS,t
;
(
PM,t
(1+τt)p∗
)ε
LCM,t
) α
1−α
and lS,t(i) =
(
yM,t(i)
AM
) 1
1−α
,
which is the same for all producers, since the world price and the tariff are the com-
mon to all varieties.4 Due to the symmetry PM,t = (1 + τt)p
∗, and it follows YM,t =
min
{
AM
(
α(1+τt)p∗AM
wS,t
) α
1−α
;LCM,t
}
. Hence there is always some domestic production of
manufactured goods, but the quantity produced might be less than the quantity consumers
demand at price (1 + τt)p
∗. If YM,t = LCM,t, there are no imports of the manufactured
goods, and the economy is in case 2 with nx
(2)
M,t = 0 and
Y
(2)
M,t = LCM,t (3.23)
and L
d(2)
S,t =
(
LCM,t
AM
) 1
α
, and Π
(2)
M = (1 + τt)p
∗
tLCM,t−wS
(
LCM,t
AM
) 1
α
. If, on the contrary,
YM,t = AM
(
α(1+τt)p∗AM
wS,t
) α
1−α
< LCM,t, case 1 applies, net imports nxM,t = YM,t −
4Notice that at the optimum piM,t(i) ≥ (1−α)
(
αα(1+τt)p
∗AM
wαS,t
) 1
1−α
> 0, indicating that there are always
some profits from producing.
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LCM,t < 0 occur and the manufacturing sector is summarized by
Y
(1)
M,t = AM
(
α(1 + τt)p
∗AM
wS,t
) α
1−α
< LCM,t (3.24)
and L
d(1)
S,t =
(
α(1+τt)p∗AM
wS,t
) 1
1−α
and Π
(1)
M,t = (1− α)
(
αα(1+τt)p∗AM
wαS,t
) 1
1−α
. In either case 1 or
2, PM,t = (1 + τ)p
∗.
Finally, suppose firm i prefers supplying both the domestic and the international market
(case 4 ). In this case, the firm charges the world price, i.e. p
(4)
t = p
∗ = P (4)M,t, which is
common to all varieties, and accrues an export subsidy of st · p∗ per unit sold abroad. It
chooses the quantity produced to maximize profits
piM,t(i) = max
yM,t(i)
p∗yM,t(i) + stp∗nxM,t − wS,t
(
yM,t(i)
AM
) 1
α
s.t. nxM,t(i) = yM,t(i)− LcM,t(i) > 0
which implies off corners
Y
(4)
M,t = AM
(
α(1 + st)p
∗AM
wS,t
) α
1−α
> LCM,t (3.25)
Therefore, provided the firm is actually exporting and nx
(4)
M,t = AM
(
α(1+st)p∗AM
wS,t
) α
1−α −
LCM,t > 0, L
d(4)
S,t =
(
α(1+st)p∗AM
wS,t
) 1
1−α
and Π
(4)
M = (1− α)
(
αα(1+st)p∗AM
wαS,t
) 1
1−α − stp∗LCM,t.
Each producer in manufacturing opts for the mode of production maximizing profits.
Figure 3.2 shows the optimal behavior of an individual firm in the manufacturing sector,
which takes price as well as aggregate consumption and wages as a given. For low world
prices exporting is not attractive and firm i opts to be a domestic monopolist of variety i.
When the cum-tariff import price of perfect substitutes ((1 + τ)p∗) is low, the producer
is constrained in price setting. For very low prices, the firm produces less than domestic
demand for their good at the prevailing price. For sufficiently high cum-subsidy import
prices, the firm is able to charge the profit maximizing price to the domestic market (pM ).
In this situation the firm is not producing up to the amount at which the price is equal to
marginal cost, but producing less in order to maximize revenue. However, when the world
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price cum subsidy is sufficiently high, the firm will opt to supply both the domestic and the
international market and charging the world price. In this case, it is optimal for the firm to
expand production until revenue per unit sold, price plus export subsidy, equals marginal
cost. For this reason, firm i’s labor demand and output supplied feature a jump at the
world price for which the domestic and the international strategy yield the same profits.
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Figure 3.2: Manufacturing in symmetric equilibrium (conditional on CM and wS ; for τ > 0
and s > 0)
For the same reason, the demand for skilled labor as a function of the skilled wage is
discontinuous, as illustrated in figure 3.3. For sufficiently low wages, exporting is optimal
and therefore a rather high labor demand. But at some higher wage, the firm switches to
the domestic mode of production resulting in a downward jump in labor demand.
In general, we focus on symmetric equilibria. As we show in section 3.3.3, if a symmetric
equilibrium exists, it is unique. But due to the intrinsic discontinuities of the model, a
symmetric equilibrium does not always exist. There is the possibility that the supply of
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Figure 3.3: Skilled labor demand (conditional on CM and p
∗; for τ > 0 and s > 0
skilled labor passes through (”intersects”) labor demand in figure 3.3 in the discontinuity
region. In this case, the skilled wage would be bounded between a high value, at which
firms would hire only for sales on the domestic market the quantity of workers ldomS , and a
low value, at which all firms want to supply the world market for which they require lexpS
skilled workers. In a symmetric equilibrium the aggregated labor demand would not equal
supply. However, at the points of discontinuity, firms are just indifferent between exporting
or domestic production as both strategies yield the same profits. Therefore we assume that
in this situation some firms are exporting and some are not, such that the labor market
clears.
In particular, when manufacturing firms are indifferent between domestic monopoly
and exporting, we let the measure
LsS−ldomS
lexpS −ldomS
of firms be exporters, who charge the world
price p∗ and hire lexpS skilled workers. The remaining
lexpS −LsS
lexpS −ldomS
firms supply the domestic
market only where they charge price pM and demand ldomS units of skilled labor. The price
of the basket of manufactured goods (3.11) and aggregate production of M goods are in
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that case
PM,t =
(
LsS,t − ldomS,t
lexpS,t − ldomS,t
(p∗)1−ε +
lexpS,t − LsS,t
lexpS,t − ldomS,t
(pMt )
1−ε
) 1
1−ε
YM,t =
LsS,t − ldomS,t
lexpS,t − ldomS,t
AM (l
exp
S,t )
α +
lexpS,t − LsS,t
lexpS,t − ldomS,t
AM (l
dom
S,t )
α (3.26)
This ensures that all markets clear. In our simulations we also verify numerically that this
indeed an equilibrium. In all other situations, we consider the symmetric equilibrium.
The decentralized equilibrium is such that all firms maximize their profits, all workers
maximize their income through their skill acquisition choice, consumers maximize utility,
the government budget is balanced, trade balances, and all market clears. The government
budget requires for the lump-sum tax/transfer on households
Tt =
 τtp∗nxM,t < 0 if nxM,t < 0stp∗nxM,t > 0 if nxM,t > 0
The trade balance and market clearing for both goods requires
nxF,t = −p∗nxM,t
YF,t = CF,t + nxF,t
YM,t = CM,t + nxM,t
The four equations above, and (3.5) to (3.26), where only the equations of the manu-
facturing firms’ profit maximizing case apply. Drawing on the recursive structure of the
system, we solve for the transitional dynamics using a shooting algorithm, where the state
variables are LsS,t−1 and Le,t−1.
5
3.3.3 A Note on the Uniqueness of the Symmetric Equilibrium (when
it exists)
In the case of the closed economy, it is easy to show that there is strategic complementarity,
i.e. when the price of the basket increases it is optimal for the individual firm to charge a
5In steady state wages and interest rates are constant, i.e. wS,t = wS and rt = r =
1−β
β
by (3.5), and
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higher price. According to (3.19), firm i’s optimal interior price pMt (i) as a function of the
basket PM,t is
pMt (i) = k · P
ε(1−α)
α+ε(1−α)
M,t , with k =
[
1
α
ε
ε− 1wS,t
(
1
AM
) 1
α
(LCM,t)
1−α
α
] α
α+ε(1−α)
> 0
Hence
∂pMt (i)
∂PM , t
= k
ε(1− α)
α+ ε(1− α)P
α
α+ε(1−α)
M,t > 0
∂2pMt (i)
∂P 2M,t
= −k εα(1− α)
(α+ ε(1− α))2P
−2α−ε(1−α)
α+ε(1−α)
M,t < 0
lim
PM,t→0
∂pMt (i)
∂PM,t
= ∞
Therefore there exists a unique fixed point for the interior optimal price (since all firm’s
solve their individual problem (3.19) and the price of the basket is determined from these
individual solutions according to (3.11)).
What changes in the open economy? On the one hand, the cum-tariff price of imports
imposes a ceiling on prices a producer can charge on the domestic market. This constraint
is binding when (1 + τt)p
∗ < pMt (i). Since
∂piM,t(i)
∂pt(i)
> 0 for pt(i) = (1 + τt)p
∗ < pMt (i) (recall
that pMt (i) is the maximizer of profits if there were no competing imports) and since the
profit function is concave in pt(i), it is optimal for a firm producing for the domestic market
only to charge a price as close as possible to the interior optimal price (pMt (i)). But since
pMt (i) = p
M
t , as implied by (3.19), all firms will set the same price p
(2)
t = (1 + τt)p
∗. On the
other hand, producers are giving the option to sell both domestically and internationally.
the labor market is characterized by
ξ¯t = ξ¯ =
1
φ
1 + r
1 + r − λ
wS −AF
wS
l0S,t = l
0
S = L
ξ¯∫
0
(1− φξi)µ(ξi)dξi
LsU,t = L
s
U,t−1 = L
s
U,t = l
0
U from (3.16)
Le,t = Le,t−1 = Le = (1− λ) · l0e from (3.17)
LsS,t = L
s
S,t−1 = L
s
S = λl
0
e + l
0
S from 3.18) and (3.17)
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In this case they will charge the world price p∗, which is common to all varieties. So again,
the equilibrium is necessarily symmetric when it exists.
3.4 Comparative Statics
To illustrate the model’s properties with regard to international trade, abstracting from
the transitional effects of skill acquisition, we conduct various comparative statics exercises
of the model’s steady state.
3.4.1 Changing the World Price
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Figure 3.4: Steady state against world price
Figure 3.4 shows equilibrium profits in the manufacturing sector as well as price and
quantity of manufactured goods as a function of the world price. The figure uses the
baseline calibration, with agricultural productivity AF = 1, and policies τ = 0.8 and
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s = 0.05. When the world price for manufactured products is sufficiently low, domestic
firms are constrained by the cum-tariff price of imports. For very low prices domestic
production is smaller than the quantity demand at this price and there are imports of
manufactured goods (case 1 ); for somewhat higher price there is no international trade
(case 2). At higher world prices, there is a range in which the monopolistic producers
gain from the protection through import tariffs such that they can achieve their interior
optimum for sales on the domestic market (case 3 ). But for a sufficiently high world price
highest profits are earned when exporting (case 4 ). This includes a range for which not all
firms can export since the supply of skilled labor is too low - that is the range for which we
impose the asymmetric outcome, as described above. Two comments are in order. First,
for most of the range of world prices, net exports of manufactured goods are (weakly)
increasing in p∗. However, for relative world prices so high that the small open economy
specializes perfectly in manufacturing, a further increase in p∗ lowers nxM , since production
is already as high as possible but domestic consumption of M goods increases due to a
positive income effect from exporting at a higher price. But since this wealth effect only
arises when the economy is a net exporter, nxM remains positive. The second important
remark is that the patterns of trade as shown in figure 3.4 depend on the calibration in the
sense that for different parameters or policies, not all the four cases might emerge. For
instance, there are policy vectors such that the economy with domestically constrained
manufacturing firms and no imports (case 2 ) switches directly to exporting manufactures
(case 4 ) as p∗ rises.
3.4.2 Agricultural Productivity – Domestic Market Size for Manufac-
tured Goods
As a comparative statics exercise, we compare the outcome above with an economy that
has lower agricultural productivity, here AF = 0.75. We show the equilibrium outcome
in figure 3.5, where we reproduce figure 3.4, which used AF = 1, by the dotted lines.
Comparing the two shows, the higher the productivity in non-manufacturing (AF ), the
higher are the thresholds of world prices at which manufacturing firms switch their mode
of production in equilibrium.
This is due to differences in the size of the domestic market for manufactured goods
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Figure 3.5: Steady state against world price for different agricultural productivities
Notes: This graph shows the outcome in manufacturing in steady states against p∗ for AF = 0.75 (solid
line) and AF = 1 (dotted line).
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that result from the differential agricultural productivity. A rise in AF affects the economy
in two crucial ways. On the one hand, it increases the marginal productivity of labor in
the unskilled sector. As long as not all newborns acquire skills, that is ξ¯ < 1 in (3.12), this
also raises the wage rate for skilled labor (wS), which commands a premium over unskilled
labor. On the other hand, higher productivity leads to an improvement in national income
(3.9), which consumers spend overproportionally on consumption of manufactured goods
CM (3.6). This positive income effect shifts out the demand curve domestic producers are
facing, and the domestic market for manufactured goods grows.
But also the increase in skilled wages can be viewed as an increase in the domestic
market for manufactures. If the domestic monopolistic producers are unconstrained in their
price setting on the domestic market (case 3 ), they charge pM according to (3.20) as a
mark-up on their marginal cost, which have increased along with wS and AF . Their profits
(3.21) hence increase, even at constant CM , since the domestic price for manufactured goods
increases with skilled wages. In countries with more productive agriculture the autarky
relative price for manufactured goods is therefore higher. This makes it less attractive for
producers to sell their products on the world market where they take prevailing prices as a
given. Moreover, higher domestic agricultural productivity lowers profits from exporting
(Π
(4)
M ) per se, as it makes skilled labor more expensive, but does not result in higher prices
on the international market.
For the behavior of firms that can choose between monopolistically supplying the
domestic market or selling at the given world price, and receiving a subsidy per unit sold
abroad, this implies,that an increase in non-manufacturing productivity raises the threshold
of the world price at which the country starts exporting. Differences in agricultural
productivity can therefore explain in principle different reactions to similar policies. A
protected manufacturing sector in a country with a more productive agricultural sector
is more likely to choose the domestic monopoly mode of production over the export-led
mode. Because agriculture has been much more productive in Latin American countries
than in East Asian countries, this might explain why Korea or Taiwan, but not Argentina,
started to export manufactured goods, despite the similarity in policies.
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3.4.3 Trade Policies
Changes in trade policies affect the patterns of international trade. Figure 3.6 illustrates
the pattern of trade. It shows the regions in the policy space, formed by pairs of import
tariffs and export subsidies, in which manufactured goods are exported, imported, or not
traded with the rest of the world at all.
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Figure 3.6: Steady state trade patterns against trade policies
For sufficiently high export subsidies on manufactured goods, these goods are exported
in equilibrium. When protection in the form of tariffs on manufactured good is sufficiently
low, in equilibrium these products are imported. With tariffs exceeding a certain level,
manufactured goods are never imported. They are exported when export incentives are
sufficiently high; otherwise there is no international trade.
When tariffs are low and subsidies are relatively high, there is an interaction between the
two effects: As protection is low, the import-competition imposes a binding constraint on
prices in the domestic market ((1+τ)p∗). When selling domestically and exporting the unit
price is principally lower (p∗), but per unit sold abroad the producer also accrues the export
subsidy. The boundaries between the import versus the export region of manufactured
good reflects the trade-off between these two alternatives. The lower the import tariff, the
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lower is the price a producer can charge on the domestic market and the more favorable is
exporting. The boundary between importing and exporting manufactured goods hence
slopes upward for sufficiently low tariffs.
Moreover, also for tariffs exceeding the no-import-threshold the edge of the export-
region is upward sloping. Although tariffs are prohibitive, the constraint on prices in the
domestic market of (1 + τ)p∗ remains binding - domestic monopolistic firms set this price to
keep imports out of the market, but are not at their interior optimal price (pM > (1 + τ)p∗).
Only when import protection is such that firms are at their interior optimum and charging
pM ≤ (1 + τ)p∗, profits from selling domestically are independent of trade policies. Then
the boundary of the export to no-trade region is flat.
3.5 Calibration
We calibrate the model for the South Korean relative to Argentine growth take-off. Under
the assumption of permanently constant trade policies, we choose parameters to match
initial targets in the data. For Argentina we assume that it was in a steady state. But for
South Korea, that saw the end of the Korean War in 1953, we assume that it has been on
a transition path starting out with zero skilled labor in 1950, the beginning of the Korean
War. This is motivated with Krueger (1979)’s observation that before Korea’s division the
North was specialized in manufacturing, with the South specializing in agriculture and
mining. In our numerical experiment we will then assume that in 1960 the path of actually
policies gets revealed, and subsequently implemented.
We take as many parameters as possible from the existing literature and choose
the remaining ones to match moments in the data. As in Caselli and Coleman (2001),
we calibrate the model such that education ‘does not spill’ from one period to another.
Therefore we set the length of a model period to 5 years. Also as Caselli and Coleman (2001),
we assume for the utility function u(Ct) = log(Ct) and for the parameters governing the
consumption aggregator (3.1) θ = 0.01 and γ = 0.2205. Moreover we take the idiosyncratic
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cost of skill acquisition ξi ∼ µ(ξi) as
µ(ξi) =
 3(ξi)2 for 0 ≤ ξi ≤ 10 otherwise (3.27)
We set λ to match the average life-expectancy in Argentina and Korea. In data from
the World Bank, the average life-expectancy at birth over 1960–2008 is 70.16. Assuming
that workers would leave the labor force at age 66, and if not acquiring skills enter the
labor force at age 14, we set λ = 0.904, which corresponds to an expected time in the
labor force of 52 years (or 10.4 model periods). For the discount factor we assume a factor
of 0.95 a year, implying for our model at five year frequency β = 0.7738. The elasticity
of substitution between the different varieties of manufactured goods is set to ε = 3.5,
consistent with Broda and Weinstein (2006)’s estimates based on disaggregated US imports
data. Moreover, we normalize AM = 1 and L = 1.
6
Table 3.1: Tariffs and subsidies to feed into the model
Year τARGt τ
KOR
t s
ARG
t s
KOR
t
1950 0.2145 0.2362 0 0
1955 0.8931 0.2831 0 0
1960 1.4704 0.484 0 0.9466
1965 1.0046 0.4162 0 0.274
1970 0.4406 0.3759 0 0.2816
1975 0.3603 0.3063 0 0.1954
1980 0.28 0.247 0 0.2033
1985 0.2843 0.2283 0
1990 0.193 0.1372 0
1995 0.131 0.0903 0
2000 0.1503 0.0948 0
2005 0.1174 0.0879 0
2010 0.0978 0.0875 0
For the history of industrial policies we draw on various sources, our reading of
the economic history literature and the World Bank’s data on average collected tariffs.
Whenever available, we take the World Bank’s data on average tariffs. For all other years,
we take values reported in the literature. We linearly interpolate the tariffs between the
6Over 1960–2010, the population in both Argentina and Korea has increased, but the population in
Korea relative to Argentina has been roughly constant, with fluctuations only between 1.2 and 1.35.
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years with data, and add the contributions of other import measures taken, such as foreign
exchange taxes, special tariffs, and estimated contribution of quantitative restrictions of
imports. For policies in South Korea, our main source for a quantification of import
protection and export promotion in manufacturing is Kim (1991), which we supplement
with various other sources that we report in table 3.5 of the appendix. For historic values
of Argentine import tariffs we mainly rely on Amsden (2001); the details are given in
appendix table 3.6.
Since we do not have consistent data on export subsidies for Argentina, we could in
principle use our model to infer subsidies. As illustrated in figure 3.6, we could employ
net export data to use the model to back out export subsidies for manufactures sjt, for
country j in year t, conditional on all other parameters. However, in the data, taking five
year averages, Argentina has been a net importer of manufactures in all periods since 1960.
As a consequence the model cannot pin down an export subsidy for manufactures– while
the export incentive was in place, in our model the average firm in manufacturing would
not take it. Therefore we set for periods with net imports of manufactured goods export
subsidies to zero. Finally we take non-overlapping 5-year averages of import tariffs and
export subsidies, since our model is calibrated to a five year frequency. We list the histories
of import tariffs and export subsidies that we feed into the model in table 3.1. We assume
that in the final steady state there are no policy measures taken and τ = s = 0. For the
periods after the last observed value, we impose a linear decline in the measures to their
steady state values of zero over 50 years.
All parameters fixed so far are summarized table 3.2. There are five remaining para-
Table 3.2: Fixed parameters
Description Value
L population size 1 (normalization)
AM productivity in manufacturing 1 (normalization)
β discount factor 0.7738
λ survival probability 0.904
ε CES elasticity of M varieties 3.5 (Broda and Weinstein (2006))
θ asymptotic expenditure share on F goods 0.01 (Caselli and Coleman (2001))
γ subsistence level in CF 0.2205 (Caselli and Coleman (2001))
Notes: The model is calibrated to a five years frequency.
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meters, α, φ, p∗, AARGF , A
ARG
F , to be calibrated jointly against targets in the data, which
we list in table 3.3. While we would like to choose parameter values to match moments
in the data for one base year prior to 1960, when the Korean policy change took place,
due to data limitations we cannot. We are aiming at matching relative GDP per capita of
South Korea and Argentina, the share of unskilled labor in both countries, and the share
of net exports in GDP in the two countries.
Table 3.3: Calibration targets
Moments to Match Data Model
calibration to 1955 transition in 1960
Unskilled Labor Share: LULU+LS
Argentina 18.38% in 1960 12.11% 12.28%
South Korea 66.60% in 1960 87.69% 73.88%
Net Export of Manufactures (share of GDP): p
∗nxM
GDP
Argentina -4.29% in 1962 0 -0.51%
Korea -7.82% in 1962 -7.71% -15.22%
Relative real (chain weighted) per Capita GDP:
Y ARGF +p
∗Y ARGM
Y KORF +p
∗Y AKORM
Argentina to Korea 4.68 in 1955 3.7570 7.2516
For the value share of net manufacturing exports in GDP, we combine several data
series published by the World Bank: We multiply ”Manufactures exports (% of merchandise
exports)” by ”Merchandise exports (current US$)” and ”Manufactures imports (% of
merchandise imports)” by ”Merchandise imports (current US$)”, take their difference and
divide by ”GDP (current US$)”. This series starts in 1962. For the share of unskilled labor
we employ data from the ILO’s LABORSTA Database, Table 1c, to compute the share of
employment in agriculture and farming in total employment (excluding the unemployed);
we can go back until 1960. For GDP, which in the model is defined as GDP = YF + p
∗YM ,
we have data from the World Penn Tables Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain
series) already since 1953.
As explained above, for the calibration exercise we assume that both economies were
under constant industrial policies before 1960 (Argentina was in steady state and Korea in a
transition from zero skilled labor in 1950) and that in 1960 the path of actually policies gets
revealed and subsequently implemented. Therefore we proceed in the following way. First,
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we choose the five parameters to match the targets for 1955, treating the statistics that
we could compute for 1960 or 1962 as the targets for 1955. The model implied statistics
from this exercise are shown in column 3 of table 3.3. Next, as we compute the model’s
transition from 1960, taking the stock of skilled labor of 1955 as the initial condition, we
can compute the model implied moments for 1960, which we list in column 4 of table 3.3.
This strategy leads to the calibrated values of the parameters shown in table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Calibrated parameters
Description Value
p∗ world relative price 1.950
α output elasticity in M sector 0.975
AjF agricultural productivity in Argentina 2.205
AjF agricultural productivity in South Korea 0.321
φ overall efficiency of education 0.9449
3.6 Results
In this section we present the model implied transition paths for the two countries, starting
with their given stock of skilled labor at the beginning of 1960, towards a long-run free-trade
steady state. As described above, we assume from the last data point a linear trend in
tariff and export policies to zero over 50 years (10 periods).
3.6.1 Transition of Argentina
Figure 3.7 shows the model implied transition path (solid lines) for Argentina under the
actual policies up to the year 2012. The dotted line shows the corresponding data.7
Starting from a very high protection, as import tariffs on manufactures are lowered over
time (top left panel), while import subsidies are constantly at zero (top mid panel), the
country imports more and more manufactured goods, and as a consequence employment in
manufacturing declines. For many periods, supply of skilled labor is in excess of demand
in manufacturing, which lowers the wage for skilled workers down to the level of unskilled
labor, and some of the skilled workforce is hired by the agricultural sector. Only in the
7The data for per capita GDP is normalized such that it takes on the 1960 value of the model analogue.
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longer run8, when the excess supply has been cleared through newborn unskilled workers
replacing older workers, the skilled wage rises again above the price for unskilled labor.
The model predicts that as import protection is lowered, the economy specializes more
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Figure 3.7: Transition path of Argentina
Notes: Given the history of import tariffs (upper-left panel) and export subsidies (upper-mid), the solid
lines show the model implied transition path. For GDP, manufacturing exports relative to GDP, share of
unskilled labor, and manufacturing’s value added share, the dotted lines show the corresponding data.
and more in agriculture. As a consequence, the value added share and net exports of
manufactures relative to GDP decline, as seen in the data, albeit the model exacerbates
these changes.
3.6.2 Transition of South Korea
Figure 3.8 shows the calibrated model’s implied transition path for South Korea and the
corresponding data (dotted line). Both import tariffs (top left panel) and export subsidies
(top mid panel) for manufactured goods were relatively high in 1960. Subsequently both
these policy measures are reduced. The economy converges to a steady state in which
8The full transition paths to the steady state, which lies in the distant future, are given in appendix 3.C.
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it specializes in manufacturing and is a net exporter of these goods. Consequently, the
share of manufactures in value added and in total employment rises. Despite the reduction
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Figure 3.8: Transition path of Korea
Notes: Given the history of import tariffs (upper-left panel) and export subsidies (upper-mid), the solid
lines show the model implied transition path. For GDP, manufacturing exports relative to GDP, share of
unskilled labor, and manufacturing’s value added share, the dotted lines show the corresponding data.
in export subsidies over time, in South Korea the manufacturing sector and its exports
keep rising. While the model predicts in principle the rise of manufacturing that we see in
the data, in terms of employment shares and value added shares it lacks somewhat in the
timing. But given that we do not assume any productivity growth or capital accumulation,
the model does remarkably well in matching the trends.
3.6.3 Comparing the Transition Experiences
While both countries see a huge decline an import tariffs, the transition experience is
very different. Despite falling incentives for Korean firms to export manufactures, the
economy’s export of manufactured goods are rising over time. In Argentina, who in the
model did not see a fall in export subsidies, net exports are predicted to decline further.
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The differential response is due to comparative advantage. As over time import tariffs
and export subsidies are removed, the economies move towards free trade. Since Korea’s
agricultural productivity is low compared to the international relative price of these goods,
its economy specializes in manufacturing and is net exporting, even in the absence of trade
policies. In Argentina on the other hand, the agricultural sector is very productive, and as
a consequence the economy exports agricultural goods and imports manufactures when
trade is liberalized.
In figure 3.9 we plot the model-implied relative performance of Korea to Argentina.
While the model predicts that Korea overtakes Argentina in terms of skilled labor, it does
not predict this for per capita GDP. This is not surprising as we do not allow for capital
accumulation.
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Figure 3.9: Relative growth experience
3.6.4 First Set of Counterfactuals: If Argentina had South Korean Policies
In figure 3.10 we show the transition Argentina, given their initial amount of skilled labor,
would have experienced if they had adopted the same import tariffs on manufactures as
Korea. Similarly figures 3.11 and 3.12 plot the transitional dynamics if Argentina had
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offered Korean export subsidies, or both policies as Korea respectively. The dashed line
replicates the transition path of the benchmark model under actual policies, and the dotted
lines show the actual data.
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Figure 3.10: If Argentina had South Korean tariffs
Notes: This solid lines show the transition path implied under counterfactual policies (displayed as solid
lines in upper-left and upper-mid panel). The dashed line replicates the transition path under actual policies
(dashed in upper-left and upper-mid). In the last four panels, the dotted lines show the data.
From these policy experiments we can draw two conclusions for Argentina. First,
measures of export promotion of Korean magnitude would not have any effect on the
Argentine economy, as figure 3.11 shows. Even with such export subsidies, our calibrated
model suggests that Argentine firms would not have opted to export, but to continue to
exploit the relatively high domestic monopoly rents. Second, if Argentina had reduced
tariffs to Korean levels (or even further), their GDP would have been higher (see figure
3.10)– due to increased gains from international trade.
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Figure 3.11: If Argentina had South Korean subsidies
Notes: This solid lines show the transition path implied under counterfactual policies (displayed as solid
lines in upper-left and upper-mid panel). The dashed line replicates the transition path under actual policies
(dashed in upper-left and upper-mid). In the last four panels, the dotted lines show the data.
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Figure 3.12: If Argentina had all South Korean policies
Notes: This solid lines show the transition path implied under counterfactual policies (displayed as solid
lines in upper-left and upper-mid panel). The dashed line replicates the transition path under actual policies
(dashed in upper-left and upper-mid). In the last four panels, the dotted lines show the data.
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3.6.5 Second Set of Counterfactuals: If South Korea had the Policies of
Argentina
Next we show the implied transition of Korea if they had adopted Argentine policies.
Figure 3.10 plots the transition under Argentine import tariffs, figure 3.11 under no export
subsidies (as in our model variant for Argentina), and figure 3.12 when both policies are as
in Argentina. Again, the dashed lines replicates the transition under the actual Korean
policies, and the dotted line the data.
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Figure 3.13: If South Korea had Argentine tariffs
Notes: This solid lines show the transition path implied under counterfactual policies (displayed as solid
lines in upper-left and upper-mid panel). The dashed line replicates the transition path under actual policies
(dashed in upper-left and upper-mid). In the last four panels, the dotted lines show the data.
The policy experiments for South Korea point out various results. Figure 3.10 shows,
if Korea had chosen tariffs on manufactures as high as the Argentine ones, it would
have affected the economy only in the 1960s, when the country was actually importing
manufactured goods. Then they would have imported less. But the calibrated model
suggests that South Korea firms would have eventually switched to exporting, even if no
export subsidies had been installed, as in figure 3.11. Therefore higher import tariffs would
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Figure 3.14: If South Korea had no export subsidies
Notes: This solid lines show the transition path implied under counterfactual policies (displayed as solid
lines in upper-left and upper-mid panel). The dashed line replicates the transition path under actual policies
(dashed in upper-left and upper-mid). In the last four panels, the dotted lines show the data.
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Figure 3.15: If South Korea had both tariffs and subsidies of Argentina
Notes: This solid lines show the transition path implied under counterfactual policies (displayed as solid
lines in upper-left and upper-mid panel). The dashed line replicates the transition path under actual policies
(dashed in upper-left and upper-mid). In the last four panels, the dotted lines show the data.
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only have had an effect before the country had build up a sufficiently large stock of skilled
labor. However, the calibrated model also suggests that export subsidies had no effect at
all on the acquisition of skills. In fact, the profits producers can achieve from exporting
are so large compared to domestic profits, that they always prefer selling abroad. As a
consequence, the continuum of producers competes for skilled workers to the extent that
the market clearing wage is so high, that all newborns choose to acquire skills (ξ¯ = 1).
With export subsidies, manufacturing firms’ labor demand is even stronger, resulting in an
even higher skilled wage, which, however, does not translate into a higher supply of skilled
workers.
3.6.6 Third Set of Counterfactuals: Keeping Initial Policies
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Figure 3.16: If Argentina had kept 1955 policies
Notes: This solid lines show the transition path implied under counterfactual policies (displayed as solid
lines in upper-left and upper-mid panel). The dashed line replicates the transition path under actual policies
(dashed in upper-left and upper-mid). In the last four panels, the dotted lines show the data.
In figures 3.16 and 3.17 we show the transition that would have occurred if both
countries kept their policies throughout time as they were in 1955. Since the calibration for
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Figure 3.17: If South Korea had kept 1955 policies
Notes: This solid lines show the transition path implied under counterfactual policies (displayed as solid
lines in upper-left and upper-mid panel). The dashed line replicates the transition path under actual policies
(dashed in upper-left and upper-mid). In the last four panels, the dotted lines show the data.
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Argentina was to steady state, keeping policies over time obviously implies that no variable
changes at all. For Korea, however, sticking to the 1955 policies permanently implies a
transition path very similar to the data and the path under actual policies (figure 3.8). This
confirms the previous finding; policies were not important in the Korean experience. The
structural change of South Korea was driven by comparative advantage in manufacturing
which was initially held back by a lack of skilled labor.
3.7 Conclusions
We find that export promotion played no important role in the South Korean growth
take-off. Comparative advantage, originating in differences in agricultural productivity,
rather than policies, is what we find key in explaining the growth experience of Argentina
and Korea. In Korea, the comparative advantage in manufacturing is so big that even in
the absence of subsidies Korean firms would have started supplying the world market. In
the 1960s Korea had been a net importer of these goods not because of policy measures,
but because it was lacking skills in the workforce. Over time, more and more workers
acquired skills, allowing a stronger expansion of production and exports of manufactures.
Argentina’s comparative advantage on the other hand lies in agriculture. Even export
subsidies at Korean levels would not have had a substantial effect on manufacturing in
Argentina, since the comparative advantage in agriculture has been too strong to make a
switch to exporting manufactures attractive.
Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Derivation of Consumer Demand
At any point in time t, a household i maximizes utility subject to his budget constraint.
This can be solved as an expenditure minimization problem. To ease notation we drop the
time subscript for now.
min
CiT ,C
i
M
CiF + PMC
i
M s.t.
(CiF − γ)θ(CiM )1−θ
θθ(1− θ)1−θ = C
i
which gives demand for F and M goods as
CiF = θP
1−θ
M C
i + γ = θEi + (1− θ)γ
CiM = (1− θ)
Ci
P θM
= (1− θ)E
i − γ
PM
where PM is the consumer price of the basket of manufactured goods and E
i = P · Ci
denotes the household’s consumption expenditure.
With the assumption of intergenerational altruism and perfect intergenerational cor-
relation of types within a dynasty, the model admits a representative consumer.9 The
9Formally,∫
CF (E
i(ξi))µ(ξi)dξi =
∫ [
θEi(ξi) + (1− θ)γ
]
µ(ξi)dξi
= θ
∫
Ei(ξi)µ(ξi)dξi + (1− θ)γ = CF
(∫
Ei(ξi)µ(ξi)dξi
)
and ∫
CM (E
i(ξi))µ(ξi)dξi = CM
(∫
Ei(ξi)µ(ξi)dξi
)
Since there is a unit mass of agents, the consumption aggregates are CF =
∫
CF (E
i(ξi))µ(ξi)dξi, CM =
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consumption-based price index is P = P 1−θM +
γ
C such that CF +PMCM = P ·C = E where
E =
∫
Ei(ξi)µ(ξi)dξi.
The minimization of expenditure on varieties i ∈ [0, 1] of the manufactured good with
corresponding prices p(i)
min
cM (i)
∫ 1
0
p(i) · cM (i) di s.t. CM =
[∫ 1
0
cM (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
gives the price index for manufactured goods
PM =
[∫ 1
0
p(i)1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
and the representative household’s consumption demand for variety i ∈ [0, 1] as
cM (i) =
(
PM
p(i)
)ε
CM for all i ∈ [0, 1]
∫
CM (E
i(ξi))µ(ξi)dξi and C =
∫
C(Ei(ξi))µ(ξi)dξi.
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3.B Histories of Trade Policies
Table 3.5: Import protection and export promotion in Korea’s manufacturing sector
Import Tariffs Export Subsidy
Year Tariff [%] +Other [%] Source World Bank For Model [%] Kim (1991) [%]
1949 10 Kim (1991); Krueger (1979) 10.00
1950 40 Westphal and Kim (1982) 40.00
1951 32.70
1952 25.4 Kim (1991) 25.40
1953 26.37
1954 27.34
1955 28.31
1956 29.28
1957 30.25 Kim (1991) 30.25
1958 7.5 Kim (1991) 39.67 130.4
1959 31.1 Kim (1991) 65.20 172.0
1960 31.28 Kim (1991); Krueger (1979) 67.30 136.2
1961 0.6 Kim (1991) 38.55 18.1
1962 39.87 0.1 Kim (1991) 39.97 16.6
1963 39.75 48.8
1964 1.5 Kim (1991) 41.12 31.3
1965 3.2 Kim (1991) 42.70 14.8
1966 2.8 Kim (1991) 42.17 19.0
1967 3.1 Kim (1991) 42.35 23.1
1968 39.12 2.2 Kim (1991) 41.32 28.1
1969 1.6 Kim (1991) 39.20 27.8
1970 1.8 Kim (1991) 37.87 28.4
1971 1.2 Kim (1991) 35.75 29.6
1972 0.8 Kim (1991) 33.82 26.9
1973 31.5 0.1 Kim (1991) 31.60 23.7
1974 0.0 Kim (1991); Krueger (1979) 31.06 21.2
1975 30.61 16.7
1976 30.17 16.9
1977 29.72 Kim (1991) 29.72 19.2
1978 27.25 19.5
1979 24.77 Kim (1991) 24.77 20.2
1980 24.19 21.3
1981 23.61
1982 23.7 23.70
1983 23.7 23.70
1984 21.88 Kim (1991) 21.9 21.90
Notes: Columns 2 and 3 show import protection in the form of tariffs and other measures, reported by the
authors of column 4. Column 5 reports the average tariffs published by the World Bank, and column 6 the
values for tariffs that we take for our model. Column 7 lists the export subsidies reported by Kim (1991).
Table 3.5 summarizes our reading of the economic history literature on South Korean
policies. Columns 2 and 3 show import tariffs and estimated contributions of other import
protection measures that were installed in certain years, e.g. a foreign exchange tax. Column
4 reports the source from which we take this information. In column 5 we report the World
Bank’s data on South Korean tariffs, taken from ”Average MFN Applied Tariff Rates in
Developing and Industrial Countries, 1981-2009 (Unweighted in %)”. Column 6 lists the
values we take for feeding into our model, for which we take averages over five years. Where
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there are gaps in the series, we interpolate linearly. Since we have World Bank data only
from 1981 onwards we have for earlier years to rely on the values reported in the economic
history literature. Comparing the World Bank data (column 6) for the early 1980s with
the values from Kim (1991), Table 3.4 ”Simple Average tariff rates”, (column 1) shows
that they are consistent. The values for export subsidies that we use in the model are
drawn from Kim (1991), Table 3.1 ”Gross [incl. indirect tax and tariff exemptions] export
subsidies”, and shown in column 7.
Table 3.6: Import protection in Argentina’s manufacturing sector
Import Tariffs of Argentina
Year Tariff [%] Source World Bank For Model [%]
1945 12.2 Amsden (2001) 12.20
1946 12.2 Amsden (2001) 12.20
1947 12.2 Amsden (2001) 12.20
1948 12.2 Amsden (2001) 12.20
1949 12.2 Amsden (2001) 12.20
1950 12.2 Amsden (2001) 12.20
1951 27.62
1952 43.04
1953 58.47
1954 73.89
1955 89.31
1956 104.73
1957 120.16
1958 135.58
1959 151 Cavallo and Cottani (1991) 151.00
1960 150.27
1961 149.53
1962 148.8 Amsden (2001) 148.80
1963 132.69
1964 116.57
1965 100.46
1966 84.34
1967 68.23
1968 52.11
1969 36 Amsden (2001) 36.00
...
1982 28 28
Notes: Columns 2 shows import tariffs reported by the authors shown in column 4. Column 5 reports the
average tariffs published by the World Bank. Column 6 shows the values for tariffs that we take for our
model.
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Similarly, we construct a series of Argentine tariffs to feed into the model. Since data
from the World Bank is only available after 1981, we use for previous years values reported
by various authors. For Argentina our main source is Amsden (2001). Table 3.6 lists the
data employed. For years where we do not have a value from the literate nor from the
World Bank database, we interpolate linearly.
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3.C Full Transition Paths
The main text shows the transition implied by the model for the periods where we can
compare to the data, up to 2010. The economy reach the steady state at a later point in
time. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show the full transition paths.
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Figure 3.18: Full transition path of Argentina
Notes: Given the history of import tariffs (upper-left panel) and export subsidies (upper-mid), the solid
lines show the model implied transition path. For GDP, manufacturing exports relative to GDP, share of
unskilled labor, and manufacturing’s value added share, the dotted lines show the corresponding data.
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Figure 3.19: Full transition path of South Korea
Notes: Given the history of import tariffs (upper-left panel) and export subsidies (upper-mid), the solid
lines show the model implied transition path. For GDP, manufacturing exports relative to GDP, share of
unskilled labor, and manufacturing’s value added share, the dotted lines show the corresponding data.
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